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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3)(j) (1953 as amended) as an appeal from an order of a court over which the Court of
Appeals does not have original jurisdiction.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Did the District Court err when it granted the Division of Family Services' Motion for

Summary Judgment and dismissed the wrongful death cause of action the Division of Family
Services with prejudice because the Division was immunefromsuit pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §63-30-10?
Standard of Appellate Review: Correction of Error. Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure; Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10(2); Ledfors v. Emory County School District,
849 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1993); Taylor v. Ogden City School Dist., 927 P.2d 159 (Utah 1996).
2.

Did the District Court err when it dismissed the Breach of Contract and Breach of the

Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing causes of action because the District Court
lacked jurisdiction to enforce the consent decree entered in David C. et al v. Leavitt et al,
Civil no. 93-C-206 W, U.S. District Court for the District of Utah?
Standard of Appellate Review: Correction of Error. Article I, §11 of the Utah
Constitution; Article VIII, §5 of the Utah Constitution; Utah Code Ann. §78-3-4(1); Tracy
Collins Bank & Trust v. Dickamore, 652 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1982); RioAlgon Corp. v. Jimco
Ltd., 618 P.2d 497 (Utah 1980); Hansen v. Green River Group, 748 P.2d 1102 (Utah Ct.
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App. 1988); State ex rel Bush v. Spurlock, 537 N.E. 2d 641(Ohio 1989).
3.

Did the District Court err when it granted the Monitoring Panel Appellees' Motion

for Summary Judgment and dismissed the Negligence cause of action against the Monitoring
Panel Appellees with prejudice because the Monitoring Appellees did not owe a duty of care
to Breanna Loveless?
Standard of Appellate Review: Correction of Error. Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure; Weber v. Springville City, 725 P.2d 1360 (Utah 1986); State ex rel Bush
v. Spurlock, 537 N.E. 2d 641(Ohio 1989).
4.

Did the District Court err when it granted the Attorney Appellees' Motion for

Summary Judgment and dismissed the Negligence cause of action against the Attorney
Appellees with prejudice because the Attorney Appellees did not owe a duty of care to
Breanna Loveless?
Standard of Review: Correction of Error. Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure; Weber v. Springville City, 725 P.2d 1360 (Utah 1986).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Article I, §11 of the Utah Constitution
Article VIII, §5 of the Utah Constitution
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10
Utah Code Ann. §78-3-4(1)
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Breanna Loveless was born on May 22, 1995 to unwed parents. Her mother was
Bobbie Dawn Widdison (referred to as "Ms. Widdison"), and her father was the Appellant,
Ricky Sanders. Soon after Breanna's birth, Ricky Sanders and his mother, Meridean Sanders,
began havingfrequentand extended visitations with Breanna. From August 1995 through
December 1995, the Sanders took care of Breanna about one-half of the time. The Sanders
immediately began seeing signs neglect, including medical neglect, which took place when
Breanna was with Ms. Widdison. On September 1, 1996, when Breanna was about three
months old, Breanna was brought to the Sanders with a terrible diaper rash and untreated
yeast infection. Because of the continued and ongoing evidence of neglect, the Sanders
called the Millard County Sheriffs office to report their concerns about Breanna. The
Sanders specifically wanted to know if there was anything they could do to prevent Breanna
from being returned to Ms. Widdison and to stop the neglect to which they believed Breanna
was being subjected. The responding officer notified the Division and Pam Goodrich, a
social worker with the Division, immediately came and met with the Sanders and the
responding officer. The responding officer and Ms. Goodrich told the Sanders they had no
legal recourse to prevent Breannafrombeing returned to Ms. Widdison and that there was
nothing they could do for Breanna.
This was not thefirsttime Ms. Widdison had been reported to the Division for child
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abuse. The Division had investigated Ms. Widdison only a few years earlier in Salt Lake
City. When Breanna's half-sister, Juana, was about ten months old, her arm was broken by
a twisting motion commonly associated with abuse. Even though both bones in Juana's arm
were broken, Juana was not provided with medical treatment until her grandmother took her
to the hospital about a week after the injury occurred. Ms. Widdison was reported to the
Division who investigated and determined that the allegation of abuse was substantiated.
Even though the Division was aware of Ms. Widdison's history of neglect and abuse, Ms.
Goodrich failed to request a search of the Division's records as required by Division policy.
As a result, Ms. Goodrich failed to discover Ms. Widdison's prior history of substantiated
allegations of neglect and abuse.
Over the next several months, Breanna continued to be brought to the Sanders with
a severe untreated ear infection. The Sanders took Breanna to the doctors several times, but
even after Breanna received medical treatment, the Sanders observed that Ms. Widdison
failed to administer prescribed medications. As a result, Breanna's ear infections persisted
for about four months and tubes were finally put into Breanna's ears on about January 3,
1996. During this time, Ricky Sanders continued to have conversations with Ms. Goodrich
in which he expressed his continuing concerns about Breanna's health and safety. Ricky
Sanders encouraged Ms. Goodrich to take action to take custody of Breanna. Ms. Goodrich
told Ricky Sanders that there was nothing she could do legally and told him hire his own
attorney.

4

On January 12, 1996, Ms. Widdison brought Breanna to the Sanders with a severe
nose infection, grotesque sores under her nose and a cut under her lower lip. The Sanders
also noticed that the medication prescribed for Breanna on January 3, 1996 had not been
administered by Ms. Widdison. In fact, the seal on the medication bottle had not even been
broken. Breanna also had strange looking bruises on her face that looked like a hand print.
The Sanders took Breanna to the doctor for treatment and Breanna was diagnosed with a
nose infection, bronchitis, persistent diarrhea, and severe diaper rash. As the Sanders were
leaving the doctor's office, one of the nurses said that the bruises looked like they were
caused by abuse. The nurse encouraged the Sanders to take Breanna to the emergency room
of the hospital and let the emergency room nurses look at the bruises. The emergency room
nurses agreed that the bruises looked like they were caused by abuse and one of the nurses
called Ms. Goodrich. Ms. Goodrich immediately came to the emergency room and met with
the Sanders and looked at Breanna. Ms. Goodrich told the Sanders that she would go visit
Ms. Widdison and call them later that day.
The Sanders returned home to wait for Ms. Goodrich's call; however, the first call the
Sanders received wasfromMs. Widdison. Ms. Widdison called Mrs. Sanders and demanded
to know whether the Sanders had sent Ms. Goodrich to her home. Because Mrs. Sanders
thought Ms. Widdison already knew why Ms. Goodrich had gone to her home, Mrs. Sanders
told Ms, Widdison about the meeting at the emergency room. Ms. Widdison became very
angry and told Mrs. Sanders that she no longer had a granddaughter and that the Sanders
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would never see Breanna again. Later that day, Ms. Goodrich called Mrs. Sanders and said
she had been to Ms. Widdisonfs home. Ms. Goodrich said she had told Ms. Widdison that
she had received an anonymous complaint about the cleanliness of Ms. Widdison1 s home and
had not told Ms. Widdison about her meeting with the Sanders at the hospital. Mrs. Sanders
told Ms. Goodrich she had already spoken to Ms. Widdison and that she had told Ms.
Widdison about the meeting at the emergency room. She told Ms. Goodrich that Ms.
Widdison had threatened that the Sanders would never see Breanna again and asked what
Ms. Goodrich was going to do. Ms. Goodrich told Mrs. Sanders that there was nothing she
could do because the house looked okay to her and that she had no legal basis to remove
BreannafromMs. Widdison.
On January 19, 1996, Ms. Goodrich visited Ms. Widdisoris home and found that
Breanna's nose sores were healing but found that Breanna was still sick. On January 25,
1996, Ms. Goodrich contacted the doctor's office and was told that Ms. Widdison had not
brought in a stool sample from Breanna as the doctor had requested nor had she taken
Breanna back to the doctor for a follow-up visit. On January 30,1996, Ms. Widdison took
Breanna to the doctor with injuries Ms. Widdison claimed were caused when Breanna got
caught between the mattress and the springs under the crib mattress. The treating doctor
observed that Breanna continued to have a runny nose, diarrhea, and drainagefromher ears.
On February 1,1996, Ms. Widdison told Ms. Goodrich that her ex-husband was taking her
to court to get custody of her two older children and that Ms. Widdison wanted to make sure
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she didn't have any reports of child abuse that he could use against her in court. Ms.
Widdison also told Ms. Goodrich that Ms. Widdison had not let the Sanders see Breanna
since January 12,1996, the day the Sanders had taken Breanna to the emergency room.
On about February 7,1996, Ms. Widdison called Mrs. Sanders and said her electricity
was going to be turned off. Ms. Widdison told Mrs. Sanders that she could see Breanna
again if Mrs. Sanders would give her money to pay the past due power bill. Instead of giving
Ms. Widdison money directly, Mrs. Sanders payed the past due power bill herself. Ms.
Widdison then told Mrs. Sanders that she could not see Breanna unless Mrs. Sanders gave
her an additional $20. The next day, Mrs. Sanders gave Ms. Widdison $20 and was able to
take Breanna home for an overnight visit. When Mrs. Sanders saw Breanna, she was
horrified by what she saw. She was hardly recognizable. Breannafs back was covered with
bruises and she would not put weight on one leg. After Mrs. Sanders returned home with
Breanna, Ms. Widdison called and asked if Mrs. Sanders had noticed the bruises on
Breanna's back. Mrs. Sanders told Ms. Widdison that she had. Ms. Widdison told Mrs.
Sanders that she had already taken Breanna to the doctor and that Breanna had got caught
between the mattress and the springs under the crib mattress. Mrs. Sanders was relieved to
find out that Ms. Widdison had taken Breanna to the doctor on her own and that there was
an explanation for these injuries. The Sanders and even the treating doctor didn't leam until
much later that the injuries were most likely caused by abuse and not as Ms. Widdison had
explained.
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Ms. Widdison made arrangements for Mrs. Sanders to pick up Breanna on the
afternoon of Saturday, February 10, 1996 for an overnight visit. Ms. Widdison said she
wanted to go out and celebrate her birthday. When Mrs. Sanders unexpectedly got off work
early, she called Ms. Widdison to see if she could pick Breanna up earlier than had been
arranged. Mrs. Sanders could hear Breanna screaming in the background. Ms. Widdison
told Mrs. Sanders that Breanna wasn't ready and that she couldn't pick her up early. Ms.
Widdison later told Mrs. Sanders that Breanna was crying because she was getting her diaper
changed. When Mrs. Sanders got home with Breanna, Mrs. Sanders noticed that Breanna
would cry every time Breanna was moved and she appeared to be in pain. The next morning,
Mrs. Sanders saw that Breanna's shoulder was red and swollen when she removed Breanna's
undershirt. Mrs. Sanders called the emergency room and described the injury to the
emergency room doctor. The Doctor told Mrs. Sanders to bring Breanna in immediately.
Mrs. Sanders was afraid to take Breanna to the emergency room without Ms.
Widdison because of what had happened when had taken Breanna to the emergency room
on January 12. Mrs. Sanders was afraid Ms. Widdison would get angry again and not let her
see Breanna in the future. Mrs. Sanders couldn't get in touch with Ms. Widdison by
telephone so she went to Ms. Widdison's house. Ms. Widdison told Mrs. Sanders that she
needed to get ready and that she would take Breanna to the emergency room. Mrs. Sanders
went to the hospital and waited for Ms. Widdison to arrive with Breanna; however, Ms.
Widdison never came. After Mrs. Sanders described Breanna's injury to the emergency room
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doctor, the emergency room doctor told Mrs. Sanders that he would call law enforcement if
Ms. Widdison didn't bring Breanna in. Mrs. Sanders returned to Ms. Widdisoris home to
find out what had happened. Ms. Widdison told Mrs. Sanders that Breanna had fallen asleep
and that Ms. Widdison didn't want to wake up Breanna. After Mrs. Sanders told Ms.
Widdison that the doctor was going to call law enforcement if she didn't take Breanna to the
emergency room, Ms. Widdison relented and took Breanna to the emergency room.
The emergency room doctor diagnosed Breanna with a broken collar bone and
immediately notified Ms. Goodrich of Breanna's injury. Ms. Goodrich came to the
emergency room and questioned Ms. Widdison and Mrs. Sanders. Ms. Widdison claimed
that the injury happened while Breanna was with Mrs. Sanders.

Ms. Goodrich had Ms.

Widdison tested for drugs which came up positive for opiates and benzodiazepines. Ms.
Goodrich told Mrs. Sanders that Breanna would be removed from Ms. Widdison while the
Division conducted an investigation. Ms. Goodrich gave Mrs. Sanders the name of the
person with whom Breanna would be placed and assured Mrs. Sanders that she could still
visit Breanna at the foster placement. Mrs. Sanders went home believing that Breanna would
be placed in protective custody by the Division.
The next day, Mrs. Sanders asked one of the Emergency Room nurses how Ms.
Widdison reacted when Breanna was taken away. The nurse informed Mrs. Sanders that
Breanna was not taken from Ms. Widdison and that Breanna had gone home with Ms.
Widdison. Mrs. Sanders was completely stunned and went to see Ms. Goodrich tofindout
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what happened. Ms. Goodrich told Mrs. Sanders that her boss told her that she didn't have
the authority to remove Breanna from Ms. Widdison. When Mrs. Sanders expressed her
disbelief, Ms. Goodrich assured Mrs. Sanders that she would go to Ms. Widdison's home
twice a day to visit Breanna and to make sure Breanna was all right.
Ms. Goodrich went to Ms. Widdison's home and saw Breanna on February 12 and 13,
1996; however, beginning on February 14,1996 Ms. Widdison refused to let Ms. Goodrich
see Breanna. Ms. Goodrich made an additional attempt to visit Breanna on February 20,
1996 but Ms. Widdison again refused to let Ms. Goodrich see Breanna. Despite Ms.
Widdisonfs previous history of neglect, the overwhelming evidence of Breanna's neglect and
abuse, Ms. Widdison's positive drug test, and Ms. Widdison's refusal to let Ms. Goodrich see
Breanna, Ms. Goodrich did not take custody of Breanna even though the law clearly gave her
authority to do so.
Just before midnight on the evening of February 20, 1996, Ms. Widdison's live-in
boyfriend called 911 and said that Breanna was not breathing. When the ambulance arrived,
Breanna was dead and the early stages of rigor mortis had already set in. Breanna was taken
to the Emergency Room of the hospital where she was pronounced dead upon arrival The
state medical examiner conducted an autopsy of Breanna's body and determined that the
immediate cause of Breanna's death was pneumonia. The medical examiner also found that
Breanna suffered from myocarditis, an illness that also may have been sufficient in and of
itself to be fatal.
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The Course of Proceedings
Ricky Sanders, individually and in his capacity as the Personal Representative of the
estate of Breanna Marie Loveless filed suit against the following defendants in the Third
District Court on February 20,1998:
1.

Bobbie Dawn Widdison and Travis Widdison for Wrongful Death;

2.

The State Appellees and the Division for wrongful death, Breach of Contact

and Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing;
3.

The Monitoring Panel Appellees for Negligence; and

4.

The Attorney Appellees for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Breach of Contract and

Negligence.
The causes of action against all appellees except for the Division arise from a
Settlement Agreement that was entered in the United States District Court for the District of
Utah in a matter entitled David C. et al v. Michael O. Leavitt et al, Case No. 93-C-206W.
David C. is a class action lawsuit filed by the Attorney Appellees against the State of Utah
on behalf of a class of individuals that included "all children who are or will be known to
[the Department of Human Services] by virtue of a report of abuse or neglect." Mr. Sanders
claims that Breanna Loveless was a member of the class of individuals being represented by
the Attorney Appellees and was a third party beneficiary of the Settlement Agreement. The
Monitoring Panel Appellees is a group that was established pursuant to the Settlement
Agreement to monitor compliance with the Settlement Agreement.
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The Widdison Defendants failed to respond to the plaintiffs Complaint and a default
certificate was entered against them. All other Defendants moved for summary judgment.
Disposition of Case in the District Court
The District Court took the following actions in this case:
1.

Default certificates were entered against the Widdison Defendants. Default

Certificates of the Widdison Defendants (R. 234-235); however, the District Court has
reserved the holding of a hearing on damages pending the resolution of this appeal.
Transcript ofDecember December 20, 1999 District Court Hearing (R. 750 at 31-32).
2.

The Wrongful Death cause of action was dismi ssed with prejudice against the

State Appellees on July 15, 1998 for failure to file a Notice of Claim as required by Utah
Code Ann. §63-30-12. District Court Order dated July 15,1998 (R. 239). This matter is not
being appealed.
3.

The Breach of Contract and Breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing claims against the State and Attorney Appellees was dismissed without prejudice on
July 15,1998 because the District Court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to enforce the
Settlement Agreement. District Court Orders dated July 15, 1998 (R. 236-237,239-241);
Transcript ofDecember December 20, 1999 District Court Hearing (749 at 53).
4.

The Attorney and Monitoring Panel's Motion for Summary Judgment was

granted and the negligence causes of action against the Attorney and Monitoring Panel
Appellees were dismissed with prejudice on July 15,1998 because the District Court ruled
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that these Appellees did not owe a duty of care to Breanna Loveless District Court Orders
dated July 15,1998 (R. 236-237,241); Transcript of December December 20,1999 District
Court Hearing (749 at 51).
5.

The Division of Family Services' Motion for Summary Judgment was granted

and the wrongful death cause of action against the Division of Family Services was
dismissed with prejudice on February 14,2000 because the District Court ruled that Division
of Family Services has immunity pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10(2). The District
Court certified this as a final order under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
District Court Order dated February 14, 2000 (R. 733-737).
Statement of the Facts
1.

The Attorney Appellees filed a federal action in the United States District Court,

District of Utah, titled David C, et al, v. Michael Leavitt, et aL, Case No. 93-C-206W.
David C was certified as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure on May 7,1993. The class included "[a]ll children who are or will be known to
[the Utah Department of Human Services] by virtue of a report of abuse or neglect." Order
dated August 29, 1994 (R. 197-200).
2.

Breanna Loveless became a member of the plaintiffs class in David C because she

was known to the DHS by virtue of a report of abuse or neglect. State Appellees
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss (R. 22); Department of Human Services
Fatality Review (R. 413-415).
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3.

The Attorney and State Appellees entered into a Settlement Agreement in David C.

on or about May 17,1994. Settlement Agreement (R. 49-104); Order dated August 29,1994
(R. 197-199).
4.

The provisions of the David C. Order and Settlement Agreement apply to and are

binding upon the Parties to the action, including all members of the certified Plaintiffs
classes, and their employees, heirs, successors-in-interest, and assigns. Order dated August

29,1994(R.m).
5.

The Governor of the State of Utah, the Executive Director of DHS, the Director of

DFS, and representatives of the Utah Attorney General all signed and agreed to be bound by
the terms of the Settlement Agreement. Order dated August 29, 1994 (R. 198).
6.

The Settlement Agreement created a Monitoring Panel and established a mechanism

for monitoring and oversight of the implementation of the provisions of the Settlement
Agreement. Order dated August 29, 1994 (R. 198); Settlement Agreement (R. 95-99).
7.

The medical examiner determined that Breanna's immediate cause of death was

pneumonia. Report ofExamination, Office of the Medical Examiner, Dr. Edward A. Leis,
M.D. (R. 695).
8.

The plaintiffs expert witness, Martin J. Nygaard, M.D., reviewed the Report of

Examination and agreed with Dr. Leis that Breanna died of pneumonia. Affidavit ofMartin
J. Nygaard, M.D. (R. 709).
9.

The stage of pneumonia that Breanna's autopsy revealed, while not always fatal, was
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sufficient to cause death even to a child who was otherwise perfectly healthy. Affidavit of
Martin J. Nygaard, M.D. (R. 709).
10.

Eight-month-old children who are otherwise perfectly healthy get pneumonia.

Affidavit ofMartin J. Nygaard, M.D. (R. 710).
11.

Pneumonia can progress from the point where symptoms are first detectible to the

point found in Breanna's autopsy report in as little as 2 days. Affidavit of Martin J. Nygaard,
M.D. (R.710).
12.

The medical examiner testified that it was possible that Breanna would have died even

if she had not had blunt force trauma injuries. Reporter's Partial Transcript of Trial,
Testimony ofDr. Edward Leis, May 5, 1998 (R. 450).
13.

Approximately six children die of pneumonia each year in the State of Utah who were

otherwise perfectly healthy. Reporter's Partial Transcript ofTrial, Testimony of Dr. Edward
Leis, May 5, 1998 (R. 450, 521-523).
14.

The medical examiner determined that Breanna had myocarditis, an infectious disease

of the heart, which may have been sufficient in and of itself to be the cause of Breanna's
death independent of the pneumonia. Report of Examination, Office of the Medical
Examiner, Dr. Edward A. Leis, M.D. (R. 696).
15.

The stage of myocarditis discovered by Breanna's autopsy was sufficient to cause

death even to a child who otherwise perfectly healthy. Affidavit of Martin J. Nygaard, M.D.
(R. 710-711).
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16.

Myocarditis would have most likely been identified as the cause of Breanna's if the

advanced stage of pneumonia had not been present. Affidavit ofMartin J. Nygaard, M.D.
(R. 710).
17.

Pneumonia and myocarditis are caused by a bacterial and/or viral infection and not

by blunt force trauma to the body. Affidavit of Martin J. Nygaard, M.D. (R. 710-711).
18.

Eight-month-old children who are otherwise perfectly healthy get myocarditis.

Affidavit of Martin J. Nygaard, M.D. (R. 711).
19.

Breanna's autopsy report identified the following blunt force and extremity injuries

that could have been inflicted as the result of a battery (referred to as "Breanna's Injuries"):
a.

Multiple external bruises that were in various stages of healing at the time of

her death. Report of Examination, Office of the Medical Examiner, Dr. Edward A.
Leis, M.D. (R. 695-697).
b.

Periosteal elevation and calcification in both arms consistent with her arms

being twisted. Report ofExamination, Office of the Medical Examiner, Dr. Edward
A. Leis, M.D. (R. 695-696); Reporter's Partial Transcript of Trial, Testimony of Dr.
Edward Leis, May 5, 1998 (R. 484-485).
c.

A partial spiralfractureof Breanna's left leg that was consistent with the leg

being twisted. Report of Examination, Office of the Medical Examiner, Dr. Edward
A. Leis, M.D. (R. 695-696); Reporter's Partial Transcript of Trial, Testimony of Dr.
Edward Leis, May 5, 1998 (R. 485-486).
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d.

A broken right collar bone. Report of Examination, Office of the Medical

Examiner, Dr. Edward A. Leis, M.D. (R. 695-697).
e.

A scrap behind her right ear and on her left scalp. Report of Examination,

Office of the Medical Examiner, Dr. Edward A. Leis, M.D. (R. 695-697).
f.

A torn upper frenula inside her mouth. Report ofExamination, Office of the

Medical Examiner, Dr. Edward A. Leis, M.D. (R. 695-697).
g.

A scrap/superficial cut below her lower lip. Report ofExamination, Office of

the Medical Examiner, Dr. Edward A. Leis, M.D. (R. 695-697).
h.

Severe diaper rash. Report ofExamination, Office of the Medical Examiner,

Dr. Edward A. Leis, M.D. (R. 695-697); Reporter's Partial Transcript of Trial,
Testimony ofDr. Edward Leis, May 5, 1998 (R. 477).
20.

None of Breanna's Injuries were sufficient either individually or collectively to cause

Breannafs death. Affidavit ofMartin J. Nygaard, M.D. (R. 711).
21.

Breanna's pneumonia and myocarditis were not caused by Breannafs Injuries.

Affidavit ofMartin J. Nygaard, M.D. (R. 710-711).
22.

Breanna had a medical history of chronic and persistent infectious illnesses including

the following:
a.

Chronic and persistent ear infections during the last five months of her life.

Affidavit ofMeridean Sanders (R. 715); Reporter's Partial Transcript of Proceedings,
Testimony ofDr. Robert H. Kirschner, May 11, 1998 (R. 312-313).
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b.

A nose infection within the last month of her life that increased in gravity from

January 12,1996 to February 11,1996 that could have been the cause of Breanna's
Pneumonia. Reporter 's Partial Transcript of Trial, Testimony of Dr. Edward Leis,
May 5,1998 (R. 551-552,583, note: pages 173-175 of the transcript are missing from
the record); Reporter 's Partial Transcript ofProceedings, Testimony ofDr. Robert
H. Kirschner, May 11, 1998 (R. 349).
c.

Bronchitis within the last month of her life. Reporter's Partial Transcript of

Trial, Testimony of Dr. Edward Leis, May 5, 1998 (R. 549); Reporter's Partial
Transcript ofProceedings, Testimony of Dr. Robert H. Kirschner, May 11, 1998 (R.
349).
d.

An unidentified potentially serious viral infection during last month of her life.

Reporter's Partial Transcript of Trial, Testimony ofDr. Edward Leis, May 5, 1998
(R. 538).
23.

Breanna had a history of chronic and persistent diarrhea that may have been caused

by infection. Affidavit ofMeridean Sanders (R. 714-715); Reporter's Partial Transcript of
Proceedings, Testimony ofDr. Robert H. Kirschner, May 11, 1998 (R. 314).
24.

Breanna's mother had a history of failing to seek timely medical treatment for

Breanna's infectious illnesses and failing to administer, or evenfill,prescribed medications.
Affidavit ofMeridean Sanders (R. 715); Reporter's Partial Transcript of Proceedings,
Testimony ofDr. Robert H. Kirschner, May 11, 1998 (R. 312-313).
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25.

The fact that a child has bronchitis increases the likelihood that an infection may

spread to the lungs and develop pneumonia. Reporter's Partial Transcript of Trial
Testimony ofDr. EdwardLeis, May 5, 1998 (R. 550).
26.

Breanna experienced weight loss in the last months of her life that is unusual for a

child her age which indicates that Breanna may have been insufficiently nourished.
Reporter's Partial Transcript ofTrial, Testimony of Dr. Edward Leis, May 5,1998 (R. 573);
Reporter's Partial Transcript ofProceedings, Testimony ofDr. Robert H. Kirschner, May
11, 1998 (R. 307, 367-377); Affidavit ofMartin J. Nygaard, M.D. (R. 711-712).
27.

The medical examiner found that Breanna had a depletion of lymphocytes in her

thymus at the time of her death. Report ofExamination, Office ofthe Medical Examiner, Dr.
Edward A. Leis, M.D. (R. 704).
28.

A depletion of lymphocytes affects the ability of the body tofightinfection. Affidavit

ofMartin J. Nygaard, M.D. (R. 712).
29.

Based on Breannafs medical history, it would not be unusual to find a depletion of

lymphocytes in Breanna's thymus at the time of her death. This could be explained solely
from the fact that Breanna was suffering from pneumonia and myocarditis at the time of her
death since both of these diseases cause a depletion of lymphocytes in the thymus. Even if
the depletion of lymphocytes is not completely explained by Breanna's pneumonia and
myocarditis, the depletion of lymphocytes could also be explained solely by the pneumonia
and myocarditis combined with Breanna's medical history of chronic infectious illness,
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failure on the part of Breanna's caretaker to seek timely medical treatment, and the failure of
Breanna's caretaker to administer prescribed medications. Affidavit ofMartin 1 Nygaard,
MD. (R. 712).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Attorneys representing a plaintiffs9 class owe a duty to an unnamed member of the

class; therefore, the District Court's order for summary judgment on behalf of the Attorney
Appellees should be overturned and the Appellant's negligence cause of action against the
Attorney Appellees should be remanded to the District Court for further proceedings.
2.

The Monitoring Panel appellees had contractual obligations and owed a duty to

Breanna Loveless to perform its obligations skillfully, diligently and in a workmanlike
manner; therefore, the District Court's order for summary judgment on behalf of the Monitor
Panel Appellees should be overturned the Appellant's negligence cause of action against the
Monitoring Panel Appellees should be remanded to the District Court for further
proceedings.
3;

The Breach of Contract actions were properly brought in the Third District Court;

therefore, the District Court's dismissal of the appellant's Breach of Contract actions should
be overturned and remanded to the District Court for further proceedings.
4.

Existing case law and the District Court's order for summary judgment on behalf of

the Division should be overturned and the Appellant's Wrongful Death cause of action
against the Division should be remanded to the District Court for further proceedings, or in
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the alternative, the Utah Supreme Court should clarify the casual standard required by Utah
Code Ann. §63-30-10 (2) and the District Court's order for summary judgment on behalf of
the Division should be overturned and the Appellant's Wrongful Death cause of action
against the Division should be remanded to the District Court for further proceedings because
there are genuine issues of material fact that can only be resolved by a jury.
ARGUMENT
ISSUE 1
NEGLIGENCE - ATTORNEY APPELLEES
The claims against the Attorney Appellees were dismissed because the District Court
ruled that the Attorney Appellees had no responsibility or duty in this matter. The issue
presented to the court is whether an attorney-client relationship exists between an attorney
and an unnamed member of a class being represented by the attorney.
Point 1
Attorneys owe a duty to their clients.
Once an attorney-client relationship is established, the attorney's duty is to
"use such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and
capacity commonly possess and excercise in the performance of tasks which
they undertake."
Harline v. Barker, 854 P.2d 595, 598 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Therefore, if an
attorney-client relationship was established between the Attorney Appellees and Breanna
Loveless, the Attorney Appellees owed a duty to excercise ordinary skill, prudence and
diligence on her behalf.
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Point 2
An attorney-client relationship was established between the
Attorney Appellees and Breanna Loveless.
In general, an attorney-client relationship is created by contract except when an
attorney is appointed by a court. Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716,727 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990). A contract may be expressed or implied. "Even in the absence of an express
attorney-client relationship, circumstances may give rise to an implied professional
relationship or a fiduciary duty toward the client..." Marguiles by Marguiles v. Upchurch,
696 P.2d 1195,1200 (Utah 1985).
It is undisputed that the Appellant Attorneys were never specifically retained by
Breanna Loveless; nevertheless, the Attorney Appellants filed a class action lawsuit in which
they expressly and voluntarily undertook to represent "all children who are or will become
known to the [Department of Human Services] by virtue of a report of abuse or neglect."
Breanna Loveless was the Attorney Appellees client by virtue of being a member of the class
that was represented by the Attorney Appellees. Even though Breanna Loveless was an
unnamed member of the class, the Attorney Appellees owed Breanna Loveless the same duty
to excercise ordinary skill, prudence and diligence on her behalf as they did to a named party
in the action.
Conclusion
The Attorney Appellees owed a duty to Breanna Loveless.
Because an attorney-client relationship was established between the Attorney
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Appellees and Breanna Loveless, the Attorney Appellees had a duty to excercise ordinary
skill, prudence and diligence on her behalf and the District Court's order for summary
judgment on behalf of the Attorney Appellees should be overturned and the plaintiffs
negligence cause of action against the Attorney Appellees should be remanded to District
Court for further proceedings.
ISSUE 2
NEGLIGENCE - MONITORING PANEL APPELLEES
The negligence claim against the Monitoring Panel Appellees was dismissed because
the District Court ruled that the Monitoring Panel Appellees had no duty towards Breanna.
The issue presented to the court is whether individuals who agree to monitor compliance with
a contract owe a duty to the beneficiaries of the contract.
Point 1
A negligence cause of action may arise from the breach of a
contractual obligation.
Utah law has long recognized that a negligence cause of action may arise from the
breach of a contractual obligation. Metcalfv. Mellen, 192 P. 767 (Utah 1920). "As a
general rule, there is implied in every contract for work or services a duty to perform it
skillfully, carefully, diligently and in a workmanlike manner, and a negligent failure to
observe any of these conditions is a tort, as well as a breach of contract... In other words,
the contract creates the relation out of which grows the duty to use care." 57A Am Jur 2d,
Negligence, § 120. "The prevailing rule appears to be that where there is a general duty, even
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though it arisesfromthe relation created by, or from the terms of, a contract, and that duty
is violated, either by negligent performance or negligent nonperformance, the breach of the
duty may constitute actionable negligence," 57A Am Jur 2d, Negligence, §121.
Point 2
The Monitoring Panel Appellees9 duty to Breanna Loveless
arose from its contractual obligations under the David C.
Settlement Agreement.
The Monitoring Panel, including its duties and obligations, were established pursuant
to the David C. Settlement Agreeement. The Monitoring Panel Appellees duty to Breanna
Loveless was to perform its contractual obligations skillfully, carefully, diligently and in a
workmanlike manner.
Conclusion
The Monitoring Panel Appellees owed a duty to Breanna
Loveless.
The Monitoring Panel Appellees had a duty to Breanna Loveless to perform its
contractual obligations skillfully, carefully, diligently and in a workmanlike manner and the
District Court's order for summary judgment on behalf of the Monitoring Panel Appellees
should be overturned and the plaintiffs negligence cause of action against the Monitoring
Panel Appellees should be remanded to District Court for further proceedings.
ISSUE 3
BREACH OF CONTRACT
The Breach of Contract and Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
24

Dealing causes of action were dismissed the District Court ruled that it did not have
jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement reached in a federal action. The issue
presented to the court is whether a breach of contract action may be brought in state court to
recover damages for failure to comply with contract if the contract was a settlement
agreement reached in a federal action.
Point 1
Third District Court has jurisdiction over breach of contract
actions.
Article VIII, §5 of the Utah State Constitution provides the following:
The District Court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as
limited by this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary
writs.
Article I, §11 of the Utah Constitution provides as follows:
All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall
be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
Utah Code Ann. §78-3 -4( 1) provides that "[t]he District Court has original jurisdiction
in all matters Civil and Criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited
by law." Based on the forgoing Statutes, the Third District Court has jurisdiction over a
breach of contract action.
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Point 2
Ricky Sanders filed an action to recover monetary damages
relating to a breach of contract not an action to force the
State and/or Attorney Appellees to comply with the terms of
the contract.
Ricky Sanders claims that the State and Attorney Appellees entered into a contract,
that Breanna Loveless was an intended beneficiary of the contract if not a party to the
contract, that the State and Attorney Appellees failed to perform its obligations under the
contract and that she suffered damages as a result. Ricky Sanders is seeking monetary
damages in state court against the State and Attorney Appellees for damages Breanna
Loveless suffered as a direct and proximate result of the State and Attonney Appellees9
breach of contract. Ricky Sanders is only asking that the contract be looked at on its face and
a determination made about whether the State and/or Attorney Appelees failed perform its
contractual obligations and whether Breanna Loveless suffered damages as a result. This is
within the proper jurisdiction of the District Court. Ricky Sanders is not asking the District
Court to order or force the State and/or Attorney Appellees to comply with terms of the
contract because Ricky Sanders agrees that such a remedy could only be pursued in the
Federal Court.
Conclusion
The Breach of Contract causes of action were properly
brought in the Third District Court.
The Breach of Contract actions were properly brought in the Third District Court;
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therefore, the District Court's dismissal of the appellant's Breach of Contract actions should
be overturned and remanded to the District Court for further proceedings.
ISSUE 4
DIVISION - WRONGFUL DEATH
The District Court ruled that the Division has immunity pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§63-30-10(2) which states as follows:
Immunityfromsuit of all government entities is waived for injury proximately
caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the
scope of employment except if:
(2) the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from assault, battery . . .
Point 1
Existing case law providing governmental immunity when
a nongovernmental employee commits the assault or battery
should be overturned.
Ricky Sanders does not dispute that existing case law grants governmental immunity
when an injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from an assault or battery when
a nongovernmental employee commits the assault or battery. Ledfors v. Emory County
School District, 849 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1993); Taylor v. Ogden City School District, 927 P.2d
159 (Utah 1996). However, Ricky Sanders requests that existing case law be reevaluated to
determine ifproper legal standards regarding statute interpretation were followed in previous
cases. Ledfors established the precedent that governmental immunity applies when a
nongovernmental employee commits the assault or battery; however, the Ledfors court failed
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to properly analyze the statute's language in accordance with proper legal standards
regarding statute interpretation and failed to examine the legislative intent. Therefore, Ricky
Sanders requests that the court reevaluate existing case law to determine if proper legal
standards regarding statute interpretation were followed.
A.

The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to
the intent of the legislature in light of the purpose the statute was
meant to achieve.

The Utah Supreme Court has stated:
The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent
of the legislature in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve. To
discover that intent, we look first to the plain language of the statute. In
construing a statute, we assume that "each term in the statute was used
advisedly; thus the statutory words are read literally, unless such a reading is
unreasonably confused or inoperable." Only when we find ambiguity in the
statute's plain language need we seek guidancefromthe legislative history and
relevant policy considerations.
Harmon City, Inc. v. Nelson & Senior, 907 P.2d 1162,1167 (Utah 1995). Therefore,
proper statutory interpretations requires the court to look first to the plain language of the
statute. If the literal reading of the statutes' plain language is unreasonably confused or
ambiguous, the court should not simply choose between the possible meanings, but should
seek guidance from the legislative history and relevant policy considerations.
B.

Because the plain language of Utah Code Ann. $63-30-10 is
unreasonably confused or ambiguous, the court is obligated to
seek guidance from the legislative history and relevant policy
considerations.

This court has held that language is ambiguous if the words can be understood to
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reach two or more plausible meanings. Saunders v. Sharp, 840 P.2d 796, 802 (Utah 1992).
The confusion or ambiguity relating to Utah Code Ann. 63-30-10 is whether the phrase
"except if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from . . . assault, battery .
.." is supposed to act as an independent clausefromthe preceding phrase "injury proximately
caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope of
employment" or whether it is supposed to act as a modifier to that phrase. Under the first
interpretation, immunity is provided regardless of who commits the battery. Under the
second interpretation, immunity only applies if the battery is committed by an employee
within the scope of employment. Because either position is a plausible interpretation of the
plain language of the statute, the court must find that the plain language of the statute is
unreasonably confused and ambiguous. Therefore, the court should not simply choose
between interpretations but should seek guidance from the legislative history and relevant
policy considerations.
C.

The legislative history of Utah Code Ann §63-30-10 supports
the position that immunity was only intended to be preserved
where the injury is the result of an assault or battery committed
by a government employee.

The legislative history of Utah Code Ann §63-30-10 is recited in Justice Durham's
dissenting opinion in Taylor which is offered for the court's consideration:
When the Utah Legislature considered the Governmental Immunity Act
in 1963, courts in California, Arizona, and Nevada had already abolished
sovereign immunity, resulting in a flood of lawsuits. See Floor Debate,
Statement of Senator Charles Welch, 65th Utah Leg., Gen. Sess. (Feb. 11,
1965) (House recording No. 1, side 2) [hereinafter Welch Statement]. In 1963,
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the Utah Legislature formed the Governmental Immunity Committee to study
the state's options in legislating laws governing governmental immunity.
(FN6) See H.R.J. Res. 21, 35th Utah Leg., 1963 Utah Laws 685. When the
legislature formed this committee, it was concerned about the "hardship"
imposed on parties who are injured or whose property may be damaged by
actions taken by governmental entities. See id.; cf. Hansen v. Salt Lake
County, 794 P.2d 838, 844 (Utah 1990) ("There was (and is) no place in the
structure of the Act for a grant of absolute immunity."). The careful balancing
of these concerns led to the current Utah Governmental Immunity Act. See
Floor Debate, Statement of Representative Ray Harding, 65th Utah Leg., Gen.
Sess. (Feb. 11, 1965) (House recording No. 2, side 2) [hereinafter Harding
statement].
The Governmental Immunity Committee released its report in 1964,
stating that it patterned its proposed bill after similar acts in California,
Michigan, and the Federal Tort Claims Act. Utah Legislative Council, Report
of the Governmental Immunity Committee, 67-68 (Dec. 1964) (on file with
State of Utah Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel). In
evaluating available alternatives to governmental immunity, including the
waiver of immunity for certain instances of tortious conduct, the committee
stated:
There was virtual unanimity that immunity of governmental entities
should be waived in relation to responsibility for the negligent acts or
omissions of employees (tort liability) with the exception of intentional or
willful misdeeds, discretionary acts and certain other activities where it was
felt that it is in the best interest of the public to exclude responsibility.
Id. at 61 (emphasis added.) The committee, therefore, recommended
that individuals should be able to sue the government for the negligence of its
employees, retaining immunity only where its employees' acts or omissions
were intentional or willful.
The operative language of the committee's proposed bill contained
almost the exact language subsequently used in section 63-30-10(l)(b). The
proposed bill stated:
Immunity from suite of all governmental entities is waived for injury
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee
committed within the scope of his employment except if the injury:
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^2j arises out of assault, battery, ialse imprisonment, talse arrest,
malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel,
slander, deceit, or interference with contract rights \ \
Id. at 92. The committee summarized this provision as a "[w]aiver of
immunityybr negligent acts ofemployees, except:, (2) intentional torts" Id,
at 68-69 (emphasis added). The report docs not refer to the actions of
nongovernment employees. In fact, the entire report seems to focus soleh on
the actions of government employees, not of private individuals.
The puipose of the Act as a whole also supports this interpretation.
Senator Charles Welch told the House of Representatives that this bill allowed
individuals to sue the government for its negligence "so as to make more
justice," Welch Statement, supra, Senator Welch stated that it was "not
moral" for citizens to be uncompensated for losses resulting from the
negligence of government employees. Id. He asserted that allowing suits
against governmental entities would not financially cripple those entities
because any person bringing suit would still have to prove all the legal
elements of a negligence action. See id.
Representative Harding the bill's sponsor, stated: "We say we're
imposing an additional burden possibly on the taxpayer. But why should one
individual through no fault of his own be required to bear the burden that
society is responsible for?
The bill will alleviate many injustices." See
Harding Statement, supra. In response, Representative Evans stated, "I think
we've waited long enough in the state to enact this legislation. If it costs a few
more bucks that we might have justice, I am one that is willing to afford it."
Floor Debate, Statement of Representative Richard V. Evans, 65th Utah Leg.,
Gen. Sess, (Jkb I 1, 1965) (House recording No. 3, side 1). In his closing
statement, Representative Harding urged the passage of the bill:
If we believe that a government should be responsible to the people, it
should be responsible to all of its acts, and this means the acts of its
agents. Now, at the present time, if a person commits a wrongful act
in a negligent manner, not an intentional wrong, he is found responsible
for his act by the courts, you ami 1 do. Bui a governmental agency is
not, because "the king can do no wrong," It appears to me that we
cannot allow this doctrine to remain the laws of this state, that we
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should assert ourselves and realize the responsibility that government
has to be a responsible agency, that its employees and officers must be
responsible. I believe that to allow a person to commit a wrong and
because of sovereign immunity and to hide behind the ancient doctrine
of "a king can do no wrong" is to be but an ostrich and put your head
in the sand and maybe it will go away. I think that we must accept
[our] obligations.
Harding Statement, supra.
The legislative history strongly supports the view that the legislature
intended to compensate victims injured by governmental negligence, but not
for injuries caused by intentional torts of government employees. Hence,
under the Act, the status of the intentional tortfeasor does matter. At no point
in the entire legislative record is there any reference *169 to immunizing the
state for its negligence where that negligence, together with an assault or
battery committed by any person, causes harm. It makes very little sense,
given the purposes of the statute, to say that the state is immune from suite for
its negligence because a private individual has fortuitously committed an
assault or battery also contributing to the injury. Thus, in this case, although
Taylor could have sued the District if he had tripped aind fallen into the glass,
the fortuity of his having been pushed renders it immune. Neither the
legislative history nor the purpose of the Act indicates that the legislature
intended such a result.
Our holding in Ledfors did not comport with the legislative history or
the purpose of the Act.
Taylor at 167-169.
Conclusion
Existing case law should be overturned.
Existing case law should be overturned because the plain language of Utah Code Ann.
§63-30-10(2) is unreasonably confused and ambiguous and the legislative history supports
the position that immunity was only intended to be preserved where the injury is the result
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of an assault or battery committed by a government employee; therefore, the District Court's
order

ummary judgment mi III» In ill nil llir Diuiioii

JHHIIIII

In iiiiniliiiiinl .null lln

, \ | "I'M 11!«n I,: > Wn m gfiil Death cause of action against the Division should be remanded to the
District Court for further proceedings
POINT 2
Even if the court is unwilling to overturn existing ease law,
Breanna's death did not arise out of, in connection with, or
result from a battery as a matter of law and the District
Court wrongfully granted the Divisions Motion foi
Summary Judgment
Based on the evidence contained in the record together with all reasonable inferences

natural effects of an untreated infectious disease independent of any battery inflicted injuries.
lliiiclure, the District Court wrongfully granted the Divisioii's Motion for Summary
Judgment. Ricky Sanders does not dispute that his claims against the Division arise i 11 n 1111 n
negligentactsoromissionsnl || K | } n tsion's i iti|>ln\n, s (liiiiil war pwlonnni within (lie sn nipt
of a P ..

n n -r.: unction as defined in Utah Code Ann. §63-30-2(4)(a). Unless the court is
overturn existing case law, Ricky Sanders does not dispute that pursuant to Utah

Code Ann. $oJ

\-

Immunity from suit of all government entities is waived for injury proximately
caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the
scope of employment except if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or
results from:
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(2) assault, battery...
Therefore, the court must decide whether, as a matter of law, Breanna's death arose
out of, in connection with, or resulted from a battery as claimed by the Division.
Summary Judgment is appropriate only when there are no disputes regarding material
facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure; Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231,235 (Utah 1993); State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Geary, 869 P.2d 952,954 (Utah App. 1994). The Court must
view all facts and all reasonable inferencesfromthose facts in the light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion. Day v. State, 882 P.2d 1150,1152 (Utah 1994); Katzenberger
v. State, 735 P.2d 405,408 (Utah App. 1987).
A.

The court needs to clarify the casual standard required by Utah
Code Ann. $63-30-10(2).

Ricky Sanders' position is that the casual standard required by Utah Code Ann. §6330-10(2) is met only if Breanna Loveless died as the direct result of battery inflicted injuries
or, if Breanna died of an infectious disease, that the battery iuflicted injuries contributed in
some meaningful and material way to Breanna's death. In the majority of cases relied on by
the Division in its Motion for Summary Judgment, the plaintiff suffered injuries that were
the direct result of an assault and battery. Ledfors v. Emery County School District, 849 P.2d
1162 (Utah 1993); Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 1993); Tiede v. State,
915 P.2d 500 (Utah 1996); Malcom v. State, 878 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1994); S.H. v. State, 865
P.2d 1363 (Utah 1993). In those cases, the plaintiff was either beat up, stabbed, murdered,
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or sexually assaulted IJnder existing case law, Ricky Sanders fully understands that the
Division would be immune from this suit if Breanna's mother had simply taken a baseball bat
.mil I i".i( liii In lir.tlit, MnViTvn, liner cases ,nv iiTdn/fiitl In llir. i\„IIISI" nl'iirlinn because
Rreanna had i i :: battery inflicted injuries that were sufficient either individually or
collectively to cause Breanna's death nor is Ricky Sanders suing the State to recover damages
for Breanna's battery inflicted injuries.
,i n h , , i \i , fin M" - « n »,' nl '• l 'htlt>r\ch<H>!Hi\t

(

P " T '"il i
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laintiff began fighting with another student. Id. at 160. During the fight,
the plaintiff was shoved into a glass window and his hand was forced through the glass. 4s
a result, the plaintiff suffered serious injuries to his haru

*«\ u*r court siau

uncontrovertea ^
>dow by the fellow student. Thus, [the plaintiffs] injuries originated, grew out of, and
flowed from [the other student's] violent conduct," Id. Ilie Taylor court held that there was
"undoubtedly 'some' causal relationship between [the plaintiffs] injury aiul ilic" I tin In,111.!!
student's] as^«
orr-rrr

IU.

In ni II I I

llu ,i niull 111 •<• I'lhiiifiH'"1 | iii|iii. "« v^ui1 I1 .nl hiive

Vviule different conclusions can be drawn from the language used by the

Taylor court, Ricky Sanders understands Taylor to mean that the Division is immune from
—'-

s if Breanna would not have contracted and diuI nl

Brea

• --..>. eiy inllii.li.il iii|iiiii". ," .( .i mmiimim .I'.II'I .u1 s<

ixlmu* HIIM.IM In I lm
auire that there be at

least some meaningful and material relationship between Breanna's battery inflicted injuries
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and the infectious disease that caused her death.
The Division, on the other hand, is arguing that the Division is immune under Utah
Code Ann. §63-30-10(2) if Breanna's battery inflicted injuries were connected in any way to
Breanna's death, no matter how remote or inconsequential that connection might be. This
appears to be an attempt by the Division to recharacterize Breanna's death as a death that was
caused by a natural disease process to a death that was caused by a battery. In this case, there
is no question that Breanna had no battery inflicted injuries that were sufficient either
individually or collectively to cause Breanna's death. There is no question that Breanna died
as the result of a natural infectious disease process. The only question is to what extent, if
any, did Breanna's battery inflicted injuries contribute to her death as the result of a natural
disease process.
Because Taylor leaves unclear the casual standard required by Utah Code Ann. §6330-10(2), the Utah Supreme Court needs to clarify the law on this matter.
B.

Breanna died of an infectious disease and not from battery
inflicted injuries.

Ricky Sanders presented the following facts to the District Court. The medical
examiner determined that Breanna's immediate cause of death was pneumonia. Ricky
Sander's expert witness agreed the Breanna died of pnuemonia. The medical examiner
determined that Breanna had myocarditis which may have been sufficient in and of itself to
be the cause of Breanna's death independent of the pneumonia. Even though pneumonia was
the most likely cause of Breanna's death given the advanced stage of the pneumonia that was
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present, Myocarditis cannot be ruled out as the primary cause of 13 reai 111a':«»111, u (I I"" i m\ • 1111 »i
a n d m y o c a r d i t i s a r e c a u s e d h> a • I,II • i•• • tp ,i ml i i > ru

i ill i hndv. Breanna's

IICIMH

following physical injuries that could have been inflicted as the
result

of a batter}- (referred to as "Breanna's Injuries11); Multiple external bruises that were

in various stages of healing at the time of her death, a partial spiral fraciu., -. \ - • *
left leg that was consistent w ill) (In leg hem}.!, I wislcil, periosteal ele\ a
i I Ili iinii'i (Li!

i calcification

i i iiiiisislciil nith her arm being twisted, a broken right collarbone, a

scrap behind her right ear and on her left scalp, a torn upper frenula inside her mouth; and
a scrap/superficial cut below her lowei I ip None oi"Breaima's Injuries were snil\i • iei 1in1111"i
individually or collective 1, I- , an <.* Mreanna1. dcill

11" •.»

|

lliese facts and all

reasonable interchv.es lh nil itic.se facts, a finder of fact can reasonably conclude that Breanna
died as the result of a natural infectious disease process and not from battery inflicted
injuries.
Q

Breanna could have contracted and died of an untreated
infectious disease even if she had been otherwise perfectly
healthy.

The Division was not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because a i > * *u,.
can reasonably conclude from the evidence provided linai Hreanna \

!

, aU
and

died of an untreated inlei.lious disease n n» il she had been otherwise perfectly healthy. In
••iiipporl of this statement, Ricky Sanders presented the following facts to the District Court.
The medical examiner determined that Breanna's immediate cause of death was pneumonia.
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The stage of pneumonia that Breanna's autopsy revealed, while not always fatal, was
sufficient to cause death even to a child who was otherwise perfectly healthy. Children who
are otherwise perfectly healthy contract pneumonia. Pneumonia can progressfromthe point
were symptoms arefirstdetectible to the point found in Breanna's autopsy report in as little
as 2 days. It was more than 5 daysfromthe last time Breanna saw a doctor until her death.
Pneumonia is a potentially fatal disease to an eight-and-a-half-month-old child if left
untreated. Approximately six children die of pnuemonia each year in the State of Utah that
were otherwise perfectly healthy. The medical examiner testified that it was possible that
Branna would have died even if she had not had blunt force trauma injuries. The medical
examiner determined that Breanna had myocarditis which may have been sufficient in and
of itself to be the cause of Breanna's death independent of the pneumonia. The stage of
myocarditis discovered by Breanna's autopsy was sufficient to cause death even to a child
who otherwise perfectly healthy.

Children who are otherwise perfectly healthy get

myocarditis. Based upon these facts and all reasonable inferencesfromthese facts, a finder
of fact can reasonably conclude that Breanna could have contracted and died of an untreated
infectious disease even if she had been otherwise perfectly healthy. Therefore, the Division
as not entitled to judgment as a matter of law and the Division's Motion for Summary
Judgment should have been denied.
D.

Even if a finder of fact were to reject the previous argument.
Breanna was not otherwise perfectly healthy and could have
contracted and died of an untreated infectious disease for
reasons completely unrelated to her blunt force trauma injuries.
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Even, if a finder of fact were to reject the previous argument, the Division is was not
entitled to a judgment as a matter o I law because n liiiiilii I hi I iiiunm link illiiill Miraima
mi i ii ill in led and din I ill ill iiiiiiiln, illi ill inleelmus disease Itir i r.isons completely unrelated to her
blunt force 'trauma injuries. In support of this statement, Ricky Sanders presented the
following facts to the District Court: Breanna had a medical history of chronic and persistent
infectious illnesses during the majority or ner ui;

i

< IIHI lib itiiJ pel si ilenl "'in' ififiYlioiis *•

* rf her life, asenuua

and persistent nose infection that increased in seriousness during the last month of her life,
bronchitis within the last month of her life, an unidentified but potentially serious \ iral
infection during the last month
persistcnl iilioiTliii, JII Ihal 111• is

tsreann.
Rreanna exnerienced a vv^iu

loss unusual in a child her age that could indicate that Breanna was receiving insufficient
nourishment. Breanna's mother also had a history of failing to seek timely medical treatment
for Breanna's infectious illn i sses and 1 ailing 10 adrninist
iiniln tiliiiiiiPi IIK iiitiiy '. iniJop^i n-> I'liU-il .1 ilcpltlioii til w mphoeytes inBreannafs Thymus.
A depletion of lymphocytes affects the ability of the body to fight infection. Based on
Breannafs medical history, it would not be unusual to find a depletion <>\ .vmphocytes in
Breanna'sthymusat lllit IIIIIC i Il liui iln HIIIIII I liiiiii. i mild In \ \\\U\\\\ ill sulk Ih liiiiii ihc lm I lh.it
Brerinna was sultmng from,, pnei

nd myocarditis at the time of her death since both

of these diseases cause a depletion of lymphocytes in the thymus. Even if the depletion of

lymphocytes is not completely explained by Breannafs pneumonia and myocarditis, the
depletion of lymphocytes could also be explained solely by the pneumonia and myocarditis
combined with Breanna's medical history of chronic infectious illness, failure on the part of
Breanna's caretaker to seek timely medical treatment, and the failure of Breanna's caretaker
to administer prescribed medications. Based upon these facts and all reasonable inferences
from these facts, a finder of fact can reasonably conclude that Breanna was in a weakened
condition and contracted and diedfromthe natural effects of an untreated infectious disease
for reasons completely unrelated to her blunt force trauma injuries. Therefore, the Division's
Motion for Summary Judgment should have been denied.
Conclusion
The District Court's order for summary judgment on behalf of
the Division should be overturned.
Breanna's death did not arise out of, in connection with, or result from a battery as a
matter of law regardless of the casual standard that may be applied. The Division cannot
demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact when all facts and reasonable
inferences arising from those facts are viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Sanders.
Based on the facts contained in the record together with all reasonable inferences arising
from those facts, a finder a fact can reasonably conclude that Breanna would have contracted
and died from the natural effects of an untreated infectious disease even if she had otherwise
been perfectly healthy. In the alternative, even if Breanna would not have contracted and
died of an infectious disease if she had been otherwise perfectly healthy, afinderof fact can
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conclude that Breanna contracted and died from the natural effects of an untreated infectious
disease for reasons completely unrelateo
n behalf of die Division should be overturned
and the Appellant's Wrongful Death cause of action against the Division should be remanded
to the District Court for further proceedings because there are genuine issues of material fact
that can only be resolved by a jury.
CONCI USION
1.

The District Court's order for summary judgment on behalf of the Attorney Appellees

should be overturned and the Appellant's negligence cause of action against the Attorney
Appellees should be remanded to div * h^i .

. ... ior ruruu
Panel

Appellees should be overturned and the Appellant's negligence cause of action against the
Monitoring Panel Appellees should be remanded lo (In District Court for further
proceedings.
3.

The Disiiit ( ( Vimi'".,, dismissal H Ihc ii^pi/ltui!*'1 Pitvu'Ji 'ilVnnlmct actions should

be overturned and remanded to the district Court for further proceedings.
4.

The District Court' s order for summary judgment on behalf of the i; * v tsion should be

overturned and the Appellant" s W rongfiil Death oust; i»(" action again-

•

1

bt: rcrrwiiiinl 1- • (In; I hsliiil "f "'«i ml I-, i furlhcr pinaTdiiip.s because the Utah Supreme Court
should overturn existing case law, or in the alternative, there are genuine issues of material

fact that can only be resolved by a jury.
Dated this 1$ day of July, 2000.

D. Kevin DeGraw
Attorney for Appellant
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ADDENDUM 1ABLI < >l ( < >NTHN'IS
ShluU s ii ill l u l c s

Article I, § 11 of the blah Constitution

1

Article VIII, § 5 of the Utah Constitution

2

Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

3

Utah

5

Annotai

Utah Code Annotated §63-30-10

/

Cited Portions of the Record (provided in order of record page numbers)
Excerpts from State Appellees' Memorandum in Support of Motion
to Dismiss (R. 20-43)
Dawd L Si'llk'Hiciil A u r m m ' h l (H •!'>• Ill I»

Federal Court Order dated 29 August, 1994 (R. 197-200)
Default Certificate, Defendant Travis Widdison (R. 234)
Default Certificate, Defendant Bobb . ;<\;,\., •.•.;..:..>
District Court < Mik'i" cl.il<
Order on Motion to Dismiss dated 24 June, 1998 (R. 238-242)
Excerpts from Reporter's Partial Transcript of Proceedings, Testimony
of Dr. Robert H. Kirschner (R. 289-3 88)
Neparlmnil nl Minimi Sen i n " . I<',ihlil\ I ' n \v\\ \\> II ' .1 v > )

Excerpts from Reporter's Partial Transcript of Trial, Testimony
of Dr. Edward Leis, May 5, 1998 (R. 423-588)

"3

Report of Examination, Office of the Medical Examiner,
Dr. Edward A. Leis, M.D. (R. 695-707)
Affidavit of Martin J. Nygaard, M.D. (R. 708-713)
Affidavit of Meridean Sanders (R. 714-716)
District Court Order dated 14 February, 2000 (R. 733-737)
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
ARTICLE I . DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
Utah. Const

[Coui: t.s opei 1.

A r t . I , § 11

(1999)

Redr ess c - . njuries .]

All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to hi m in h:I
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall
be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by
himse •' 01 counsel , any civil cause to which he is a party.
HISTORY: Const. .1 8 96.
NOTES T U DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Action under Civil

R i gl its P. ct c: Ill: II 8 :i II

Actions by court.
Actions by state.
Actions not created.
Arbitration.
Assignments.
Attorneys' dut2 es.
Criminal law,
-- Suspension of execution of death sentence.
Debt collection.
Discriminatory classification.
District court jurisdiction.
Election contest.
Forum non conveniens.
Health care professional immunity.
Injury or damage to property
Intoxicating liquor.
Land Registration Act.
Limitations.
-- Choses in action.
-- Habeas corpus.
-- Limitation of actions.
-- Statutory limitation of revi ew
No - f au. It statute.
Occupational disease law.
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
ARTICLE VIII. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Utah Const. Art. VIII, § 5
§ 5.

(1999)

[Jurisdiction of district court and other courts -- Right of appeal.]

The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as
limited by this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary
writs. The district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by
statute. The jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and appellate,
shall be provided by statute. Except for matters filed originally with the
Supreme Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the court of
original jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause.
HISTORY: Const. 1896; L. 1943, S.J.R. 2; 1984 (2nd S.S.), S.J.R. 1.
NOTES:

COMPILER'S NOTES. --Provisions similar to those in this section were formerly
found in Art. VIII, Sees. 7, 8 and 9.
CROSS-REFERENCES. --Original and appellate jurisdiction, § 78-3-4.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
In general.
Appeal by the state in criminal cases.
Appeal from justice court.
Appeal where case originated in circuit court.
Appeals.
City court supervision.
Defendant's right to appeal.
District court jurisdiction.
-- Appellate.
-- Original.
Divorce decree.
Educational institution proceedings.
Equity as distinguished from law case.
Extraordinary writs.
Final judgment.
Habeas corpus.
Invoking jurisdiction.

t-

UTAH COURT RULES ANNOTATED
i $ ;. . gi.L (c) 1953-1999 by the Michie Company
A Division of Reed Elsevier Inc.
and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc.
A13 Rights Reserved
* THIS DOCUMENT IS CURRENT THROUGH CHANGES RECEIVED AS OF' FEBRUARY 10,
2 000 *
State Rules
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PART VTT. JUDGMENT
URCP Rule- .,6
Ru 1 e -•f:;

(2000)

Summan" judgment.

(ay roi claimant. A party seeking to recover up . ,. ... .^:;., -jountercla.fi. oxcross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may. at any time after the
expiration of 2 0 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a
motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part
thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a -:1a in. counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a r -ma-•"-.- -•:inmr-"' i- hi n favor
as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda
aindavits
shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4 5 0 1 . The j moment sought
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, I nterlocutory In character, may
be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine Issue as
to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief
is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as
are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed
established, and the trial shal 3 be conducted according] y.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth si ich
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facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit
shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits
to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or
further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations
or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if
appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of
a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the
court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount of
the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to incur,
including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be
adjudged guilty of contempt.
HISTORY: (Amended effective November 1, 1997.)
NOTES:
Amendment Notes. -- The 1997 amendment, in Subdivision (c), substituted the
first sentence for the former first sentence which read "The motion shall be
served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing"; deleted the
former second sentence which read "The adverse party prior to the day of hearing
may serve opposing affidavits"; and deleted "forthwith" following "rendered" in
the present second sentence.
Compiler's Notes. -- This rule is similar to Rule 56, F.R.C.P.
Cross References. -- Contempt generally, §§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Affidavit.
-- Contents.
-- Corporation.
-- Experts.
-- Inconsistency with deposition.
-- Necessity of opposing affidavits.
-- -- Resting on pleadings.
-- Objection.
-- Sufficiency.
-- -- Hearsay and opinion testimony.
-- Superseding pleadings.
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STATUTES

5
PAhl
> t.

JUDICIAL COI'K
COURTS
[QTDTPT

Utah K'UO^ AJUI.. ;^ t v - < H
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STATUS: CONSULT SLIP LAWS CITED BELOW FOR RECENT CHANGES TO THIS DOCUMENT
< = 1> LEXSEE 2000 Ut SB 240 -- See section 1 ] '
§ 78 3 4

Jur i s d i c t ,i on. - - Apneas

(1) The district court has ••.?! iu
criminal, not excepted in the Utah

-i 1.1 MI ,I: <* I I 'i s civiL 'and,
and not prcV - '-d by law.

(2) Tl le district court juti<: -s may issue all extraordinary writs and other
writs necessary to carry into •* - _,t their orders, judgments, and decrees.
(3) The district court has jurisdiction over matters
consistent with the rules of the Supreme Court.

.; .^AV^,. «,J-. ^ ine

(4) The district court has jurisdiction over a„]] matters properly filed in
the circuit court prior to July ] irn'
(5) The district court has appellate jurisdiction to adjudicate trials de
novo of the judgments of the justi ce court and, of the sma"n ri^-i ms department of
the district court.
(6) Appeals from the final orders, judgmc
court are under Sections 78-2-2 and 78-2a-3.
("i ) The distr ict coui t 1 las jurisdictioi i to review agency adjudicative
proceedings as set forth in Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures
Act, and shall comply with, the requirements of that chapter, ,i n its review of
agency adjudicative proceedings.
(8) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the district court has subject matter
jurisdiction in class B misdemeanors, c] ass C misdemeanors, infractions and
violations of ordinances only if
(c ,„) t: 1 i, e r € :i s i i : • j u s t i c < •••-..-<; r t: w ,:i t ,h„ t e r r i t o i :i a 1 j u i: i s d i, c t: ion;
lb) the matter was properly filed in, the circuit court prior to July 1,
iyy6;
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(c) the offense occurred within the boundaries of the municipality in
which the district courthouse is located and that municipality has not formed
§a justice court; or
(d) they are included in an indictment or information covering a single
criminal episode alleging the commission of a felony or a class A misdemeanor.
HISTORY: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Supp., 104-3-4; L. 1983, ch. 75, § 2;
1986, ch. 47, § 50; 1987, ch. 161, § 305; 1988, ch. 248, § 10; 1991, ch. 268, §
23; 1992, ch. 290, § 8; 1993, ch. 59, § 6; 1996, ch. 198, § 50; 1997, ch. 216, §
2; 1998, Ch. 313, § 1.
NOTES:
AMENDMENT NOTES. --The 1993 amendment, effective March 12, 1993, substituted
"the circuit and district court of" for "no such court exists in" and inserted
"have been merged into one court under Section 78-1-2 or 78-1-2.4" in the first
sentence in Subsection (6).
The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1996, deleted former Subsection (3),
relating to transfer of cases to circuit court; added new Subsections (3) to
(5), redesignating former Subsections (4) and (5) as (6) and (7); and deleted
former Subsection (6), providing for jurisdiction when the circuit and district
courts have been merged.
The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, added Subsection (8).
The 1998 amendment, effective July 1, 1998, deleted "between July 1, 1997,
and July 1, 1998" after "Subsection (1)" in Subsection (8).
CROSS-REFERENCES. --Constitutional delineation of jurisdiction, Utah Const.,
Art. VIII, Sec. 5.
Effect of formation of new county on pending cases, § 17-3-7.
Extraordinary relief, U.R.C.P. 65B.
Injunction, U.R.C.P. 65A.
Juvenile courts, concurrent jurisdiction with, § 78-3a-105.
Probate proceedings, §§ 75-1-301 to 75-1-311.
Time of jurisdiction, U.R.C.P. 3(b).
Venue, § 78-13-1 et seq.
Water rights, determination of, § 73-4-1 et seq.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Consent of parties.
Disciplining attorneys.
Extraterritorial powers of district judge.
Extraordinary writs.
-- Habeas corpus.
-- Mandamus.
Implied powers.
Injunctions.
Invoking jurisdiction.
Judgments of justice court.
Objections to jurisdiction.
-- Estoppel.
-- Time.
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-10 printed in FULL format.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright (c) 2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc.
one of the LEXIS Publishing companies.
All rights reserved.
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 1999 SUPPLEMENT ***
*** (1999 GENERAL SESSION) ***
*** ANNOTATIONS THROUGH 2000 UT 20 AND 2000 UT APP 5 ***
TITLE 63. STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL
CHAPTER 30. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10

(1999)

§ 63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent act or omission
of employee -- Exceptions
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed
within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of, in connection
with, or results from:
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused;
(2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious
prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit,
interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or violation of
civil rights;
(3) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or by the failure
or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, license, certificate,
approval, order, or similar authorization;
(4) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or
negligent inspection;
(5) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative
proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause;
(6) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is negligent or
intentional;
(7) riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, mob violence, and
civil disturbances;
(8) the collection of and assessment of taxes;
(9) the activities of the Utah National Guard;
(10) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or city
jail, or other place of legal confinement;
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(11) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands, any
condition existing in connection with an abandoned mine or mining operation,
§or any activity authorized by the School and Institutional Trust Lands
Administration or the Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands;
(12) research or implementation of cloud management or seeding for the
clearing of fog;
(13) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or natural disasters;
(14) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or storm systems;
(15) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being driven in
accordance with the requirements of Section 41-6-14;
(16) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any highway,
road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or
other structure located on them;
(17) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any public
building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other public improvement;
(18) the activities of:
(a) providing emergency medical assistance;
(b) fighting fire;
(c) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or
hazardous wastes;
(d) emergency evacuations; or
(e) intervening during dam emergencies; or
(19) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform any
function pursuant to Title 73, Chapter 5a or Title 73, Chapter 10 which immunity
is in addition to all other immunities granted by law.
HISTORY: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 10; 1975, ch. 194, § 11; 1982, ch. 10, § 1; 1985,
Ch. 169, § 1; 1989, Ch. 185, § 1; 1989, ch. 187, § 3; 1989, ch. 268, § 29; 1990,
Ch. 15, §§ 1, 2; 1990, ch. 319, §§ 1, 2; 1991, ch. 76, § 4; 1995, ch. 299, § 35;
1996, ch. 159, § 6; 1996, ch. 264, § 1.
NOTES:
AMENDMENT NOTES. --The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, substituted
"School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration or the Division of
Sovereign Lands and Forestry" for "Board of State Lands and Forestry" in
Subsection (11).
The 1996 amendment by ch. 159, effective July 1, 1996, added "in connection
with, or results from" to the end of the introductory paragraph; deleted "or
results from" from the beginning of Subsection (7); deleted "or in connection
with" from the beginning of Subsection (8); and substituted "Division of
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Plaintiff's minor daughter, Breanna, died on February 22,
1996 as the result of pneumonia, which resulted from and was
aggravated by the abuse and neglect to which she had been
subjected by her mother, Bobbie Dawn Widdison, and her mother's
boyfriend, Travis Widdison.
79).

(Complaint at M

15, 16, 27, and

Criminal proceedings have been instituted against Bobbie

Dawn Widdison and Travis Widdison in connection with Breanna's
death. (See Notice of Claim, attached hereto as Exhibit A, at
page 2) .1
1

The attaching of this Notice of Claim does not convert
this Motion to Dismiss to a Motion for Summary Judgment. A court
may consider exhibits attached to a defendant's motion to dismiss
when the document may be considered part of the pleadings because
the plaintiff has referred to it in their complaint and the
2

Breanna was a member of the plaintiff class in a federal
action entitled David C , et al. v. Leavitt, et al. , filed in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Utah, case number 93-C206W.

(Complaint at f 10). The parties to that action entered

into a consent decree (Settlement Agreement) on May 17, 1994, a
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B.2

Defendants

Leavitt, Steadman, and Noonan signed the agreement in their
official capacities.

Defendants Clawson and Luinstra signed the

agreement as the attorneys for the defendants in that action.
The Settlement Agreement provided for the appointment of three
persons to serve as a Monitoring Panel to determine compliance
with the consent decree (Exhibit B at p. 47-48) .

document is central to plaintiff's claim. Sheppard v. Texas
Dept. of Transportation, 158 F.R.D. 592, 595 (E.D. Tex.
1994)(relying on Venture Associates v. Zenith Date Systems, 987
F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1993); Branch v. Tunnel, 14 F.3d 449 (9th Cir.
1994), cert, denied, 114 S.Ct. 2704 (1994); Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corp. v. White Consolidated Industries, 998 F.2d 1192
(3rd Cir. 1993), cert, denied, 114 S.Ct. 687 (1994); Fudge v.
Penthouse Int'l, 840 F.2d 1012 (1st Cir. 1988), cert, denied, 488
U.S. 821 (1988); Field v. Trump, 850 F.2d 938 (2nd Cir. 1988),
cert, denied, 489 U.S. 1012 (1989).
"And where an exhibit contradicts an assertion made in the
complaint and eliminates any possible claim for relief, dismissal
is appropriate." Sheppard at 595.
2

The attaching of this Settlement Agreement does not
convert this Motion to Dismiss to a Motion for Summary Judgment.
See footnote 1.
3

The Monitoring Panel appointees (defendants Atkinson, Cotterell
and Lunt)3 were not parties to the David C. lawsuit and did not
sign the Settlement Agreement. (Exhibit B at p. 52).
Plaintiff's complaint in this action alleges causes of
action against the State defendants (Leavitt, Steadman, Noonan,
Giraham, Clawson, Luinstra, Utah State Department of Human
Services, and Division of Family Services) for wrongful death,
breach of contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.

Plaintiff also asserts a claim against

the Monitoring Panel defendants for negligence.
Plaintiff's first cause of action foisJvrongful death against
the State defendants is barred by the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act since the injuries arise out of assault and battery.

In

addition, plaintiff's first cause of action should be dismissed
against all State defendants other than DFS for failure to file a
notice of claim.

To the extent that plaintiff's complaint

purports to state claims against the individual state defendants
in their personal capacity, such claims must be dismissed on the
grounds that they are barred by governmental immunity.

3

Although the "monitoring panel" is also named as a
defendant, it is not a legal entity and has no statutory or
common law basis to be sued as an entity. It is simply a term of
convenience used in the consent decree to collectively refer to
the three individuals appointed thereunder to monitor compliance.
4

This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear
plaintiff's claims for breach of contract and breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Even if this

Court had jurisdiction, no viable cause of action has been stated
for those claims and plaintiff's second and third causes of
action should therefore be dismissed.
Plaintiff's fourth cause of action against the Monitoring
Panel defendants should be dismissed because it is barred by
quasi-judicial immunity.

It is also barred for failure to file a

notice of claim under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and
because the Monitoring Panel defendants did not owe a duty of
care to Breanna.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim presents a
question of law.

St. Benedict's Development Co. v. St.

Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991).

In reviewing a Rule

12(b)(6) motion, the court accepts all factual allegations of the
plaintiff as true.

Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah

1991).
A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
under Rule 12(b)(1) also presents a question of law and the
determining question is "whether any cause of action cognizable

5

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

DAVID C. et. al.,
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
Plaintiffs,
v.
MICHAEL LEAVITT, in his official
capacity as Governor of Utah, et.
al.,

Case No. 93-C-206W

Defendants.

On this 17th day of May, 1994, the undersigned State
Defendants and their attorneys, and the Plaintiff class and its
attorneys, hereby stipulate and agree to the following terms and
conditions for purposes of settlement of this matter.

I.

CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES

A.

Priorities for immediate statewide implementation

1.

Investigations

Except as modified in the sections which follow, all reports of
child abuse or neglect shall be investigated in compliance with
current law and policy, and the following:
• With all investigations of child abuse or neglect, the
child shall be seen or interviewed in accordance with the
priorities already established in policy (priority one-within one hour in urban areas and within three hours in
rural areas, priority two--within twenty-four hours, and
priority three--within three working days). If, due to
unforeseen
or
extraordinary
circumstances,
the
investigation time mandates are not met in an individual
case, the caseworker shall document the reasons for the
deviation from policy and report that deviation to the
Regional Director in writing.
Within 3 0 days of the report of abuse or neglect, or sooner if
necessary to ensure the child's safety and welfare, the
investigator shall:
• determine whether the child can safely remain at home
and, if not, arrange for the removal of the child from
the home.
• if the child can remain safely at home with appropriate
family services, initiate available services.
• determine whether the report of abuse/neglect is
substantiated or unsubstantiated, and if the report is
founded and removal from home or protective supervision
is necessary to protect the child, contact the attorney
general to initiate proceedings in the juvenile court.
If, due to unforeseen or extraordinary 'circumstances, the time
frames mandated for completing an investigation are not met in an
individual case, the caseworker shall document the reasons for the
deviation from policy and report that deviation to the Regional
director in writing. The Regional Director may grant an extension
of time for 30 days upon a showing of good cause.
2. Screening of abuse/neolect reports
In all cases where a decision is made not to accept and investigate
a report of abuse or neglect (under Policy #202(4)):
• The person making the report, unless the report is made
anonymously, shall be informed of this decision and the
2

INTRODUCTION
Wherever this Agreement refers to H.B. 265, the specifically
cited sections of the Bill are incorporated by reference. However,
failure to abide by time periods set forth in H.B. 265 is not a
violation of the mandates of this Agreement unless adherence to
applicable H.B. 265 time periods is specifically incorporated into
the body of this Agreement.
Definitions
•

Custody All references in this Agreement to "custody" of
the Division of Family Services mean the date of the
child'ss removal from home, unless otherwise specified
within the body of this Agreement.

•

Use of statutory definitions Except where specifically
noted, the definition of terms in this Agreement is the
same as in state statutes pertaining to child welfare in
effect during the time period of this Agreement.

•

Calculation of time periods Whenever a provision of this
Agreement sets a time period, the time period shall be
calculated in calendar days unless otherwise specified
within the body of the Agreement. Similarly, references
to "the end of the year" refer to calendar years.

•

Current law and policy References in the Agreement to
"current law and policy" include statutes, regulations
adopted pursuant to the Utah Administrative Procedures
Act, and policy as set forth in the Child Welfare Manual
and in other policies adopted by the Board of the
Division of Family Services, which are in effect during
the time period of this Agreement.

reasons for it, and referred, where appropriate, to other
agencies or community resources.
• The nature of the report and the basis for the decision
not to aRFept it shall be documented.
• No less frequently than once a month, supervisors of
screening staff shall review a sample of referrals for
each screener which were rejected for investigation ar.
the documentation supporting the decision to ensure thai
all reports meeting the statutory definitions of abuse
and/or neglect are being referred for investigation, and
needs for additional training, support, corrective
action, or discipline necessary to ensure that staff are
making proper screening decisions are identified and
fulfilled.
3. Content of investigations
All investigations shall include, among other actions necessary to
meet reasonable professional standards, all of the actions set
forth in H.B. 265, § 78-3a-304.
4. Interviews of alleged victims
It is essential to minimize the trauma to the child who is being
interviewed about suspected abuse or neglect and to thereby
increase the likelihood of ascertaining the facts. Accordingly,
whenever a child is interviewed, the child shall be allowed to have
a support person of the child's choice present (other than the
alleged perpetrator).
S££ H.B. 265, § 78-3a-304(5).
The
investigator shall inform the child of this right prior to the
interview.
Specifically, whenever a child is interviewed at
school, the child shall be allowed to have present at the interview
a member of the school staff with whom the child has a significant
relationship. The school staff member remaining in the interview
shall be required to sign a confidentiality agreement and agree to
keep all information disclosed in the interview confidential.
Each child protective and law enforcement agency shall notify all
employees who participate in the investigation of child abuse
reports of these requirementsThe Division of Family Services
staff involved in the interview shall not reveal the identity of
the child's support person to the alleged perpetrator of the abuse.
In "priority one cases" referred to in § I.A.I involving severe
maltreatment, severe physical injury or recent sexual abuse causing
trauma to the child, a medical examination of the child shall be
obtained no later than 24 hours after the report.
All
investigations of medical neglect shall include an assessment by a
health care provider within 30 days of the referral, or sooner if
indicated by the nature of the neglect. In such situations, the
opinion of the examining physician, physician's assistant or nurse
3

practitioner as to whether or not the injury is non-accidental
trauma, sexual abuse, or medical neglect shall be specifically
requested by the investigator.
If the examining health care
provider concludes that there is evidence of non-accidental trauma,
sexual abustfT*- or medical neglect, the report
shall be
substantiated.
Nothing in this section shall prevent DFS, the
parents, or the child from obtaining a second opinion about the
nature of the injury. See: H.B. 265. § 78-3a-304(2)(a) .
6. "Unable to locate" cases
No investigation of a report of abuse or neglect shall be closed on
the grounds that the investigator is unable to locate the child
until all reasonable efforts have been made to locate the child and
family members, including, but not limited to:
• visiting the home at times other than normal" work hours;
• contacting local schools;
• contacting local, county, and state law enforcement
agencies;
• checking public assistance records.
X.
Determination
whether
report
is
substantiated
or
unsubstantiated
The decision whether a report is substantiated or unsubstantiated
shall be made in light of all evidence obtained through the steps
described above. A decision whether the report is substantiated or
unsubstantiated may be based on the child's statements alone;
corroborating evidence shall not be required in all cases. Also,
if the evidence shows that abuse or neglect occurred, the
investigator's inability to identify the perpetrator shall not be
a basis for deciding that the report is unsubstantiated.
The decision shall be made on the basis of the facts at the time
the report was made; a report shall not be considered
unsubstantiated because the family corrected the conditions that
caused the abuse or neglect while the investigation was pending.
6. Documentation of reports and investigations
Records shall be kept of every report of abuse/neglect received by
DFS in accordance with the provisions of H.B. 265, § €2A-4a-116.
Within one week of the completion of an abuse/neglect
investigation, the person making the report shall be notified of
the completion of the investigation (unless the report is
anonymous). The person making the report shall be notified of the
outcome of the investigation only if the person is a part of the
child's interdisciplinary team or is otherwise an individual
authorized to receive such information in accordance with the Child
Abuse Reporting Act.
9. Revised Protocols for Investigations
By the end of 1994, DFS shall revise and adopt protocols for child
4

abuse and neglect investigations which meet accepted professional
standards and are reasonably in accordance with the recommendations
of the American Association for the Protection df Children and the
Child Welfare-ieague of America.
10. Supervision of protective services cases
No less often than every three months, supervisors shall receive
comparative data concerning each protective services caseworker's
compliance with priorities and timeliness, number of cases closed
as unable to locate, numbers of cases determined to be
substantiated and unsubstantiated, cases previously closed that
have been reopened, and number of cases opened for services.
Supervisors shall also review a random sample of each caseworker's
investigations and accompany the worker during investigations in
order to assess, among other skills, the worker's ability to
interview victims.
This information shall be used to identify problem areas and needs
for corrective action. Corrective action may include additional
training, assigning a mentor, and/or having a supervisor accompany
tne worker during investigations. Workers who fail to improve
their performance in accordance with the corrective action plan
shall be subject to disciplinary action, including probation and/or
dismissal.
11. Investigation of reports of abuse/neolect in out of home care
Investigations of reports of abuse or neglect of children in foste^
care and other out-of-home placements shall be conducted by law
enforcement personnel. All allegations of abuse or neglect of
children in out-of-home placements shall be reported by agency
staff to the director of the Division of Family Services who shall
request from law enforcement a copy of its final police report
within 3 0 days. The director shall submit the police report to the
Children's Justice Division of the Attorney General's office which
shall review the report for purposes of assuring that the
investigative standards of this Agreement have been met. If the
Attorney General's office determines that the investigative
standards have not been met, the Attorney General shall act to
ensure that a proper investigation is conducted and prosecution
initiated, if appropriate.
If the director does not receive a
police report within the 3 0 day time period, she shall so inform
the Children's Justice Division of the Attorney General's office
which shall coordinate with local law enforcement to ensure that
the investigation is completed within a reasonable time period.
Copies of all reports of abuse or neglect of children in out-ofhome placements, in which the child involved has been identified as
developmentally disabled or mentally ill, shall be provided to the
Legal Center for Persons with Disabilities.

5

12
Comprehensive Family Assessments
Witr.m 3 0 days of substantiating a report of suspected abuse or
neglect, DFS shall complete an assessment of risks to the child and
the services needed to address those risks. This assessment shall
be used in demising an individualized service plan to meet the
unique needs of the family in accordance with the provisions of §
II of this Agreement. The plan shall be completed no later than 15
days after the assessment and shall be based upon the child's and
family's needs and not just the services that are immediately
available. DFS shall implement its responsibilities under the
individualized service plan, and shall document the results of the
services provided under the plan in terms of addressing the risks
to the child. In areas where there are school-based interagency
teams under the ACT/Youth at Risk program and where a child in the
home is school-aged, such teams shall be invited to participate m
the assessment and development of the service plan.
13. Child Fatality Review
A multidisciplmary and interagency child fatality review team
shall be created which shall have responsibility for accurately
identifying, investigating, and preventing child fatalities
attributable to child abuse or neglect. The team shall be composed
of at least five members, which may include representatives of
social services, law enforcement, schools,
physician/medical
examiner, a prosecuting attorney, mental health professionals,
concerned citizens and public health representatives. The director
of the Guardian ad Litem or her designee shall be invited to attend
reviews regarding deaths of children who were in DFS custody at the
time of their death and the deaths of children for whom DFS has
received an abuse or neglect referral prior to death.
The Child Fatality Review Team shall review all deaths of children
in DFS custody and deaths of children attributed by the medical
examiner to 'homicide' or 'undetermined causes,' whether or not
identified as caused by abuse or neglect. As part of its review,
the Team shall do the following:
• determine what actions were taken by the Division of
Family Services and other public agencies before and
after the death of the child;
• determine the actual cause of death;
• recommend actions which should have been taken in the
case and;
• identify appropriate actions taken by involved staff;
• identify changes necessary to prevent future deaths;
• report its findings (including non-identifying data) to
the public.
6

II.
A.

FAMILY SERVICES
Priorities for immediate statewide implementation.

1. Service fr^entorv & needs assessment
DFS shall complete an inventory of all early
preventative, and family preservation services that
through public and private agencies and individuals,
with the provisions of H.B. 265, § 62A-4a-202 (2).
shall be distributed to caseworkers in a form usable
directory, by the end of 1994.

intervention,
are available
in accordance
The inventory
as a resource

2. Core services for families against whom an abuse or neglect
referral has been substantiated but whose children are not at
immediate risk of removal
In situations in which a report of abuse or neglect is
substantiated but in which the family does nor qualify for
intensive family preservation services as required by H.B. 265 at
§ 62A-4a-202 (3) and at § II. A. 3. of this Agreement (i.e., for
families whose children are not at immediate risk of being removed
from the home and for families which are not in crisis) , the
following core services shall be provided by DFS as long as the
family is willing to accept them:
• Home visits by a caseworker at least once per month.
• Collateral contacts to monitor the child's and family's
progress (e.g. by talking to teachers, day care providers,
therapists, and other professionals working with the child or
family) at least monthly.
• Case management (helping the family maintain eligibility for
needed benefits and services such as AFDC, food stamps,
Medicaid, etc., and accessing community resources to meet new
needs as they arise).
DFS shall implement its responsibilities under this section and
shall document its attempts at implementation as well as the
results of the services provided under the plan in terms of
addressing the risks to the child who has remained at home.
If the family refuses to accept services voluntarily, fails to
follow up on referrals made by the caseworker, or fails to benefit
from the services provided and the worker has reason to believe
that a child may be at risk, the caseworker shall discuss the case
with Attorney General staff for purposes of making a decision about
seeking court-ordered protective supervision or filing a petition
to seek removal of the child.

7

3.
Core services — intensive family preservation/reunif igar-i nr.
program.
Family preservation services shall be provided for families whose
children are at immediate risk of being removed from the home and
for families"-I* crisis in accordance with the provisions of H.B.
265,
§ 62A-4a-202. As a part of these preventive services, the
division shall provide family preservation services statewide that
are short-term, intensive, crisis intervention programs which
address the areas set forth in H.B. 265 at § 62A-4a-202 (3) . In
fulfilling the requirements of § 62A-4a-202(3), DFS shall address:
•
Eligibility determinations & case management.
Caseworkers shall assist parents in obtaining needed
benefits and services.
• Counseling & parenting-skills training. Caseworkers
shall provide (or arrange for other professionals to
provide) individual and family counseling, and training
in parenting skills and child development, as needed in
light of the problems that led to DFS intervention and
the individual situation of the family.
• Drug/alcohol assessment & treatment. Caseworkers shall
arrange for such assessment and treatment (through
coordination with the Department of Health or private
service providers) for families where alcohol or drug use
is a substantial factor in the problems leading to DFS
intervention.
• Parent-aide & homemaker services. Caseworkers shall
provide or arrange for in-home help with homemaking tasks
(such as budgeting, shopping, preparing meals, cleaning,
infant care, etc.) for families whose inability to manage
such tasks is a substantial factor in the problems
leading to DFS intervention.
DFS shall maintain the capacity to serve at least the same number
of families served by its intensive family preservationreunification programs which existed in fiscal year 1993.
If the family refuses to accept services voluntarily, fai"s to
follow up on referrals made by the caseworker, or fails to benefit
from the services provided and the worker has reason to believe
that a child may be at risk, the caseworker shall discuss the case
with Attorney General staff for purposes of making a decision about
seeking court-ordered supervision or filing a petition to seek
removal of the child.

L*

intensive fynjiy prgservatipn/r?vnific?tipn services fox

families of adolescents.
By the July 30, 1995, DHS shall complete a plan addressing the
problems of adolescents with emotional or behavioral problems who
8

have been identified to DFS as children at risk of placement in DFS
custody, with recommendations for serving this population. By the
end of 1995, DHS shall have completed a long-range plan for
statewide . implementation
of
intensive
family
preservation/reunification services for this population of
children. Implementation shall be completed by December 31, 1998.
5. Core reunification services for families of children in DFS
custody as of the date of disposition
The system of delivery of core services for families whose children
are in DFS custody after disposition by the Juvenile Court and
whose permanency goal is reunification shall include the provision
of necessary services for the family which could speed
reunification, including at least the following characteristics:
•
Eligibility
determinations
& case management.
Caseworkers shall assist parents in obtaining needed
benefits and services, including state and federal
assistance programs such as Medicaid, housing assistance,
special education, disability and employment benefits,
general assistance benefits, food stamps, AFDC, AFDCEmergency Assistance, cash assistance, and child support
enforcement assistance.
• Counseling & parenting-skills training. Caseworkers
shall provide (or arrange for other professionals to
provide) individual and family counseling, and training
in parenting skills and child development, as needed in
light of the problems that led to DFS intervention i-.nd
the individual situation of the family.
• Drug/alcohol assessment & treatment. Caseworkers shall
arrange for such assessment and treatment (through
coordination with the Department of Health or private
service providers), for families where alcohol or drug
use is a substantial factor in the problems leading to
DFS intervention.
• Parent-aide & homemaker services. Caseworkers shall
provide or arrar.ge for in-home help with homemaking tasks
(such as budgeting, shopping, preparing meals, cleaning,
infant care, etc.), for families whose inability to
manage such tasks is a substantial factor in the problems
leading to DFS intervention.
• Children in DFS custody shall be provided with visits
with their parents no less than once per week. If the
caseworker believes that such visitation would be
contrary to the welfare of the child, the caseworker
shall staff the case with the Attorney General to pursue
whether to seek a juvenile court order mandating less
frequent visits. While awaiting a court order on the
9

issue of visitation, less-frequent visitation may be
provided if, m the exercise of professional judgement
and as documented in the case file, weekly visits are
determines to be contrary to the health1and welfare of
the child. Part of the child's treatment plan shall
include the long term visitation schedule for the child
and parents. Unless otherwise ordered by a court or
impossible due to circumstances outside the control of
the agency, an initial visit shall be offered within
three working days of initial placement. For siblings,
who have lived together prior to entry into foster care
and who have a personal relationship, DFS shall arrange
for visitation at least twice a month, unless the
placements are in excess of two hours travel time apart
in which case monthly visits shall be arranged.
Mandatory sibling visitations need not be arranged if it
is notN in the best interests of the child(ren) (as
documented in the case record.) Visitation plans shall
take into account the child's age, the child's own wishes
and reactions regarding visitation, and the child's
permanency plan.
6. Aftercare services
By the end of 1994, the following basic services shall be available
to all families during the period of time in which DFS has a
continuing court order for protective supervision of a child after
a child has been returned home from foster care:
• Home visits by a caseworker at least once per month.
• Collateral contacts to monitor the child's and family's
progress (e.g. by talking to teachers, day care providers,
therapists, and other professionals working with the child or
family) at least monthly.
• Case management (helping the family maintain eligibility for
needed benefits and services such as AFDC, food stamps,
Medicaid, etc., and accessing community resources to meet new
needs as they arise).
DFS shall continue to prepare quarterly reports analyzing reasonfor-placement data from all cases in which children removed from
home had prior custody episodes and to analyze case files from a
random sample of these cases. This report shall identify practices
and services (such as caseworker monitoring, supportive services,
etc.) needed to ensure children's safety upon return home and to
prevent reentry into foster care, and shall be used in long-range
service planning.
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B.

Steps toward long-range service development

Statewide service development plan
DFS shall complete its statewide service development plan within
the time frames" set forth in the federal family preservation act.
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III.
A.

SHELTER CARE

Priorities for immediate statewide implementation.

1. Duration 56*5helter Care
Upon initial removal from the parent or guardian's home, and if
placement with a natural parent or relative (H.B. 265, § 78-3a-307)
or in a former foster home is not acceptable or available, a child
may be placed in shelter care for no longer than 14 days. If it is
necessary to extend a child's shelter care placement beyond 14
days, the case shall be screened by the out-of-home placement
committee, unless the shelter placement is mandated by juvenile
court order. The out-of-home committee may approve an extension of
a shelter care placement for an additional 14 days. If the out-of home committee denies the request for a shelter care extension, the
committee shall provide assistance in placing the child.
2. Caseworker Visits
By March 1, 1995, caseworker visits to children in shelter homes
shall meet the following schedule:
The caseworker shall visit the shelter care facility within the
first two days of the child's placement and once a week thereafter.
The purpose of these visits shall be to determine the child's
adjustment to the placement and the child's and/or shelter care
provider's need for services. These visits shall be documented in
the child's case record.

1^ Providing infprttifttiQn t? shelter cere Prpvjflers
At the time the child is placed in shelter care, the caseworker
shall provide the shelter parents whatever medical, educational,
and developmental information about the child is known to DFS.
Within 24 hours of the child's placement in shelter care, the
caseworker shall make reasonable efforts to gather information
essential to the child's safety and well-being (e.g., information
about current illness or other medical problems, prescription
medications, risks of suicide or aggressive behavior, etc.)
Reasonable efforts include an attempt to identify and obtain
information from the child's parents, physician, school teacher or
care provider. Any additional information obtained as a result of
these efforts shall be promptly provided to the shelter care
provider.

L* gJMcetiPTial Service?
Educational services shall be provided to children in shelter care
in accordance with this Agreement at § VII.
5. Multiple Placements
DFS shall identify the factors which contribute to multiple shelter
care placements, including casework practices, and characteristics
of children and shelter care providers. By the end of 1995, DFS
shall develop and implement a plan with the goal of reducing the
incidence of multiple shelter placements.
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IV.
A.

QUALITY & SAFETY OF OUT-OF-HOME CARE
Priorities for immediate statewide implementation.

1. Placement inventory & needs assessment.
DFS shall complete an inventory of all currently available out-ofhome placement resources, including foster homes, specialized
foster homes, group homes, residential treatment centers,
foster/adoptive homes, adoptive homes, etc.
• The inventory shall include out-of-home care resources
purchased directly by the DFS, those provided by private
agencies from which it purchases services, and services
available through the Divisions of Mental Health or
Services to Persons with Disabilities. All types of
substitute care resources shall be surveyed, -including
foster "homes, therapeutic foster homes, group homes,
residential treatment facilities, and independent living
resources.
For each out-of-home care resource the
inventory shall provide the name of the foster parents or
name of the director; address; type of resource;
eligibility requirements; total number of beds available;
specialized services available; the age, race and sex of
a children and adults residing in the home or facility;
the characteristics or needs of the children which the
home is licensed to accept.
•
By December 31, 1994, and thereafter on an annual
basis, using the information obtained in the out-of-home
care resources inventory database and additional data
available from regional offices regarding the number and
characteristics of the children in state custody and
their special needs, DFS shall determine the number and
types of additional out-of-home care resources necessary
to provide appropriate placements, including therapeutic
foster homes and group homes.
2. Statewide Placement Resource Recruitment and Development
By the end of 1994, DFS shall have completed a survey of regional
administrators and caseworkers to determine what kinds of out-ofhome placements are needed by children in their area, but are
unavailable or available only through waiting lists.
DFS shall
use the information gathered through its placement inventory and
needs assessment to develop a region-by-region plan by June 30,
1995 for foster parent recruitment and other placement development
activities.
The plan shall include staff time and resources
designated specifically for recruitment activities. Recruitment
criteria and activities shall reflect the types of placements
needed in each region -- 'regular1 foster homes, homes for sibling
groups, infants, adolescents, children with special needs, fosteradoptive homes, culturally appropriate homes for minority children,
etc. The plan shall be implemented on an ongoing basis and updated
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annually to reflect changing needs for placement resources.
3. Placement information system.
By the end of 1995, DFS shall have developed an efficient system
for caseworkefy-to survey available placement resources (including
information about the special skills or resources and the
limitations of each placement), to determine which available
placement will best serve the needs of each child. The information
in the system shall be updated quarterly.
DFS shall train all caseworkers to use this information system, in
conjunction with information from foster care licensor staff, to.
select the best placement for each child, in light of the placement
criteria discussed in § A.6., below).
4. Placement selection: kinship care
If a child is in the protective custody of the Division, the
Division shall report to the court at the shelter hearing whether
it has knowledge of any relatives who may be able and willing to
take temporary custody of the child.
If temporary custody is
awarded to the Division at the shelter hearing, then the caseworker
shall make reasonable efforts prior to the dispositional hearing to
identify and locate the child's relatives (non-custodial parent,
grandparents, aunts and uncles, adult siblings, etc.) Reasonable
efforts include asking the child, the parents, school teachers, and
care providers about the child's relatives and how to contact them.
The information gathered by the caseworker shall be provided to the
juvenile court at the dispositional hearing.
The decision with respect to whether placement with the other
natural parent is appropriate shall be left to the juvenile court
judge in accordance* with H.B. 265, § 78-3a-307 (1) , (2). If the
court orders DFS to conduct an investigation regarding the safety
and appropriateness of the placement, the division shall report its
findings in writing to the court. If a child is removed from the
physical custody of his parent and is not placed in the physical
custody of his other parent, the juvenile court shall determine if
there is a relative who is able and willing to care for the child
in accordance with H.B. 265, § 78-3a-307(4). DFS shall investigate
the relative's home and report in writing as ordered by the court
in accordance with H.B. 265.
Relatives interested in providing care to children in state custody
shall be informed of the option to seek guardianship of the child
pursuant to H.B. 265, §78-3a-307 (4) , as well as the option to
become licensed as a foster home to care for the child and to
receive foster care payments if the court orders DFS to remain the
temporary guardian of the child.
5. "Specific" foster homes.
By July 1, 1994, DFS shall promulgate and begin implementing a
licensing and training policy for all "specific" foster homes,
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including licensed kinship placements. The DFS Executive Team will
charter a team to oversee development of policy changes, training,
staffing requirements, and implementation plans for foster parent
training.
Children in state custody who are placed in "specific" foster homes
and kinship homefe shall receive all of the same protections and
services (e.g. health care, caseworker visits, placement support
services, etc.) as other foster children.
6. Placement selectior criteria.
Placement decisions shall be made in light of complete and accurate
information about the child's needs and currently available
placement resources.
All placement decisions shall be made in accordance with the
following criteria listed in order of priority:
• special needs or circumstances of the child; the skills,
training, and resources required to meet those needs;
including, in the case of sexually reactive children and
children with severe mental health problems, conditions
necessary to ensure the safety of the child and other children
in the home; the foster parents' willingness to work with a
child with those needs, (and, where applicable, proximity to
community resources required to meet the child's needs);
• least restrictive placement consistent with the child's
needs;
• potential for adoption if return home is unlikely (to be
considered for all children);
• placement of siblings together;
• proximity to the child's home and school;
• sensitivity to the cultural heritage and needs of
minority children (same-race placement is not required,
if the foster parents possess the skills and^resources to
ensure such sensitivity).
These criteria shall be used by placement screening committees in
making an initial choice of placement, and in all other contexts in
which in which a child's placement is selected or reviewed,
7. Placement selection upon reentry into foster care
Upon a child's reentry into foster care, the child's former foster
care provider(s) shall be notified of the child's reentry and the
caseworker shall determine their willingness to accept the child
for re-placement in their home.
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If the former foster parent is or becomes licensed and is willing
and able to accept the child, the former foster parent shall be
given a preference for placement of the child and the caseworker
shall immediately place the child in the former foster home, as
long as this" placement is consistent with the placement selection
criteria listed in § A.6, above.
Caseworkers and placement screening committees may consider a
waiver of restrictions on the number of children in a foster home.
Only the Regional Director may approve waiver requests.
6. Licensing Evaluations.
Immediate steps snail be taken to ensure the quality and safety of
all out of home placements, including licensing evaluations.
a. Licensing evaluations. No child in DFS custody shall be
placed m an out-of-home placement without a current and valid
license (including compliance with training requirements).
By the end cf 1994, all out-of-home placements shall have had
an annual reevaluation by a licensor.
All shelter homes and foster homes in which there has
been a ma]or change in the lives of the foster parents,
shall be reevaluated within one month of the change. A
ma^or change in the lives of the foster parents shall
include, but is not limited to : (1) death or serious
illness among the members of the foster family, (2)
separation or divorce; (3) loss of employment; (4) change
of residence; (5) suspected abuse or neglect of any child
in the foster home.
Licensors shall receive proper training, to be updated
annually, on the standards out-of-home placements homes and
how to evaluate compliance with these standards.
9. Special needs payments
Adequate funds shall be made available to address foster children's
educational, cultural, and recreational expenses, and DFS shall
ensure that the use of these funds is consistent statewide and that
the process of accessing them is not unduly burdensome for
caseworkers and foster parents.
10. Providing information to out-of-home care providers.
DFS shall address the crucial need of foster parents, shelter
parents, and other out-of-home care providers for complete
information about children for whom they provide care. Foster
parents shall be included as part of a child's treatment plan team,
in accordance with H.B. 265, § 62A-4a-205 (3) and providing them
with copies of the child's treatment plan in accordance with H.B.
265, § 62A-4a-205(6). All out-of-home care providers shall be
provided with the child's foster care out-of-home placement record
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•'traveling file" and all medical information which is discussed
below. All out-of-home care providers shall be provided with a
copy of the child's treatment plan and any revisions to the
treatment plan in accordance with H.B. 265.
Caseworkers shall be
background information
possible, but no more
This information shall

responsible for gathering and providing
to out-of-home care providers as soon as
than 30 days from the date of placement.
include, at least:

• Health history, current health status, and names of health
care providers;
• School records and names of teachers and counselors familiar
with the child (including preschool);
• Records and ccntact persons from any other public and
private health, mental health, social service, etc. agencies
that have worked with the child;
• Information from the natural parents about the child's needs
and habits;
• Child's current treatment plan, within 3 working days
of its completion.
Caseworkers shall also give out-of-home providers, before a
placement is made, basic available information essential to the
child's safety and welfare and the safety of other children in the
home (e.g., information about current illness or other medical
problems, prescription medications, suicide risk, risk of
aggressive behavior, etc.), which the caseworker shall obtain from
the child's prior health care providers, parents, school, etc.
Foster parent training shall discuss the right to receive such
information, and the responsibility to seek clarification or
additional information if the information received is unclear or
incomplete.
IX* Decisions affecting the foster parent or children
Foster parent due process procedures shall be established on or
before July 1, 1994 as required by the provisions of H.B. 265, §§
62A-4a-206 and 78-3a-115.
12. Foster and shelter parent grievances
DFS shall publish the phone number of the Office of Liability
Management's constituent advocate as a resource for parents to
contact in cases where their foster or shelter children's needs are
not being met through the normal process of working with the
caseworker and supervisor, and in cases where foster or shelter
parents wish to report misconduct by DFS staff.
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Foster and shelter parents may express their concerns to the
grievance council established by H.B. 265, § 6?A-4a-102(3).
13. Caseworfcatr visits.
By March 1, 1995, DFS shall have implemented the following
caseworker visitation schedule statewide:
Children in DFS custody shall be visited by their caseworker at
least once per week in their out-of-home placement during the first
four weeks of placement. After the initial month in care, the
caseworker shall visit the child at least twice per month, at least
one of those visits being m the child's out of home placement.
Each visit shall include a private conversation with the child
outside the presence of the foster parents or group home staff
except in those cases where the child is an infant or otherwise
non-communicative. The caseworker shall also regularly interview
the foster parents or providers of care. The purposes of these
visits shall be to assess the quality of the care being provided,
to determine the extent to which the child's needs are being met,
and to investigate the child's adjustment to the placement and to
school. The caseworker shall indicate the date of the visit and
summarize the results of each visit in the child's case record. If
the child or out-of-home providers inform the caseworker of unmet
needs of the child during a visit, the caseworker shall make every
reasonable effort to meet these needs, and shall document these
efforts in the case record.
14
"Red flag" reviews--statewide.
Each child's administrative review shall include a review of his or
her placement history. If a child has experienced more than two
changes of placement in one year, a "red flag" notice containing
the number of placement changes experienced and a copy of the
child's placement history shall be sent to the local Regional
Director by the caseworker and/or the administrative review team so
that special attention will be paid to the case by appropriate
supervisory staff not directly involved in providing services in
the case. This notice shall be prepared and sent within two weeks
of the third change in placement and shall serve to focus attention
on the case in order to address the issues related to placement
changes, including detailed action set forth in the treatment plan
to address the problems that may be causing or contributing to the
multiple placements. The review shall be completed within 30 days
of receipt by the Regional Director of the notice. This review
shall include interviews with the child, the caseworker and
supervisor, and the foster parents. Based upon this review, the
Regional Director shall take appropriate action (a) to determine if
the child is appropriately placed and (b) to prevent further
placement disruptions by additional interventions which may include
additional training for foster parents or requests for additional
support services for the foster parents. Changes in placement do
not include the initial placement, hospitalization, respite care,
institutionalization, or return to out-of-home placement after a
scheduled visit home.
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15. Placement support and preventing placement disruption.
DFS snail address the need for supportive services to help foster
parents meet the needs of foster children and prevent placement
disruption. _ In order to seek to prevent the disruption of a
child's placement in a foster home and to assist the foster parent
in providing proper care to a child, DFS shall establish, either
directly or through contract, placement support services to seek to
assure stable placements for children in DFS custody. The division
shall offer to specialized and structured foster parents a total of
12 days of respite care annually. The division shall offer to
basic foster parents a total of 6 days of respite care annuallv.
Crisis response and emergency medical help for serious medical or
mental health problems shall be available as needed.
DFS shall require caseworkers to determine, whenever there is a
risk of placement disruption, whether supportive services could
avoid the ne^d for a change in placement, and if so, to arrange for
these services.
DFS shall not change a child's foster placement without a
determination that the foster parents are requesting removal of the
child or the current placement does not meet the child's needs and
that a change in placement is in the child's best interest; this
determination and the reasons for it shall be documented in the
case file.
B.

Pilot Projects:

1. Foster and adoptive home recruitment.
In pilot pro]ect areas (one rural and one urban), DFS shall
intensify its efforts to recruit foster and adoptive parents and
shall explore new sources for recruitment.
Based upon the
information obtained from the resources inventory and the
Division's needs assessment (see section IV.A.1. above), the
Division shall implement recruitment plans for out-of-home care
providers on a local Regional level with the goal being to ensure
that all children are placed in the least restrictive, most familylike setting that meets their individual needs and is in close
proximity to the homes or communities where they resided prior to
entering DFS custody, and which takes into account the importance
of placing siblings together- Targeted recruitment of specialized
and therapeutic foster parents shall be conducted to address the
special needs of children in DFS custody- DFS will develop and
implement in the selected area a program to intensify its efforts
to recruit foster parents and foster parents who wish to become
adoptive parents. Foster parents who wish to be considered as
potential adoptive parents shall receive, as part of their foster
parent training, information concerning both the role of foster
parents in family reunification and the adoptive process. Foster
parent and adoptive placement recruitment efforts shall include,
^where appropriate, public and private agencies and community
groups.
An innovative system will look to new sources for
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recruiting families who can be trained to do this work and people
with education and experience in working with special needs
children who prefer to work at home. Recruiting themes shall
present a realistic picture of the difficulties of caring for
today's fostel^children and what the job entails, emphasizing the
need to work in partnership with the children, their parents, and
the Division. DFS shall also intensify its efforts to recruit
foster and adoptive parents that reflect the racial and cultural
composition of the foster care population. The purpose of these
efforts is to ensure that there is a choice of placements for a
child and that placement is not made on the basis of the first
available resource.
DFS shall also intensify its efforts to
recruit foster and adoptive parents that reflect the racial and
cultural composition of the foster care population.
At the end of July, 1995, DFS shall complete a report on the
results of these recruitment efforts, and the report shall be used
in DFS's long-ranae recruitment and placement development plan (see
§ IV.C.l, below).
2 . Peer parent program
In the pilot areas for each DFS region, DFS shall implement its
"peer parent" program, using specially trained foster parents to
assist and mentcr natural parents with the goal of family
reunification.
At the end of July 1995, DFS shall complete a report on the
problems and successes experienced in the pilot areas, any
modifications needed to ensure the program's effectiveness, and the
steps necessary to implement the program statewide. The report
shall be used in developing a long range plan for statewide
implementation of peer parenting.
C.

Long-range planning

1. Placement support services.
By the end of 1995, DFS shall develop a plan for statewide
implementation of placement support services (beyond the basic
services described above) , to help foster parents care for children
with special needs and to prevent placement disruption.
In
developing this plan, DFS will seek input from foster parents as to
their needs for supportive services, and input from caseworkers and
Regional administrators as to the common reasons for placement
disruption.
The plan will include steps for obtaining needed
resources, staff, and coordination with other agencies to ensure
statewide availability of these support services.
DFS shall implement this plan so as to achieve a measurable
reduction in the average number of placements experienced by foster
children, and measurable improvements in recruitment and retention
of foster parents, by the end of 1996.
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2. Review of utilization of specialized foster care.
By the end of July 1, 1995, DHS shall complete a review of current
utilization of foster homes receiving "specialized" care rates.
Using this review, DFS shall determine whether the qualifications
enabling foster-parents to receive specialized rates actually match
the special needs of the children placed in their homes. Based
upon this information, the Division shall develop a long range plan
for the utilization of specialized-care homes. The plan shall
include
written
standards
and
training
requirements
for
specialized-care homes, and criteria for placement of children in
these homes.
DFS shall implement this plan so that, by the end of 1996, all
homes receiving specialized-care rates shall meet the plan'?
standards and training requirements, and all placements cf childre
in specialized-care homes shall comply with the plan's placemen!
criteria.
3. Review of utilization of unpaid placements.
3y the end of 1994, DFS shall provide that all foster children are
placed in licensed foster placements and, where the foster parents
are not receiving payments, inform the providers of foster care of
the availability of foster care payments.
4. Independent living.
By the end cf 1994, DFS shall complete a plan to ensure that ail
foster children age 16 and over receive training and other services
to develop independent living skills, as described in DFS Policy
#307(4-6), and to set standards for the substantive content of that
training.
DFS shall implement this plan so that, by the end of 1996, every
child in DFS custody aged 16 and over is given independent living
services appropriate to that child's individual situation.
In
con:unction with this plan, starring January 1995, DFS shall
conduct an exit interview with all children leaving DFS custody
from an independent living program and request these children to
complete a questionnaire about the skills gained by the child while
in independent living. The questionnaire shall gather information
about the child's'current living status, services that were helpful
in achieving independence, unmet services needs., etc, DFS shall
use this information to assess the success of, and any need for
change in, the independent living program.
5. Quantifiable outcome measures for substitute care
In accordance with the provisions of H.B. 265, § 62A-4a-117, the
Director of DFS in cooperation with the Board, shall develop
quantifiable outcome measures for foster care and other substitute
care placement of children in its custody having mental health
problems.
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V.

HEALTH CARE FOR FOSTER CHILDREN

A.

P r i o r i t i e s f o r immediate s t a t e w i d e

implementation.

1. Health S e r v i c e s Advisory Committee
DFS shall form and begin utilizing the Health Services Advisory
Committee, comprised of specialists from medicine, dentistry, child
psychology and/or psychiatry and public health.
The Advisory
Committee shall help develop protocols to be followed in the
initial health screening and comprehensive health assessment of
children in DFS custody and to assist the health care coordinators
to recruit health care providers, advise DFS on contracts with
providers, and review and advise on health care components of DFS
training plans. The Advisory Committee shall include at least one
member who is a foster parent.
By the end of 1994, all DFS policy changes, health screening and
assessment protocols, provider recruitment plans, health-related
components of caseworker and foster parent training curricula, and
similar measures concerning health care for foster children shall
be reviewed and approved by this committee.
2. Health Care Coordinators
DFS
shall
hire
health
care
coordinators for each region and a state coordinator for the State
Office. These people will have responsibility for assuring that
each child in foster care receives regular health care, including
mental health services in accordance with accepted medical practice
as currently exemplified in the EPSDT(CHEC) standards- The health
care coordinators will be responsible for organizing, supporting
and monitoring the following activities:
(1) development and
monitoring of agency health policies and procedures; (2) completion
of initial health care screening; (3) collection of health history
information; (4) completion of comprehensive health assessments;
(5) assist caseworker in preparation of a health plan for each
child; (6) advising case workers on health issues; (7) assisting
case workers in collection and maintenance of health information
for each child; (8) tracking of appropriate health and mental
health care for each child; (9) recruitment and development of
service agreements or contracts with health providers; (10)
establishment of liaison with health services providers; (11)
assessment and evaluation of data about health care services; (12)
reviewing periodically the appropriateness of health plans; (13)
collaborating with the Health Department and the advisory committee
to develop and implement a plan for recruiting additional health
care providers. Regional Administrators and supervisors shall be
responsible for monitoring and providing supervision for the
performance of the above mentioned activities.
3. Health care resource survey & needs
By the end of 1994, DFS shall update and
health care providers to include all
providers, including pediatric and
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assessment.
expand its 1993 survey of
medical and dental care
adolescent health care

specialists, who are willing to accept foster children as patients.
This survey shall be distributed to all caseworkers and foster
parents in a form organized by region and usable as a resource
directory, and*fee updated annually.
In conjunction with completing and updating the survey, DFS shall
complete a comprehensive and detailed report on: which regions have
unmet
needs
for which
kinds of health care providers
(pediatricians, adolescent health care specialists, family
practitioners,
specialists
in
various
areas,
dentists,
orthodontists, etc.); and what factors affect providers' decisions
whether to treat foster children.
The results of the survey and needs assessment shall be used in
DFS's long-range plan for health care resource development (see §
V.C.2, below)\
4. Initial health screenings & treatment.
All children in DFS custody shall receive initial health screenings
as follows:
• A child who enters the custody of DFS where the reason
for removal is evidence of severe mistreatment, severe
physical injury or recent sexual abuse involving trauma
(a "priority one" case) or where there is evidence of
acute illness or injury, shall receive an initial health
screening within 24 hours of removal. All other children
who enter DFS custody shall receive an initial health
screening within 5 working days after removal from their
homes. The initial health screening may be performed by
a physician, nurse practitioner, registered nurse,
qualified E.M.T.s sanctioned by health care professionals
in rural areas, or a physician's assistant under the
supervision of a physician. In cases of allegations of
severe mistreatment or injury, a physician shall conduct
the initial health screening.
DFS will provide
authorization letters for the payment of health care at
the time of the initial screening, unless a mediraid card
is available. DFS will complete a medicaid application
within 30 days of removal of a child from her home. DFS
has entered into an agreement with the Office of Family
Support (OFS) under which medicaid applications of
children in DFS custody shall be processed on an
expedited bases.
• The out-of-home care provider should, whenever
possible, accompany the child to the initial screening.
If the care provider cannot attend, the case worker or
case aides shall accompany the child and inform the
child's care provider of the results of the screening,
and any instructions for the child's care and treatment
that develop from the screening. The care provider shall
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be informed of the name of the person performing the
screening and the names of the child's prior health care
providers, if known.
• The content of initial screenings shall comply with
CWLA Standard 2.3.1
If a child's initial screening indicates a need for further
evaluation or treatment within 3 0 days, such treatment shall be
provided as follows, within the time frame recommended by the
treating professional:
•
The case worker, in conjunction with the foster
parent, is responsible for seeing that treatment is
properly provided. The foster parent should accompany
the child to the additional medical examinations and
consult with the health care provider about the child's
health care needs.
If the foster parents do not
accompany the child, the case worker or case aide shall
accompany the child and convey the health care
information to the foster parent. After each health care
visit, the health passport (traveling record) shall be
revised as necessary. The case worker is responsible for
informing the child's parent about any medical treatment
scheduled for the child, unless prohibited by Court
Order.
Children in DFS custody shall promptly receive initial screenings,
comprehensive screenings, and all necessary treatment regardless of
their Medicaid eligibility status. If a child is not Medicaideligible at the time the health care is provided, EFS shall
guarantee payment from its own funds.
5. Gathering and maintaining health records, and providing health
information to out-of-home placements.
Accurate and complete health histories shall be gathered and
maintained for all children in DFS custody, as follows:
(a) An accurate and complete health care history for a
child in DFS custody is necessary for DFS to adequately
fulfill its duty of providing proper care.
All
reasonable efforts should be made by the caseworker to
obtain and update the child's medical record. The case
worker is responsible to gather the medical history for
each child by using the forms contained in the travelling
medical packet. Information obtained shall be available
for the comprehensive health examination.
1

All references to CWLA Standards refer to the Child Welfare
League of America, Standards for Health Care Services for Children
in Out-of-Home Care (1988) .
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(b)

The

case

worker

shall

obtain

all

available
information about the child's medical history and written
releases
for health records
from the parents, if
possible. The case worker shall also ask' the child (if
age appifSpnate) about his or her health care history,
and
shall
seek
out
other
available
sources
of
information, such as previous caretakers of the child and
school records.
If indicated, the case worker shall
check with the State and County Health Departments to
obtain health information.
(c)
The Department will track medical authorization
letters and medicaid payments and ensure that letters are
provided and payment documents are complete within 3 0
days of removal,
(d) All medical history information gathered shall be
given by the caseworker and/or foster parent(s) to the
physician
who
will
do
the
comprehensive
health
examination, and also shall be used to supplement and
complete the child's medical passport.
(e) After each health care visit, the case worker and
foster parent shall collect records of the child's health
care and update the medical packet.
(f) When a child moves to a permanent placement (e.g.,
return home, placement with a relative, adoption), the
case worker shall provide the current medical record and
all
essential
medical
information
to the
child's
permanent care taker.
(g) If a child enters an independent living program, the
case worker shall provide essential medical information
to the child, including the medical packet.
If adequate records are unavailable from other sources, caseworkers
snail cnecK other available systems, including the Medicaid MIS
system (as soon as access to that system r>y DFS becomes possible.)
In addition to giving records to health care providers as described
m
(d) above, DFS caseworkers shall provide all available health
records described in (a) through (c) above to the out-of home
provider within 30 days of a child's placement. Caseworkers shall
also give out-of-home care providers, before a placement is made,
basic available health information essential to the child's safety
and welfare.
When a child is moved to a new out-of-home placement, health
records and information shall be given to the new providers at or
before the time the new placement is made.
All out-of-home care providers, and all foster children over 14
years old, shall be informed of the availability and scope of CHEC
services and of the importance of preventive health care.
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By the end of 1994, DFS shall complete a report on any existing
barriers and inefficiencies in gathering and maintaining foster
children's
health
records
(e.g.,
duplicative
paperwork
requirements i difficulty in accessing the Medicaid database, etc.).
The report sha?l consider using clerical or administrative staff to
gather health records, to free up caseworker time.
This report
shall be used in developing a computerized health information
system (see § V.C.I, below).
6, Comprehensive health assessments.
Every child currently in DFS custody, and every child entering DFS
custody, shall have initial health assessments as described above,
and periodic health assessments, as follows:
(a) A comprehensive health assessment of each child shall
be completed within 3 0 days of removal from the home and
every 12 months thereafter as long as the child is in DFS
custody or more
often
if required by
periodicity
schedules
recognized
by
the
American
Academy
of
Pediatrics.
(b)
The assessment shall be conducted by a qualified
health practitioner as authorized by the Department of
Health, and in consultation with a qualified mental
health
practitioner,
if
indicated
and
necessary.
Preferably, the physician should be the one who will
provide the ongoing care for the child. The case worker,
natural parents, and foster parents shall be involved in
the assessment, unless prohibited by Court Order.
(c) The case worker shall develop a health plan for the
child which shall be incorporated into the child's
treatment plan. The health plan shall be maintained and
updated as part of the child's treatment plan.
Health
plans will contain, where appropriate, a mental health
plan. This part of the plan shall indicate what services
are necessary and how the services will be provided and
updated.
(d) DFS shall review the case files of every child in out
of home care, as part of the administrative review
process and determine whether the child has received the
equivalent of a comprehensive health examination, whether
the child's treatment plan includes a health plan, and
whether the child is currently receiving all essential
treatment in a timely manner. Regional Administrators,
i.e.
Regional
Director,
Associate
Directors
and
Supervisors shall monitor, supervise and evaluate workers
to ensure that examinations are conducted and health
plans prepared.
The health care coordinators will be
responsible for assisting case workers in obtaining
comprehensive health examinations and devising written
health plans. The health care coordinators will monitor
this activity and make it available to the caseworker's
supervisor.
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(e) Periodic reassessment of child's needs Following
the
initial
screening
and
comprehensive
health
assessment, DFS shall insure that periodic evaluations of
each footer, child's health and mental health are
conducted by qualified providers according to the
schedule recommended by the health care professionals.
DFS will review periodically (but not less than every 6
months in conjunction with the administrative case
review), the appropriateness of each health plan and
shall modify it as necessary.
The content of these assessments shall comply with CWLA Standards
2.6 and 2.7.
The medical portion of the assessments shall be conducted by a
qualified health practitioner, and also by a mental health
practitioner if necessary, as described above. The dental portion
of the assessments shall be conducted by a dentist and/or
orthodontist.
7, Ongoing treatment.
DFS has the responsibility to provide proper care to children in
its custody in a timely manner. The case worker, the health care
coordinator, and the foster parent shall ensure that a child's
health care, treatment and follow-up care are provided according to
the schedule recommended by the child's health care professionals.
Every child in DFS custody shall receive all treatment identified
as necessary during a comprehensive health assessment, within the
time frame recommended by the treating professional.
Foster
parents will accompany children when they receive treatment. If an
emergency prevents the foster parent from accompanying the child,
the case worker or case aide shall accompany the child and convey
the health care provider's diagnosis and instructions to the foster
parents. After each visit, the child's medical information packet
shall be appropriately amended for the caseworker in conjunction
with the foster parents or other care provider. For those children
for whom the permanent treatment plan is reunification, the case
worker shall keep the child's parents informed about the child's
health status, unless prohibited by Court Order•

8-

continuity <?t gfrrs

DFS caseworkers shall be responsible for maintaining continuity in
foster children's health care.
DFS shall, whenever possible,
ensure that the provider -no conducts the initial screening and
comprehensive assessment will be the child's ongoing health care
provider. When a child must be moved, whenever feasible the child
shall continue to see the same health care providers. When a child
must change health care providers, the caseworker shall be
responsible for ensuring that periodic assessments and any ongoing
treatment are not interrupted.
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9
Natural parents as health care partners.
In cases where the goal is reunification, DFS shall involve natural
parents in their children's health care to the- extent appropriate
(e.g. by requesting parents to accompany children to health care
appointments***^ providing transportation if needed, by providing
any needed training for parents to meet their children's home
health care needs, etc.).
B.

Long-range planning for foster children's health care.

1. Computerized information system.
In coordination with the Department of Health and in accordance
with the State of Utah's health care reform act, DFS shall complete
a plan for a computerized system to store, update, and access
foster children's health records, and provide ready access to
health information to caseworkers, foster parents, natural parents,
and health care providers.
In collaboration with the Health
Department, DFS shall develop and implement a system for
maintaining, tracking and providing medical history on children in
DFS custody.
The system should be readily usable by caseworkers. The plan shall
include concrete steps and timetables for implementation (including
training in the use of the system) , and steps to ensure that DFS
has adequate staff, resources, and equipment to carry it out.
DFS shall implement this plan so that the health information system
is fully operational statewide by the end of 1998. DFS shall, at
least on an annual basis, complete a comprehensive report to the
monitoring panel on its progress towards development of
computerized management information systems and steps to be taken
during the next year. This report shall be provided to the panel
in accordance with XI.D. of this Agreement.
2^

Health care resource development.

By the end of July 1995, DHS, in coordination with DOH, will
develop a plan to address barriers to health care for foster
children. This plan shall use the results of the resource survey
and needs assessment discussed above, and shall examine ways of
solving problems that have discouraged providers from accepting
foster children as patients in the past, and ways of enhancing
DFS's use of existing public and private health care resources.
This plan shall be implemented on an on-going basis.

28

VI.
A.

MENTAL HEALTH CARE FOR FOSTER CHILDREN
Priorities for immediate statewide implementation.

1. Survey of iffacement and treatment resources for foster children
with mental health problems, and needs assessment.
DFS shall conduct a statewide survey of existing resources for
children with mental health problems, including: providers of
initial mental health assessments and of the psycho-social
component of CHEC screenings; providers of ongoing mental health
treatment for children in DFS custody (e.g., CMHCs, private
providers, public and private psychiatric hospitals, etc.); and
placements for children with mental health problems (including
specialized and therapeutic foster homes, group homes, residential
treatment centers, etc.).
DFS shall also collect data indicating the extent of unmet needs
for such assessment, treatment, and placement resources. For each
region, DFS shall determine whether there are waiting lists for
assessment or treatment, and/or a lack of appropriate placements
for children with certain kinds of problems. DFS shall consult
with the health department, CMHCs, and private providers of mental
health services regarding the reasons for shortages of assessment,
treatment and placement providers.
As part of this resource survey and needs assessment, DHS shall
analyze its funding and expenditures for placement and treatment of
foster children with mental health problems. DFS shall explore ail
available sources of funding for mental health services, and shall
determine how the proposed change to the state's Medicaid plan can
be used to remove barriers to foster children's access to mental
health care.
Z?S shall also examine whether a disproportionate part of its funds
are currently being used for highly restrictive, high cost
placements (e.g., inpatient psychiatric facilities and residential
treatment centers), and whether there is a corresponding lack of
resources for home- and community-based treatment. If so, this
information shall be used to plan for reallocation of resources
away from highly restrictive and costly settings.
The resource survey and needs assessment shall be used in a longrange resource development plan.

2.

Interagency coordination.

DFS shall take steps to resolve interagency coordination problems
leading to inadequate and uncoordinated mental health services for
children in DFS custody. These steps shall include:
a. CA5SP/community mental health planning. DFS shall
participate in the development and implementation of the
state's CASSP plan and community mental health plan, to
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ensure that the needs of foster children are addressed by
these plans.
b.
CMaCc.
DHS, in conjunction with the health
department, shall work with CMHCs' to develop contracts
and service planning processes which address the mental
health care needs of foster children, especially needs
for home-based and day treatment services and for mental
health services coordinated with family reunification
efforts.
c. Participation in interagency teams. DFS caseworkers
shall participate in interagency coordination efforts
for children being served both by DFS and by the mental
health system.
3
Obtaining timely and adequate mental health assessments and
treatment for children in DFS custody.
DFS snail utilize the CHEC system to obtain needed mental health
assessments and treatment for foster children (and overcome
Medicaid restrictions on coverage of mental health treatment).
3y tne end of 1994, all initial/emergency health screenings shall
include an assessment of whether the child has any urgent mental
health problems requiring immediate treatment and/or specialized
care, and all CHEC screenings shall include psycho-social
assessments and referrals for follow-up treatment when needed.
In addition, caseworkers shall by July 1995 be trained and provided
with guidelines (such as the Children's Behavior Checklist or a
similar instrument) for screening of children's mental health
needs.
Caseworkers shall gather information about children's mental health
history for use in assessments and treatment; seek out treatment
resources to meet those needs; monitor the treatment to assure that
it is consistent with the treatment plan; and work with other
agencies and professionals involved with the child.
DFS shall make intensified efforts to involve foster parents in
planning and monitoring children's mental health treatment.
4. Placement of children with mental health problems.
Children with mental health problems shall be matched with the
least restrictive placement appropriate to meet their needs.
Caseworkers shall choose placements for children with mental health
problems in light of all available information about the child's
history and needs and the array of currently available placements.
5. Providing information to caregivers
Foster parents and other out-of home providers shall receive all
available information about the past mental health problems and
special needs of children placed in their care. Out-of-home care
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providers shall be enabled to decide whether to care for a child in
light of complete and accurate information about the child's needs
and, after agreeing to care for a child, shall have information
necessary to-pjovide safe and appropriate care;
B.

Steps towards long-range planning

1. Treatment and placement development plan
By the end of 1994, DFS shall complete a statewide plan for
development of sufficient resources for initial mental health
assessments, ongoing mental health treatment, and appropriate
placement for all children in DFS custody with mental health
problems. The plan shall include recruitment of additional private
providers, better coordination with the Division of Mental Health
and with local CMHCs, and recruitment and training of specialized
foster care providers.
DFS shall implement this plan so that, by the end of 1998, every
child in DFS custody who has a serious diagnosed mental health
problem shall receive appropriate assessment and treatment, and
shall be placed in the least restrictive environment consistent
with the child's needs.
2. Case management system.
By the end of 1995, DHS shall complete a plan for a statewide case
management system to track the provision of mental health services
to foster children, and, for children involved with multiple state
agencies and service providers, to coordinate these agencies'
efforts and centralize information and planning. This system shall
also provide a source of data for future service planning.
This system shall be integrated with the health care information
system (see § V.C.I, above) and the general plan for computerizing
DFS recordkeeping and case planning (see § VIII.B.l. below)
The system shall be fully operational by the end of 1998. DFS
shall, at least on an annual basis, complete a comprehensive report
to the monitoring panel on its progress towards development of
computerized management information systems and steps to be taken
during the next year. This report shall be provided to the panel
in accordance with XI.D. of this Agreement.
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VII. EDUCATION FOR FOSTER CHILDREN
A,

Priorities for immediate statewide implementation

1. Protecting^foster children1s basic educational rights
All children in the custody of DFS are entitled to a free
appropriate public education. This includes the right to special
educational services.
DFS shall ensure that all school age
children in its custody attend school regularly and comply with
state compulsory education laws.
Providing a tutor for children in shelter care does not comply w^th
the requirement that children in DFS custody shall be provided with
a free appropriate public education.
An exception to this
requirement may be permitted for no more than 5 days and until
transportation can be arranged to the child's home school or
his/her transfer to another school.
In order that children in DFS custody may fully participate in
school activities, DFS shall pay all school fees that are not
waived by the school district.
By December 31, 1994, DFS shall publish for public comment a
comprehensive written policy regarding the educational rights of
foster children and the responsibilities of DFS employees for
assuring that these rights are fulfilled.
2. Educational assessments
Within 10 days of a child's placement in foster care,
the
caseworker shall refer the child to the appropriate Youth In
Custody (YIC) program and take whatever steps are necessary in
order to obtain an evaluation of the child's level and scope of
educational performance and the student's learning abilities.
Following completion of the assessment, the caseworker and foster
parent shall participate in the development of an individual
education plan for the child. The caseworker and foster parent
shall carry out the responsibilities assigned to them in the YIC
plan.
3. Minimizing school changes
All children in shelter care shall attend the school they attended
prior to entering DFS custody, unless removal from the school is
necessary to ensure the child's safety. If a child in shelter care
must be removed from the home school, DFS shall make every effort
to ensure educational continuity (e.g. arrange for the home school
teacher to consult with the on-site tutor; arrange for special
education staff to come to the shelter)
The goal of minimizing the number of times a child must change
schools shall be taken into account in choosing initial foster
placements and in all subsequent changes in placement.
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When a child in DFS custody must be transferred to a new school,
the caseworker shall inform the transferring school in advance, and
consult with that school's staff about how to minimize disruption
of the child's education.
4. Foster parents' educational responsibilities.
DFS shall ensure that all foster parents take responsibility for
monitoring and assisting in children's educational progress (e.g.
by helping with homework, attending parent/teacher conferences),
and alerting the caseworker to any unmet educational needs.
5^ Gathering the child's educational record
Upon a child's entry into shelter care, DFS shall determine .e
name and address of the school attended by the child, the name .f
the child's teacher(s), the child's current grade level, progress
and behavior in school, and any special education services the
child was receiving. This information shall be provided to out-of home care providers, and shall be updated at the time of any
subsequent changes in placement and provided to the child's new
caregiver.
6. Screening for special education needs
Caseworkers shall immediately refer children for special education
assessment if, at any time during the child's placement, the
child's school records or performance indicate that the child may
have a disability requiring special education services, or if the
child's foster parent, teacher, or other service provider informs
the caseworker that the child might need special educationCaseworkers shall be responsible for ensuring that children receive
a thorough and appropriate special education assessment, and that,
as a result of the assessment, children receive all special
education and related services to which they are entitled under
federal and state law.
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VIII. • CASE PLANNING, CASE REVIEW,
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS.
A.

PERMANENCY

PLANNING, AND

Priorities^for immediate statewide implementation

1. Treatment plans for children in DFS custody
Treatment plans shall be prepared for all children in the custody
of the Division and finalized within 45 days after the child's
entry into DFS custody in accordance with the provisions of H.B.
265, § 62A-4a-205, but no later than 60 days after removal from the
child's home. To prepare a child's initial treatment plan, the
caseworker and supervisor shall use an interdisciplinary team
approach and shall convene an informal conference including,
whenever possible, the child's natural parent(s), and foster
parents, representatives of mental health, education, and where
appropriate, va representative of law enforcement. H.B. 265 §62A4a-205 (2) , (3) .
Implementation of the treatment plan is the
responsibility of individual workers. Caseworkers shall be held
accountable for making concrete, reasonable steps to implement all
provisions of the treatment plan.
2. Modification of treatment plans/permanency plans
Whenever there is a substantial change in circumstances of the
child or parent which may indicate a need to change the treatment
plan or permanency goal, the caseworker shall immediately arrange
for a treatment planning conference (see VIII.A.1 above) to
determine whether the treatment plan and/or permanency goal should
be changed.
This determination shall specifically take into
account any failure by parents to fulfill the requirement of
previous treatment plans.
After the conference, if the caseworker decides that the treatment
plan or permanency goal should be changed, the caseworker shall
immediately notify the case review panel of the recommended changes
and the reasons for them, and shall immediately arrange for a case
review (see §VIII.A.7) (not waiting for the next six month review
or court date).
If the case review panel determines that a modification of the
treatment plan* or permanency goal is necessary, the panel shall
modify the plan or if necessary, notify the court of its
recommendation. If a change in a court-ordered treatment plan is
necessary to implement the case review panel's determination, the
caseworker shall staff the case with attorney general staff, for
purposes of requesting a court hearing or receiving advice with
respect to the previous court orders.
3. Multiple reentries into state custody—"red flag" review
If a child returns to DFS custody after being placed home to
facilitate a "return home" permanency plan goal, a "foster care
reentry red flag" notice containing the child's protective service
and placement history and past treatment plans, shall be sent to
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the locai Regional Director by the caseworker within five days
after the child's shelter hearing. The case shall also be "red
flagged" to the child's administrative review team so that special
attention will be paid to the case by appropriate supervisory staff
and others wh^are not directly involved in providing services in
the case. This notice shall serve to focus attention on the case
in order to address the issues related to the failure of the
"return home" goal. Upon a child's reentry into foster care, the
new treatment plan shall specifically address, among other things,
the reason (s) for the child's return to foster care and for the
selection of the particular foster care placement for the child.
If any of the criteria set forth in H.B. 265 at §78-3a-311 (3) exist
in the case, then it shall be presumed that a goal of return home
is inappropriate and that reunification services should not be
provided to the parents. If after reentry, the caseworker and
supervisor adopt a goal of "return home" and the court does not
order otherwise, then the treatment plan shall specify the reasons
why a goal of reunification was selected again.
4. Adoption planning for children who reenter care
When the permanency plan is adoption, such plan shall include
specific steps for termination of parental rights. Where possible,
voluntary relinquishments shall be obtained. If a relinquishment
has not been obtained within six weeks of establishing the plan,
the worker shall perform and record the following:
• Within 60 days after establishing the plan, submit to
the attorney representing the Division the necessary
information for termination of parental rights. If the
worker has reason to believe a voluntary relinquishment
will not be obtained, he or she may make an earlier
referral.
• Within 15 working days of submitting information to
the attorney, the worker shall contact the attorney to
discuss the status of the case, to determine if any
additional information is needed, and to establish and
put in writing a reasonable timetable for obtaining
necessary information, for filing the petition, and for
requesting a hearing date.
•
If the court dismisses a petition to terminate
parental rights, the worker shall meet with the Attorney
General's office and the guardian ad litem to determine
whether an appeal should be taken or other relief sought
from the court's decision.
•
As soon as a permanency plan of adoption is
established for a child, the Region's adoption unit shall
be notified and provided with pertinent information on
the child.
The adoptions staff will begin examining
available adoptive families for a possible match with the
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child upon receipt of t h i s n o t i c e .
5. Adoption planning
DFS shall conduct a special review of the cases' of all children in
DFS custody wTrace parental rights have been terminated and who have
a permanent plan of adoption, but who have not been adopted. In
cases where termination of parental rights has not been achieved,
DFS shall seek voluntary relinquishment or termination of parental
rights, as described above. DFS shall make prompt and intensive
efforts to find adoptive placements for these children, including
coordination with and referrals to private and religious agencies
involved in adoption services.
By July 1995, DFS shall complete a report on the successes and
problems experienced in this expedited adoption planning process.
This report shall be used to develop a statewide" plan for all
children in DFS custody whose parental rights have been terminated
and have a permanent plan of adoption.
6. Preferential Adoptive Placements-For any child whose permanent plan is adoption and who has
substantial emotional ties to foster parent(s) or other caregiver
who have had physical custody of the child, and for whom removal
from that caregiver would be seriously detrimental to the child's
well-being, the caregiver's application to adopt the child shall be
given preference. The caregiver's application shall be processed
and, if satisfactory, the family study shall be completed before
any other applications to adopt the child are processed.
7. Case reviews*
All children in DFS custody shall receive case reviews within six
months of coming into DFS custody, and every six months thereafter,
and these case reviews shall meet the following standards:
• Through a process of administrative/citizen panel/court
review, DFS shall monitor the effectiveness of its
treatment planning and service delivery in achieving the
goals of preserving families, providing proper care for
children in out of home care, and achieving discharge of
children from out of home placements into permanent
homes.
The case review process shall also monitor
compliance with state and federal law and policy to
identify resources and training needs and to identify
problematic procedures or practices.
• The administrative/citizen review panel must ensure at
least the following evaluations and assessments are made:
(a) a determination that the initial and annual health
screening and comprehensive assessment have been
performed and incorporated in the plan;
(b) a review of the treatment plan to ensure that the
plan ccnplies with court orders, agency policies and procedures;
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(c) a review of the case record to ensure that the record
contains documentation as to the reasons why the child
was taken into state custody and the reasonable efforts
that were made to keep the family intact; •
(d) a revTIw* of the reasons for selecting the permanency
goal, the appropriateness of the plan tc the goal, and
goal achievement date to ensure that these decisions are
consistent
with court orders, agency policies
and
procedures; and
(e) a review of the child's placement history with
particular attention paid to changes of placement since
the last review, reasons for change, impact on the class
member, and services and other steps required to enable
him/her to have a stable placement.
•
Staff will be assigned to manage the process of
organizing
administrative
reviews
(notification,
organization, keeping up documentation, etc.)
The
administrative review panel/citizen review board shall
identify significant deficiencies in implementing the
treatment plan and performing case activities and shall
report them in writing to the Regional Director who shall
take appropriate actions.
• Prior to scheduling a case review, workers shall give
recommendations as to the amount of time needed for the
hearing. The review panel should receive case materials
for review at least two days in advance. Foster parents'
opinions and recommendations on the child should be
included.
Part of the preparation should be to review
previous
panel
recommendations
and
outcomes.
Administrative case review notices shall be sent by
certified mail to the parents. See notice requirements,
paragraph IX.A.2 of this Agreement.
• In constituting the panel for an administrative review,
the following considerations will be implemented:
(a)
The review panel members will be independent of the
caseworker and supervisor assigned to any child's case,
(b) The panel shall include at least two members who are
neither a DFS employees or employees of an organization
which receives more than 50% of its direct funding from
DFS(c) The panel may include an outside professional
who has relevant specialized expertise.
The outside
panel members must sign a confidentiality form.
• Attendance at administrative reviews shall include (a)
the child, if age 12 and older and attendance is feasible
and appropriate, (children as young as ages 7-8 may be
invited to attend as the case situation may indicate) and
(b) the caseworker and supervisor.
Caseworkers shall
encourage natural parents, foster parents, out-of-home
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care providers, treatment providers, and GALs to attend.
• The panel needs to review for accountability, not just
staff a~aaee. Especially, participants should be asked
to report progress on implementing specifics contained in
the treatment plan. There will be greater scrutiny of
progress and outcomes, in addition to specifying future
directions for the case.
The administrative review
summary shall include a checklist of recommendations.
The summary shall be sent to natural parents, foster
parents, the GAL, the court, the child's caseworker and
his or her supervisor. The administrative case review
panel shall have the authority and responsibility to
recommend changes in the treatment plan if necessary to
assure that each case is managed in conformity with
agency policies and procedures. The administrative case
review/citizen review panel staff shall have the
authority and responsibility to report to the Regional
Director if it is their opinion that the treatment plan,
agency policies and procedures, or the panel's
recommendations have been violated or disregarded by the
caseworker or his or her supervisor.
The Regional
Director shall determine any action needed to remedy any
deficiency in a treatment plan or in a worker's
implementation of a treatment plan or the review panel's
recommendations with respect to a changes in a treatment
plan. The Regional Director shall, within one month of
receiving a report of a deficiency in a treatment plan,
direct the worker's supervisor and the caseworker to take
actions. Within one month of receipt of the Regional
Director's directives, the family services worker or his
supervisor must certify in writing to the Regional
Director that appropriate corrective actions have been
taken. Any failure of the Regional Director, supervisor,
or caseworker to fulfill their responsibilities with
respect to correcting deficiencies in treatment plans
shall be recorded in the employee's personnel record or
other remedial actions taken.
DFS may elect to use administrative review panels, citizen review
boards, and/or courts to perform these reviews. Where DFS elects
to use administrative review panels, these panels must include at
least two members who are not DFS employees.
B. Involving foster parents in treatment planning & case review.
The treatment plan shall be signed by the foster parents, as well
as by the caseworker, the supervisor, and the child's parents. A
copy of the treatment plan shall be provided to the child's foster
parents. Foster parents' input and opinions shall be sought for
every administrative or court review regarding a child in their
physical custody. If foster parents cannot attend a conference or
hearing,
caseworkers
shall
request
written
comments
and
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recommendations from the foster parents and/or make arrangements
for the foster parent to participate by telephone. A form should
be created for use by foster parents to encourage their giving
input in reviews and hearings.
In order to facilitate the agency's emphasis on foster parents as
members of the treatment "team" for out-of-home care cases, the
department shall develop and implement a consumer evaluation
procedure.
9. Case assignment
By the end of 1995, DFS shall design and implement measures with
the goal of reducing caseworker changes experienced by foster
children. These measures shall include: a system for rating the
difficulty of the case and selecting caseworkers with appropriate
experience and training; mentoring and supervision to assist
caseworkers when problems arise; and "red flag" reviews when a case
is transferred to a new foster care worker more than twice in a
twelve-month period.
10. Case transfer
Whenever a child's case must be reassigned:
• The case shall be assigned within two weeks of the date when
the former caseworker ceased to actively work on the case;
• The assigned caseworker shall receive and review the child's
complete file, and visit with the child, and the foster
parents or other caregivers, within four weeks of that date.
11. Permanency planning.
All treatment plans for a child in state custody after disposition
shall include a permanency goal for the child which goal may be:
(a) provide reunification services in order to allow the child to
return home (including kinship placements), (b) termination of
parental rights/adoption, (c) independent living or (d) permanent
foster care/guardianship. The agency's selected permanency goal
shall be presented for juvenile court approval at the dispositional
hearing in accordance with H.B. 265, § 78-3a-311. The Division
may, under any circumstances, recommend to the court that efforts
to reunify a child with his family are not reasonable, based upon
the individual circumstances of the family, and that reunification
services should not provided to the family.
The agency will
represent to the court that reunification services need not be
provided to a parent when the agency is of the opinion that the
circumstances outlined at H.B. 265, § 78-3a-311(3)- (5) exist.
12. Expedited permanency planning and relinquishment/termination
(a) The Division shall by July 1, 1994 have ascertained all
children in its custody who have remained in custody in excess of
18 months. For purposes of this section, parental visitation of
the child by the parents during the 18 month period shall not serve
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to interrupt the running of the period. By December 31, 1994,
those children who have remained in DFS custody in excess of IS
months shall be screened for expedited permanency planning and
scheduled fos^a dispositional review hearing before the ]uveniie
court in accordance with the provisions of H.B. 265, § 78-3a-312.
The permanency goal for these children shall be reviewed by the
juvenile court and a permanent plan developed in accordance with
the provisions of K.B. 265, § 78-3a-312.
(b) Prior to the dispositional review hearing provided for by H.B.
265, the Division shall convene an administrative/citizen review
panel for a determination of the content of the agency's report to
the court as required by H.B. 265, § 78-3a-312.
The panel shall
examine the child's history with the agency, which examination
shall include reviewing the parents' response to the agency's
reasonable efforts to maintain the child at home prior to removal,
the parents' response to the agency's reasonable efforts to reunify
the family after removal, the age of the child, the frequency of
contact between the parent and child, the available means of
contact, the extent of the child's present relationship to the
parent(s), the parents' response to the treatment plan entered into
with the return home goal, and the adequacy of the services
provided to the parents pursuant to the treatment plan. If this
examination demonstrates that the reunification efforts provided
the family by the agency have been inadequate and that, in the
opinion of the committee/panel, there is a reasonable likelihood
that the return home objectives of the treatment plan can be
accomplished within six months with provision of intensive
reunification services to the parent (s), then the agency's report
to the court may recommend that the reunification goal be extended
for an additional six months. If the administrative review panel
determines that the treatment goals cannot be reasonably
accomplished within an additional six months with provision of
additional family centered services, then the panel shall recommend
that the child's permanency plan goal be changed to a more
appropriate goal, including termination of parental rights,
adoption, guardianship, or long-term foster care.
11. Computerised treatment; plannjpg
The Division shall develop and implement a management infomation
system that meets the requirements of H.B. 265, § 62A-4a-116. DFS
shall, at least on an annual basis, complete a comprehensive report
to the monitoring panel on its progress towards development of
computerized management information systems and steps to be taken
during the next year. This report shall be provided to the panel
in accordance with XI.D. of this Agreement.
B. Long-range planning
1, Expedited permanency planning and adoptive planning
By the end of July 1995, DFS shall develop a plan, including
coordination with the attorney general's office, to ensure that:
• all children who remain in DFS custody for 18 months or more
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receive an intensified
process; and

and expedited permanency planning

• voluntary relinquishment or termination bt parental rights
is promptly pursued for all children in DFS custody for IB
months or more who cannot return hone, and for all children
whose permanency plan calls for adoption.
• intensive efforts to find an adoptive family are promptly
made for all children whose permanent plan is adoption.
DFS shall implement this plan with the goal that, by the end of
1998, no child shall remain in DFS custody for more than two years
(except children for whom a permanency plan of long-term foster
care or independent living is chosen after full exploration of all
other permanency planning options).
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IX. NOTICES, COURT PROCESSES, ATTORNEY GENERAL AND GUARDIANS AD
LITEM-A.

Priorities for immediate statewide implementation.

1. Out-of-home care providers/GAL contact
DFS shall inform all out-of-home care providers, at or before the
time of a new placement, of the name, address and phone number of
the child's guardian ad litem (GAL), and of the GAL's role in
protecting the child's interests. DFS shall also promptly give all
out-of-home care providers this information for children currently
in DFS custody. Foster parents shall be encouraged to contact the
child's GAL about any concerns that the child's needs are not being
met.
2. Notice and access to information
DFS shall provide-to all children's GALs, natural parents, and outof-home care providers:
• written notice, one week in advance, of administrative
reviews, of changes m foster placement, and of adjudication
and disposition hearings and reviews. Notice (written or
oral) of case conferences as soon as they are scheduled.
• written recommendations of the caseworker, one week in
advance of court hearings and administrative reviews.
In addition, DFS shall provide all children's GALs:
• prompt and continuous access to all DFS files and other
information in DFS's control concerning the child;
3. Participation in treatment planning
DFS shall encourage the active participation of children's GALs,
natural parents, and foster parents in treatment planning
conferences, planning of parent-child visitation, and permanency
planning. In addition, DFS shall solicit the input of the GAL in
the selection of adoptive placements of children for whom they
served as attorney.
4. Coordination with attorney general staff
DFS caseworkers shall meet with attorney general staff to assess
every case having a permanency goal of termination of parental
rights or adoption, and every case which meets the criteria stated
in § VIII.A. 10 above and/or in H.B. 265 for seeking termination of
parental rights. In these conferences, the caseworker and attorney
general staff shall develop a strategy to achieve termination of
parental rights and permanency for the child. The caseworker shall
work with the attorney general staff on an ongoing basis to ensure
that this strategy is promptly carried out.
By the end of 1995, DFS shall complete a report on problems and
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successes experienced in working with attorney general staff, if
this report indicates problems areas, then DFS and the attorney
general's office shall jointly develop a plan fpr dealing with any
problems poinj^d out by the report.
This plan shall be fully
implemented by the end of 1997.
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X.

STAFFING, TRAINING, SUPERVISION k ACCOUNTABILITY

A.

Priorities for immediate statewide implementation

1, Caseworker training
Education and training of new caseworkers and curriculum shall be
accomplished pursuant to the provisions of H.B. 265, § 62A-4a-107
and training shall be conducted to enable caseworkers and
supervisors to fulfill their responsibilities under all sections of
this Agreement.
By December 31, 1994, supervisors shall conduct individual
assessments of current caseworkers' training levels.
After
conducting these assessments, supervisors will develop individual
performance and training plans for caseworkers for the following
purposes: (1) to incorporate evaluations of the strengths and
weaknesses of a worker's knowledge, skills, and familiarity with
agency policies and procedures and (2) to designate time frames and
training programs required to improve a worker's knowledge and
skills or to remedy professional deficiencies. These individual
performance and training plans will be maintained in the worker's
personnel file. The Regional Director will conduct individual
assessments of DFS supervisors to ascertain their current level of
training and to develop individual performance and training plans.
These plans shall be maintained in the supervisor's personnel file.
The Division Director shall conduct individual assessments of
Regional Director's training and develop individual training and
performance plans which shall also be maintained in their personnel
file.
Using the results of the individual training and performance plan
assessment process, a training plan and schedule shall be developed
for each caseworker and supervisor as is needed and implemented by
December 31, 1995. The plan shall be revised annually as part of
the employee's performance evaluation.
Workers shall be
temporarily relieved of their duties to participate in training and
supervisors shall be responsible fox ensuring that their caseloads
are covered.
Every caseworker and supervisor shall receive a minimum of 40 hours
of training annually. Every foster care worker shall have attended
the training given to foster parents. For all caseworkers and
supervisors, DFS shall maintain a record of the training the
employee has attended.
2^ Foster parent traininq-DFS shall develop and implement training programs as needed for
foster parents (including shelter care parents) to fulfill their
responsibilities under all sections of this Agreement, including:
• providing safe and appropriate care to children in
their homes (§§ III and IV) , and monitoring and assisting
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in children's health care (§ V), mental health care (§
VI), and education (§ VII)
• participating in treatment planning, permanency planning,
and case reviews (§ VIII)
3. Supervision and accountability
DFS shall develop and implement supervision, accountability, and
disciplinary measures needed to ensure that caseworkers and foster
parents fulfill their responsibilities under this Agreement. Such
measures shall include at least:
• Periodic outcome and performance ratings for individual
caseworkers and foster parents;
• Corrective action by supervisors in response to any problems
revealed ' by these ratings (e.g. mentoring, additional
training, enhanced supervision, etc.);
• Discipline and termination processes to be used where
corrective action is not effective.
B. Long-range planning
1. Training
By the end of 1994, DFS shall complete a comprehensive training
plan for foster parents (with provisions for joint training of
foster parents and caseworkers whenever possible).
The plan shall cover pre-service training, in-service training and
professional development, and individualized training for foster
parents up to the plan's new standards.
The plan shall set mandatory standards for pre-service training,
yearly in-service training for basic and specialized foster care.
These standards shall include:
• minimum numbers of hours of both classroom and on-the-job
training (classroom hours shall only count if relevant to the
job skills actually needed and used by the trainee);
• evaluation processes, including both classroom testing and
on-the-job evaluation, and provisions for corrective action if
the trainee does not pass the evaluation.
DFS shall implement this plan so that caseworkers, supervisors, and
foster parents are in full compliance with the plan's standards by
the end of 1996.
2. Staffing
By July 1, 1995, DFS shall complete a study of caseworkers' and
supervisors' caseloads and staffing patterns.
The study shall
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consider: whether current caseloads and work distribution are
appropriate; whether DFS should adopt a weighted caseload system
(i.e. varying the number of cases assigned to a. worker according to
the complexity of each case) ; whether some tasks currently being
done by caseworkers could more efficiently be done by clerical
staff, aides, or other support staff; and what qualifications
should be required for newly hired or promoted DFS caseworkers,
supervisors, aides, and support staff.
DFS shall fully implement the recommendations of this study by the
end of 1996.
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XI.

MONITORING AND SYSTEM ACCOUNTABILITY

A. Composition of the monitoring panel
The monitorin^^anel shall have three members. All panel members,
at the time of their appointment to the panel, must be Utah
residents, and cannot be DHS employees or contractors.
B. Selection and organization of monitoring panel.
At the time this Agreement is submitted to the Court for approval,
plaintiffs and defendants will each select one member of the
monitoring panel. The third member of the panel shall be Pamela
Atkinson, who served as a volunteer mediator during the negotiation
of this Agreement.
The panel shall have 4 5 days, from the date the Agreement is
approved by the Court, to develop its internal procedures and hire
its staff.
C. Staff and budget
The panel shall have a staff of two: one research analyst and one
secretary. In addition, the panel may engage consultants (who may
be from out of state), if needed. The panel members shall receive
a per diem of $90, and shall be reimbursed for expenses. The
budget for the panel's per diem and expenses, staff, and
consultants shall be sufficient to allow the panel to fulfill its
responsibilities under this Agreement, and shall be at least
$111,345 per year.
D. Access to Information
The panel shall have access to all internal memoranda, reports and
studies generated by DFS and DHS, and all DFS files, including
foster care files, CPS files, and licensing files (except the
agency's Resolution Committee (RC) records which will be provided
in accordance with section XI.L below). The panel may require that
DFS research personnel meet with them and provide information about
reports generated by the Research and Evaluation Office.
The panel may informally interview any DFS employees, foster
parents, private service providers, and/or families involved in the
child welfare system. Panel members may also visit any site at
which care or services is provided to class members.
If the information received by the panel from DFS is inadequate to
determine compliance with the Agreement, or is not produced in a
timely manner, the panel may issue subpoenas compelling any DFS
employee to appear before the panel and to produce any documents
requested by the panel (except documents whose production is
prohibited by a court order).
E. Case-reading
§
In conducting .the annual review of a sample of cases required by
H.B. 265, § 62A-4a-118, DHS shall review a randomly selected,
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statistically significant sample of cases, using a case reading
instrument that includes all* case-specific provisions of this
Agreement. In conducting the audit required by H.B. 265 § 62A-4a118(4), the -fa%gisiative Auditor General shall review a randomly
selected subsample of these cases, also using an instrument that
includes all case-specific provisions of this Agreement. If, at
any time during the period of this Agreement, the Auditor is unable
to perform this review, the Panel shall have authority to retain
consultants to perform an independent case review.
In addition, DHS shall review a sample of foster care aud
protective services cases and the Legislative Auditor General shall
audit a subsample of foster care and protective services cases.
DHS and the Auditor General shall use an instrument- including all
applicable case-specific provisions of this Agreement and DHS shall
seek approval of the monitoring panel for the number of cases which
it reviews. (The sample used in this case review may also be part
of the sample used for the review mandated by H.B. 265, which is
due December 31, 1995.) The results of this initial review and
audit shall be reported to the Panel by July 31, 1995.
All reports generated by DHS and by the Auditor General shall be
provided to the monitoring panel.
F. Six-month grace period
DFS shall begin providing information to the Panel 30
the agreement is given final approval by the Court.
shall make its first compliance report six months from
During this six-month period, the plaintiffs shall not
enforcement of the agreement.

days
The
that
seek

after
panel
date.
court

G. Compliance Reports
After its first report, the panel shall make quarterly written
reports, to be issued on or before March 1, June 1, September 1,
and December 1 of each year. (This off-set reporting schedule is
to allow the panel to incorporate data generated quarterly by DHS.)
The panel's reports shall follow the, format of the Agreement,
shall make findings of compliance or non-compliance with each
provision of the Agreement applicable in that quarter, and shall
describe the basis for each finding- of compliance or noncompliance.
The panel's findings shall be provided to both
plaintiffs' counsel and defendants' counsel and each side shall
have 15 days from receipt of the report to review the report and
redact confidential, protected and privileged information from the
report before the panel publishes it. The panel shall not publish
the report until each side has submitted its redacted version. In
cases of a dispute regarding redaction, the panel shall make the
final decision. When the redacted and edited versions have been
received, the panel shall publish its report as a public document.
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The panel's findings of compliance or non-compliance shall be based
on sufficient information to determine overall, systemic patterns
of compliance or non-compliance, not on isolated instances or
unsupported -reports of compliance or noncompliance. Compliance
does not always require 100* performance of each provision of the
Agreement.
The panel retains the discretion to define an
appropriate level of compliance with each provision of the
Agreement, based upon a review of the agency's implementation of
that provision.
H. Corrective Action period
If the Panel finds non-compliance with any provision(s) of the
Agreement, the panel will confer with the plaintiffs' and
defendants' counsel and with DHS and DFS officials regarding a
corrective action plan.
DFS shall submit a corrective action plan to the panel within two
weeks of the finding of non-compliance. The panel, within two
weeks of the submission of the plan, shall either approve the
corrective action plan, or allow DFS an additional two weeks to
submit a revised corrective action plan. If the panel does not
approve DFS's revised corrective action plan, the panel shall
create a corrective action plan.
DFS shall implement the corrective action plan within 90 days of
the date it is approved by the panel. At the end of the 90 days,
DFS shall report to the panel. The panel shall consider this
report, and may also conduct its own investigation, to determine
whether the non-compliance has been corrected.
If the noncompliance is not corrected, but the panel finds that there are
extraordinary circumstances and that compliance could be achieved
in an additional 3 0 days, the panel may allow DFS an additional 3 0
days to implement the corrective action plan.
At the end of the corrective action period, the panel shall make a
finding as to whether compliance has been achieved.
L< Court Determination of Compliance or Non-Compliance
If the monitoring panel finds non-compliance, defendants may
immediately seek court review of the finding. Plaintiffs must wait
until the corrective action period has transpired before they may
seek relief from the court upon a finding of non-compliance.
If the panel finds compliance, plaintiffs may immediately seek the
court determination of the panel's findings.
All requests for relief for court determination shall state the
specific findings of compliance or non-compliance challenged, the
reasons for such challenge, and the relief sought. Such a request
must be filed within 20 days of the issuance of the panel's
compliance report. The opposing party shall have 20 days from the
filing of a request for court determination to file a response.
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The court shall then set a hearing or other proceeding to resolve
the matter. The court shall examine the evidence before it de novo
and it shall enter its own findings of compliance or noncompliance.
J. Enforcement of the Agreement.
The Agreement constitutes a final and binding determination of
plaintiffs' claims and entitlement to relief. These claims, and
any defenses to these claims, are merged into and resolved by the
Agreement. The Court shall retain jurisdiction over these claims
solely for the purpose of enforcement of the Agreement. If noncompliance is not resolved through the corrective action process,
as described above, the Court may enter any necessary orders to
enforce the Agreement.
K. Modification of Agreement based on Compliance
At the request of defendants, plaintiffs will stipulate to a
modification of the Agreement upon a finding by the panel of
compliance with any portion of the Agreement (unless such finding
is reversed by the court on review).
L. Individual cases
The mechanism for resolving problems that may arise in individual
children's cases is as follows:
(a) Plaintiffs' counsel may request the files of any children
in DFS custody, or any CPS files, when they have reason to
believe that a child's health, safety, or welfare is at risK
due to a violation by DFS of the requirements of federal or
state law, or the provisions of this Agreement. Defendants
shall produce these files within 15 days of plaintiffs'
request.
(b) Plaintiffs' counsel may contact the DFS Director or the
Director's designee directly, concerning any information they
receive indicating that a child's health, safety, or welfare
is at risk due to violation by DFS of the requirements of
federal or state law, or the provisions of this Agreement.
Within 10 days of plaintiffs' request, the DFS Director or the
Director's designee shall:
(i) take action directly to resolve the complaint,
(ii) refer the matter to the Resolution Committee
(RC) , which shall make a recommendation within 15
days of the referral; or
(iii) determine that no action is needed, and
inform plaintiffs' counsel of the reasons for that
decision (plaintiffs' counsel may then bring the
matter before the grievance council, as set forth
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in section

(d), below).

(c) The Division shall report on its actions regarding cases
referred-tp it under section (b)(i) or (b)(ii) above, within
3 0 days of receiving instructions from the Director or
designee, or receiving recommendations from the RC,
(d) After receiving the Division's report, if plaintiffs'
counsel believe that the problem has not been resolved, they
may bring the matter before the grievance council established
under H.B. 265 § 62A-4a-102 (3) . An attorney representing the
plaintiff class shall serve as a member of this council.
(e) DFS shall, on a quarterly basis, submit its reports on
the cases referred to it (see section (c) above) , to the
monitoring panel.
The timelines set forth above shall not apply in cases where there
is imminent risk to a child's health or safety.
No attorneys fees shall be claimed by plaintiffs' counsel for any
time spent under this section.
The RC and the grievance council shall submit periodic reports, at
least on a quarterly basis, to the Monitoring Panel, summarizing
the issues raised in each case brought to their attention, and the
resolution of each case. These reports shall be considered (along
with all other data
described
in section XI.D,
above)
in
determining compliance with the Agreement.
JL
Termination of the Agreement
The Agreement shall terminate in 4 8 months from
given final approval by the Court.

the

date

it

is

N. Attorneys' fees
Plaintiffs shall provide
the State with an itemization
of
attorneys' fees to date that they intend to claim. Nothing in the
Agreement shall constitute a waiver of any defense to any claim of
fees made by the plaintiffs.
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V

: day cf May, 1994

MICHAEL 0. LEAVIT
Governor, State of Utah

d .S4ZZ^*£^2^
STEADMAN
Executive Director
Department of Human Services

u
MARY(flCTONAN ""°
s/ctor, Division
Divisic of Family Services
Director,

FOR: JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General, State of Utah

JL CLAWSON
Solicitor General, State of Utah
Attorney for Defendants

JXNDA LUINSTRA
CRAIG L. BARLOW
Assistant Attorneys General
Attorneys for Defendants

^%£
WILLIAtf^feBB^RIMM
National Center for Youth Law
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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MICHAEL PATRICK O'BRIEN
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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EXHIBIT A

Addendum/Modification to Settlement Agreement § XL L, M, N & O

L Individual cases
The mechanism for resolving problems that may arise in individual children's cases is as follows:
(a)
Plaintiffs' counsel may request the files of any children in DCFS custody, or any
CPS files, when they have reason to believe that a child's health, safety, or welfare is at
risk due to a violation by DCFS of the requirements of federal or state law, or the
provisions of this Agreement Defendants shall produce these files within 15 days of
plaintiffs' request.
(b)
Plaintiffs' counsel may contact the DCFS Director or the Director's designee
directly, concerning any information they receive indicating that a child's health, safety, or
welfare is at risk due to a violation by DCFS of the requirements of federal or state law,
or the provisions of this Agreement Within ] 0 days of plaintiffs' request, the DCFS
Director or the Director's designee shall
(i) take action direct!) to re>oi\ e the complaint.
(ii) refer the matter to the ()f:kc of Child Protection Ombudsman
COCPCT), or
(iii) determine that no action LS needed, and inform plaintiffs' counsel of the
reasons for that decision
(c)
The OCPO shall report on its actions to the Division and plaintiffs' counsel
regarding cases referred to ii under section (b)(ii) above, within the time frames
established by OCPO policy and procedures, but in no event to exceed 40 days of the
plaintiffs' request to the DCFS Director or designee
(d)
After receiving the Director's or OCPO's report, if plaintiffs' counsel believe that
the problem has not been resolved, they may bring the matter before the Consumer
Hearing Panel as set forth in U.C A § 62A-4a-102 or the Grievance Council as set forth in
§ XI. M of this Agreement In the event that the Utah Legislature repeals, amends or
otherwise modifies § 62A-4a-102, plaintiffs shall continue to have a right of review before
the Grievance Council, but will have no claim for any alternative or additional review
before the Consumer Hearing Panel
(e)
The timelines set forth in (b) above shall not apply in cases where there is imminent
risk to a child's health or safety

(f)
No attorneys fees shall be claimed by plaintiffs' counsel for any time spent under
this section.
(i)
Plaintiffs have informed defendants of their intension to seek an award of
attorney's fees for time spent on individual cases prior to the effective date
of this stipulation and reserve therightto file such a claim.
(ii)

Conversely, defendants reserve theirrightsto object to those fees as
outside the terms of this settlement agreement A reservation ofrightsto
claim such fees, is not an agreement to change the provision in this section

(g)
Plaintiffs' counsel shall receive a travel allowance for attendance at the Grievance
Council meetings The Board will set the travel allowance Air fare, when necessary and
appropriate, shall be based upon the lowest seven day advanced purchase fare available
(h)
The OCPO and the Grievance Council shall submit periodic reports, at least on a
quarterly basis, to the Monitoring Panel, summarizing the issues raised in each case
brought to their attention, and the resolution of each case These reports shall be
considered (along with all other data described in section XI D , above) in determining
compliance with the Agreement

M

Grievance Council

By June 1, 1997, the Board of DC! S shall create a Grievance Council, independent of the
division, for the purpose of receiving, mediating, and making recommendations to the division
regarding the concerns of consumers, natural parents and immediate family members, and foster
parents regarding child welfare issues as specified in this section
(a)
The Grievance Council shall be appointed by the Board of Child and Family
Services and shall include, but not be limited to the following
(i)
A representative of the Child Welfare Legislative Oversight Committee,
chosen b\ the 0\ crsiuht Committee The representative may be either a Senator
or a Representative The Oversight Committee shall also have the option of placing
two representatives on the council If there are two representatives, one shall be a
Senator and one shall be a member of the House of Representatives In the event
that the Oversight Committee declines in writing to have a representative serve on
the Grievance Council, this requirement will be waived

(b)

(ii)

At least one member of the Board of Child and Family Services, and

(iii)

An attorney representing the plaintiff class

Potential other members of the council may include educators, child mental health
care providers, social workers and physicians,

(c)

No employee of the Division shall be a member of the Grievance Council

(d)

The Department of Human Services will provide staff support to the Grievance
Council for purposes of keeping minutes, sending out notices, and other items that
are necessary for the Grievance Council to function

(e)

When the Grievance Council reviews and discusses an individual case, its meeting
may be held in private. However, the consumer, the child's natural parents, if
applicable, the child's foster parents, if applicable, the Guardian ad Litem and the
parties' attorneys may attend

(0

All records of the Grievance Council shall be classified as private, and may be
disclosed only in accordance with Utah Code Ann § 63-2-202

(g)

The plaintiflTs shall first exhaust all administrative remedies under section L (b) and
(c) above prior to requesting a review by the Grievance Council The council may,
however, consent to accept a case for review, pnor to exhaustion of administrative
remedies, if it determines it to be appropriate under the circumstances

(h)

The Grievance Council has authority only to make recommendations to the
Division, and has no power to overturn decisions made b> the Division, or to make
determinations regarding a party's rights or responsibilities

Section M on page 51 is relettered to be section N
Section N on page 51 is relettered to be section 0

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

DAVID C , etal.,

:
Plaintiffs,

ORDER

vs.

:

Case No. 93-C-206W

MICHAEL LEAVITT, et al.,

:

Judge David K. Winder

Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION
The Parties have consented to the entry of their settlement of the above-captioned
matter as an Order of the Court. By virtue of the Parties' settlement and consent, it is
unnecessary to have a trial on the liability issues and the remedies in this case.
The Parties' agreement to entry of this Order is the outcome of negotiations and
bargaining. The Settlement Agreement (hereafter the "Agreement") (Exhibit "A" attached),
incorporated herein by reference, is the result of intensive negotiations starting in May of
1993 and continuing through May of 1994, in which both parties were represented by
negotiating teams including Plaintiffs' and Defendants' counsel.
This Order and the Agreement set forth general operating standards and direct
Defendants to ensure that the Utah Department of Human Services' (DHS) and its Division
of Family Services' (DFS) child welfare system comply with the Agreement. Defendants
maintain full operating authority over DHS and DFS and have discretion as noted in the
Agreement to devise the means by which to achieve compliance with this Order and the
Agreement.
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II. PARTIES
The provisions of this Order and the Agreement shall apply to and be binding upon
the Parties to this action, and upon their employees, heirs, successors-in-interest, and assigns.
The undersigned representatives of Plaintiffs and Defendants certify that they are fully
authorized, subject to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to enter into and to execute the
terms and conditions of this Order and to legally bind the parties, including all members of
the certified Plaintiff classes.
TIL THE PLAINTIFF CLASSES
On May 7, 1993, the Court certified this matter as a class action pursuant to Rule 23
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court defined the Plaintiff classes as follows:
(1)

All children who are now or who will be in the custody of DHS and who have
been or who will be placed by DHS in a shelter care facility, foster family
home, group home or institutional care; and,

(2)

All children who are or who will be known to DHS by virtue of a report of
abuse or neglect.
IV

A.

PROVISIONS

SCOPE: The Governor of the State of Utah, the Executive Director of DHS,

the Director of DFS, and representatives of the Utah Attorney General have all signed and
agreed to be bound by the terms of the Agreement.
B.

COMPLIANCE AND OVERSIGHT REPORTING: The Agreement creates a

Monitoring Panel and establishes a mechanism for monitoring and oversight of the
implementation of its provisions.
C.

CONFIDENTIALITY: Plaintiffs' counsel shall maintain the confidentiality of

any information contained in any documents provided to them during the course of this
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litigation or provided under the terms of this Order, that may identify specific individuals
where the confidentiality of such information is provided by law.
D.

ENFORCEMENT: This Order and the Agreement, incorporated herein by

reference, constitute a final and binding determination of Plaintiffs' causes of action. The
Court shall retain jurisdiction of this matter.
E.

ATTORNEYS' FEES: Plaintiffs and Defendants reserve the issue of

entitlement to and amount of attorneys' fees and costs of this action. The parties agree to
meet in good faith in an attempt to settle this issue. If no settlement is reached by June 30,
1994, the issue of attorneys' fees and costs shall be submitted to the Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this ~T\ day of UltGU&L 1994.
/

The Honorable David K. Winder
United States District Court Judge
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Approved by.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

By
Michael Patrick O'Brien (USB-?4894)
D. James Morgan (USB # 6005)
Daniel A. Kaplan (USB #6258)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 521-3200THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR YOUTH LAW
By:
Williamlil Grimm
Patrice McElroy
Martha Matthews
Elizabeth Butler Steyer
NATIONAL CENTER FOR YOUTH LAW
114 Sansome Street, Suite 900
San Francisco, CA 94104
(415) 543-3307
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

Jan C. Gra
Carol Cla
Linda Luinstra
Craig L. Barlow
Attorneys for Defendants
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DAVID W. SCOFIELD - 4140
PAIGE BIGELOW - 6493
PARSONS, DAVIES, KINGHORN & PETERS
185 South State Street, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-4300
Attorneys for the Plaintiff
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

RICKY LEE SANDERS, individually, and in
his capacity as the personal representative of
the estate of Breanna Marie Loveless,
Deceased,

DEFAULT CERTIFICATE
DEFENDANT TRAVIS WIDDISON

Plaintiff,
C M No. 980901895

-vsMCHAEL O. LEAVITT, in his capacity as
Governor of the State of Utah; et at.,
j

Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendants.

IN THIS ACTION, defendant Travis Widdison, having been regularly served with process
on March 19, 1998, and having failed to appear and answer plaintiffs complaint on file herein and
the time allowed by law for answering having expired, the default of said defendant in the premises
is hereby duly entered according to law.
/
ATTEST my hand, and the seal of the above-entitled court, this _o££-day of June, 1998.

•. A Clerk of the Gburt

BY:
Depufy Clerk
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the estate of Breanna Marie Loveless,
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DEFAULT CERTIFICATE
DEFENDANT BOBBIE DAWN
WIDDISON
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-vsCivil No. 980901895
MICHAEL O. LEAVITT, in his capacity as
Governor of the State of Utah; et al,
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson
Defendants.

IN THIS ACTION, defendant Bobbie Dawn Widdison, having been regularly served with
process on March 19, 1998, and having failed to appear and answer plaintiffs complaint on file
herein and the time allowed by law for answering having expired, the default of said defendant in
the premises is hereby duly entered according to law.
/
ATTEST my hand, and the seal of the above-entitled court, this pv
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M. David Eckersley (0956)
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Attorneys for Michael O'Brien, Jones,
Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough,
William Grimm, The National Center
for Youth Law

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RICKY LEE SANDERS,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.

|
|

ft>
Civil No. 9809018$
Judge: Homer F. Wilkinson

MICHAEL O. LEAVITT, et al.,
Defendants.

The motion of defendants Jones,Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, the National
Center for Youth Law, Michael O'Brien and William Grimm came on for hearing before
the Court on June 23, 1998. Plaintiff was represented by his counsel, David Scofield, and
the moving defendants were represented by David Eckersley. The Court, having
considered the memoranda submitted by counsel and the arguments made at hearing, hereby
ABATES

II enters the following:

AHLER
"
.Suite 900
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e City
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ORPER
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is hereby granted.
DATED this'jL. day offeneM998.
BY THE C O t a ^ w S f e

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the
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day of June, 1998,1 caused to be mailed, first-

class mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER to the
following:
David W. Scofield
Paige Bigelow
PARSONS, DAVIES, KINGHORN & PETERS
185 South State, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
James R. Soper
Barbara E. Ochoa
Assistant Attorneys General
Post Office Box 140856
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0856
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Fourth South
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JAMES R. SOPER - 3043
BARBARA E. OCHOA - 4102
Assistant Attorneys General
JAN GRAHAM - 1231
Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendants
Leavi11, Steadman, Noonan,
Graham, Clawson, Luinstra,
Utah State Department of
Human Services, Division of
Family Services, Monitoring
Panel, Atkihson, Cotterell,
and Lunt
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140856
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856
Telephone: (801) 366-0100
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RICKY LEE SANDERS,
individually, and in his
capacity as the personal
representative of the estate
of Breanna Marie Loveless,
Deceased,

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS
:
:
:

Civil No. 980901895

:

Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Plaintiff,
vs.
MICHAEL O. LEAVITT, in his
capacity as Governor of the
State of Utah; et al. ,

:

Defendants.

The MOTION TO DISMISS filed by defendants, Michael 0.
Leavitt, Kerry Steadman, Mary T. Noonan, Jan Graham, Carol
Clawson, Linda Luinstra, Pamela Atkinson, Sherianne Cotterell,

Larry Lunt, the Monitoring Panel, the Utah State Department of
Human Services, and the Division of Family Services, duly came on
for hearing on the June 23, 1998, the Honorable Homer F.
Wilkinson presiding.

The moving defendants being represented by

James R. Soper and Barbara Ochoa. Plaintiff being represented by
David W.Scofield.

The Court having reviewed the pleadings and

papers on file and having heard agrument of counsel and being
fully advised, HEREBY ORDERS AS FOLLOWS:

1. Count I of plaintiff's complaint is dimissed, with
prejudice, againt the following defendants for failure to file a
notice of claim as required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12:
Utah State Department of Human Services
Micheal 0. Leavitt
Kerry D. Steadman
Mary T. Noonan
Jan Graham
Carol Clawson
Linda Luinstra
Pamela Atkinson
Sherianne Cotterell
Larry Lunt
the Monitoring Panel
The motion to dismiss Count I as against defendant Division of
Family Services is continued without date.

2. Count II of plaintiff's complaint is dimissed against the
following defendants because this Court lacks jurisdiction to
2

enforce the consent decree entered in David C. v. Leavitt, Civil
no. 93-C-206 W, U.S. District Court for District of Utah:
Utah State Department of Human Services
Division of Family Services
Micheal 0. Leavitt
Kerry D. Steadman
Mary T. Noonan
Jan Graham
Carol Clawson
Linda Luihstra
Pamela Atkinson
Sherianne Cotterell
Larry Lunt
the Monitoring Panel
The dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice to
plaintiff to bring the claims of Count II in U.S. District Court.

3. Count III of plaintiff's complaint is dimissed against
the following defendants because this Court lacks jurisdiction to
enforce the consent decree entered in David C. v. Leavitt, Civil
no. 93-C-206 W, U.S. District Court for District of Utah:
Utah State Department of Human Services
Division of Family Services
Micheal 0. Leavitt
Kerry D. Steadman
Mary T. Noonan
Jan Graham
Carol Clawson
Linda Luinstra
Pamela Atkinson
Sherianne Cotterell
Larry Lunt
the Monitoring Panel
3

The dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice to
plaintiff to bring the claims of Count III in U.S. District
Court.

4. Count IV of plaintiff's complaint is dimissed, with
prejudice, against the following defendants because they did not
owe a duty of care to Breanna Loveless:
Pamela Atkinson
Sherianne Cotterell
Larry Lunt
the Monitoring Panel

Dated this

^ T day of

1998

f-

mer F. Wilkins
istrict Court JuJ
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS, postage prepaid, this

M

day of June, 1998, to the following:
David W. Scofield
Paige Bigelow
PARSONS, DAVIES, KINGHORN & PETERS
Attorneys" for Plaintiff
185 South State Street, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
M. David Eckersley
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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bleeding disorders that make them easily detectable and one
can, you know, rule those out or make that diagnosis often
just really on history, based on a history and physical
examination, and if that can't be done, then in certain
simple laboratory studies.
Q.

Based on your training and experience, Doctor,

what's the significance of weight loss in a child under the
age of 1?
A.

Weight loss in any child under the age of 1

is--always should set off alarms and warning signs to a
pediatrician.

An infant should triple its birth weight by

the time it reaches the age of 1, so a child should continue
to grow and gain weight from day-to-day literally until
about well, it goes on until its first birthday beyond that.
So that a child who fails to gain weight or in fact loses
weight, this indicates a significant--a significant problem
and something should be investigated by the physicians.
It may be due to chronic illness, serious chronic
illness.

It may be one of the early signs of abuse and

neglect inadequate nutrition.

Often merely neglect itself

may lead to a child not eating, as well may cause her to
gain weight or even weight loss.
Q.

How common is it for infants to die of pneumonia?

A.

It's very rare for a normal infant to die of

pneumonia particularly beyond the neonatal period first
J. M. LIDDELL

histories.

The histories are also inconsistent.

I mean

these children don't suffer these kinds of injuries in falls
from a couch or getting trapped between a mattress and a bed
spring of a crib. And we've seen different histories again.
This is characteristic of Battered Child Syndrome,
discrepancy in the histories.
But even without the history, if we look at this
child--look at the the child, just look at the photographs
here where these injuries are and fractures and you can rule
out any natural disease process. And Ifve seen, as I say,
not only babies who will die, but thousands of babies.

I've

seen babies who have accidental injuries and these are not
consistent with any form of accidental injury.

They're not

consistent with any form of natural disease process that I
know of or that is recognized today by the physicians in the
medical field.
Q.

Thank you, Doctor.

Did you review records showing

that Breanna had been seen numerous times for ear
infections?
A.

Yes, she had.

Q.

Was there any significance to you o*f the number of

times in eight months that she had had ear infection?
A.

Well, I think the fact that these ear infections

did not clear up and were recurrent, that they indicated
that she was not receiving medication that she was supposed
J. M. LIDDELL
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to receive when a culture of the ear infection was finally
performed and did turn out Pseudomonas.

That Pseudomonas

was sensitive to virtually any antibiotic and had she
received adequate therapy with the antibiotic, we would
expect the ear infection to have cleared up.

In fact, you

know that in January that when the prescription was given,
ah, to, urn, to Mrs. Widdison, that the, ah--that it was not
filled.

And then finally a physician followed necessarily

injectable antibiotics in order to assure the child was
receiving the appropriate dose*
Q.

Did you review the records relating to a visit

that Breanna had to the doctor on January 12th of 1996?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

What did you find that was significant about that

visit?
A.

Well, not only, of course, that at that time that

she had, ah, still had suppurative otitis media, but that
she also had bruises on the forehead and on the left cheek.
And again, we have three bruises.
forehead.

One bruise on the

You might find some excuse, for there are usually

bruises on the forehead.

Should be midlines.

Here we have

two more, not midline, plus the bruise on the cheek. And I
think the bruise to the cheek is immediately suspicious for
a bruise because it's not the kind of area that we come to
get an accidental--an accidental bruise.
J. M. LIDDELL
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Q.

As to the condition of the baby's nose, did you

find anything significant about that?
A.

Well, also, there was erosion of the child's

nose--tip of the nose.
abrasion and erosion.

Between the nostrils, there was
Again, it's a medical condition that

needed to be treated.
Q.

Did you also--I!m sorry.

A.

I'm sorry.

The child also had diaper rash, a

chronic diaper rash which was persistent up until her death.
Q.

Did you also then review records that were

relating to the doctor visit on January 30th of 1996?
A.

Yes. And the record of January 30th, particular,

was very disturbing because now the child has multiple
bruises all over the body and multiple bruises of different
ages now on the face and this.

And also it was significant

that at this time, although the child had complained of as
given diarrhea, the previous visit on the 12th of January,
and the mother even had been asked to bring a stool sample,
that stool sample had not been returned.

And again, it's

important, if a child has diarrhea, to culture the stools
for the presence of different organisms in order to know how
to treat the diarrhea; and that had not been done.
But as I say, most importantly the fact that not
only were there additional bruises, but these were on the
facial, also a lesion--a laceration below the lower lip,
J. M. LIDDELL
OFFICIAL REPORTER

PAGE

26

those documents and let me just have you take a look at
that,
(INDICATED)
And you received copies of those, didn't you?
THE WITNESS:
Q.

That's correct.

I have these.

And do you have the one in front of you for

January the 30th--excuse me.

January the 12th or the 30th;

which one did I just show you?
A.

You showed me January the 12th.

Q.

January the 12th.

And you're familiar that at the

end of this situation the physician made some diagnosis; is
that right?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

Okay.

And the first diagnosis was--what's the

first thing that he noted?
A.

Purulent rhinitis.

Q.

What's the second then thing he noted?

A.

Bronchitis.

Q.

The third thing?

A.

Diarrhea.

Q.

And the fourth?

A.

Diaper dermatitis by history.

Q.

Thank you.

Q.

Concerning Pseudomonas, this case you indicated

that you did see a culture relating to Pseudomonas?
J. M. LIDDELL
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of the body, and then when that was removed, I'd sayeventually lividity would appear in that area of the body.
Q.

Assuming that so much time hadn't passed that

we're past the time when lividity could occur?
A.

If that portion of the body were dependent, yes.
MR. McCANDLESS:

I don't believe I have any other

questions right now, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Mr. Parrish, you my redirect.
MR. PARRISH:

Thank you, Your Honor.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. PARRISH:
Q.

Let's just begin, Dr. Kirschner, with that

particular issue of what position the baby had likely been
lying for the hours prior to her being discovered.

The

opinion you rendered earlier was that approximately two
hours prior to her discovery she would have been lying face
up.

Is that also somewhat based on the degree of rigor

mortis and the position of the baby's body?
A.

It's based on the degree of rigor mortis, yes.

Q.

Would you explain that, to some extent•

A.

Again, rigor mortis sets in much more quickly in

children than in adults.

We don't see rigor in adults until

perhaps up to eight hours, or eight hours after death. And
noticeable rigor within a couple of hours after death, we'd

J. M. LIDDELL

see significant rigor mortis in an infant.

But in a child

whofs just died or only been dead less than an hour, we
wouldn't expect to see for an hour-and-a-half to two hours.
As I say, itfs not an exact science, but it does take at
least an hour-and-a-half to two hours for rigor mortis to
become apparent in a child.
If a child has a fever, it may become more marked,
yes, earlier on, if the child1s body temperature is lower.
It may take longer for rigor mortis to appear.

But that

estimate of anywhere from 1-1/2 to 2-1/2 hours there was
significant rigor is what we would use.

So it means a

child, if it's found and the paramedics got there and the
child was already in rigor, the child has to have been dead
for some period of time.
Q.

Mr. McCandless asked you a number of questions

about Dr. Nixon's report of his concern about the quality of
X-rays.
A.

Did Dr. Leis actually examine those bones?
Yes. And I examined them microscopically and

those were fractures.
Q.

There's no doubt about that.

A.

That's correct.

Q.

Mr. Gaither's cross examination, you talked about

stresses and the difference between*the adrenal system and
the effect on the thymus.

I think you testified, and

correct me if I'm wrong, that the lymphocytes in the heart
J. M. LIDDELL
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maybe were related to the adrenal hormones; is that correct?
A.
are.

I said actually in this case I don't think they

I think what we found in this case is purely just the

benign.

That's like a slight collection you see in infants.

It has no significance whatsoever.
possibility.

I was talking about the

In cases we see this, all the adrenal effect

is while the adrenal effect is possible.

My opinion is this

is just a totally benign collection of lymphocytes that has
no connection whatsoever.
Q.

Thank you.

That helps.

As to the questions about bronchitis and pneumonia
and such, as you review the records, did you note that every
time the doctors listened to the baby's chest they found
that it was clear?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

If I were to tell you that the evidence in this

case is that the baby had a saturation rate of 99 percent on
the 11th of February of 1996, what would that say to you?
A.

That would certainly be inconsistent with the

child having pneumonia.
saturation.

And oxygen, that's total oxygen

Thatfs a normal oxygen saturation level and in

the blood, which indicates that the lungs were functioning
normally.

And when one gets pneumonia, the oxygen

saturation level in the blood drops down.
not have pneumonia at that time.
J. M. LIDDELL
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So this child did

Q.

Does the underlying cause of the pneumonia in this

case, that meaning whether itfs viral or bacterial, have any
effect at all on the opinions you've rendered here today?
A.

No.

Q.

Mr. Gaither asked you a question about thrush and

whether that might be a sign of some underlying immune
deficiency disorder.

Do you have an opinion as to whether

Breanna had an underlying immune deficiency disorder?
A.

She did not have an underlying immune deficiency

order.
Q.

And how do you rule that out?

A.

We rule that out several reasons.

She was very

healthy for the first six or seven months of her life.
has no other types of intercurrent infections.
no growth retardation.
50th percentile.

She grew normally.

She

She showed

She was on the

All this is against the immune defieicney

disorder.
She has a normal white blood cell count, so that
this also would be against that, microscopically, at
autopsy.

She has a normal--normal lymphoid system.

she has a thymus.

That is

She has lymph nodes, the lymphoid

decrease; and secondly, immune deficiency disorders often
have an absence of the thymus, and if they have a thymus, it
would be very small and would not have shown proper
development.

We would not see the normal lymphoid cells
J. M. LIDDELL

within the lymph node.
deficiency disorder.

She does not have an immune

Her bone marrow is also normal.

Q.

And that's another indication?

A.

That's correct.

Q.

Mr. Gaither also asked you some questions about

Sudden Infant Death Syndrome or SIDS.

Is that even

something to be considered in a case like this?
A.

It can't even be in the differential diagnosis

because it first of all requires that you have a negative
autopsy; also, a negative in every respect.
unlike SIDS.

It's totally

Sudden Infant Death Syndrome, by definition,

requires that you have totally negative autopsy.

That is no

evidence of disease, no evidence of injuries, and a negative
scene and circumstances investigation.

And it's the sudden

death of a child who's previously been in good health and
where there's no other evidence of any possible injury or
disease.

So she just doesn't fall into the SIDS category.

Plus she really is too old.

As I say, officially a

definition goes up to the age of a year.

It's really rare

to see a child even as old as six months die of SIDS.
Q.

There was a question asked about the lack of lung

cultures done during the autopsy.

Does that have any

significance in this case?
A.

It doesn't have any bearing in regard to my

opinion or the diagnosis.

I think the child had bacterial

J. M. LIDDELL

pneumonia, not viral pneumonia, based on the microscopic
appearance.

Again, the child does not/ show Pseudomonas

pneumonia because the microscopic appearance is a not
Pseudomonas pneumonia.
MR. PARRISH:
THE COURT:

So it doesnft have any bearing.
Thatfs all I have.

You the may recross.

MR. GAITHER:

Thank you, Your Honor.

RECROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. GAITHER:
Q.

Concerning the viral or bacterial pneumonia, the

culture could have shown which one was present; is that
correct?
A.

It's not a viral pneumonia.

Viral pneumonia

doesn't look like that.
Q.

Concerning my question, would a culture have

showed what type of bacterial infection?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And are you aware of a situation that exists where

there can be a viral pneumonia and a bacterial pneumonia in
combination?
A.

Certainly.

Q.

And there's been some testimony by some of the

experts in this case that if you have that type of a
combination, the onset could happen more quickly-A.

It certainly could.
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Q.

--and that the child could die quicker--is that

correct?--if there were a combination.
A.

Yes.

Q.

And the usual symptoms that you described would

not necessarily onset in the--the more slower faction.

It

may have a quick onset.
A.

There is an onset in that case.

The child becomes

ill more quickly, but it would be even more obvious to the
caretaker this child is in severe respiratory distress.
Q.

But there's no evidence that this child has even a

mixed viral bacterial pneumonia.
A.

This doesn't show the type of cellular partner in

the lungs that we would see in a cellular viral pneumonia.
Q.

Concerning the question about SIDS, and that's

basically the question I asked you, if the child is
diagnosed with pneumonia, that takes the child out of the
classification of SIDS
A.

Any child had bruises or evidence of fracture

would diagnose not SIDS.
Q.

Concerning the periosteal elevations that counsel

asked you about, could those types of elevations be caused
by mishandling of a child?
A.

Only by intentional mishandling of a child.

That

is inflicted injuries of this child.
Q.

Now that would be possibly grabbing a child by one
J. M. LIDDELL

arm and picking a child up?
A.

You have to take this nine-month-old and take its

arm and snap its arms to do that.

This is not

something--it's inflicted injury.

It's not an accidental

injury.

It's not due to carelessness.

It's due to an

inflicted injury on the child.
Q.

And you've never seen any type of injuries to this

area, that you would classify as accidental?
A.

In a nine-month-old?

Q.

Yes.

A.

In radial ulnar injuries I don't believe I have.

Q.

Concerning the age of the clavicle injury, did

you--what was the age that the clavicle injury was diagnosed
at?

Do you remember?
A.

I think at the time it was diagnosed it was a

fresh injury.
Q.

Excuse me.

I used the wrong word.

You did some

microscopies in relation to the clavicle injury?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And those microscopies, did they show healing?

A.

They showed healing, yes.

Q.

And did you put an age on the clavicle injury?

A.

Not specifically.

It's difficult to do.

It's

simple with a couple of weeks of age, but it's hard to be
more specific than that.

I can't pin it down to a specific
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day or more, give it a time frame.
Q.

The periosteal elevations, did you have what time

frame they were evolved in?
A.

Again, that would indicate a time frame of

approximately three to four weeks or three to five weeks.
Q.

Okay.

So which ones--

A.

Are you talking about just in the clavicle?

Q.

No.

A.

I think the clavicle was consistent with an injury

The clavicle, you said it was--

of, you know, anywhere from 10 days to 3 weeks or so.
Q.

And then you said the periosteal, let me talk--

A.

Well, the other injuries looked older.

That is

the clavicle looked more recent than the other injuries.
They're probably somewhat older, three to four weeks or
three to five weeks of age.
Q,

What would be the the long-range length of time on

those other fractures?
A.

Ah, probably about six weeks.

It's difficult.

It

is difficult microscopically to be specifying on those
injuries.

That's one of the reasons that radiologic

assessment is important.
Q.

So if we're talking about the injuries, were they

related as far back as noting the time of death, back into
early January and December would have been a possible time
frame?
J. M. LIDDELL

A.

For those other injuries.

Certainly back into the

early part of January is possible, yes,. I don't know that
they go back into December.
early.

I think that probably is too

But they could go back to January.

Q.

Do you remember the date of--ah, and then again,

you may have mentioned this.
my notes.

I just didn't get it down in

Would it have been that the range of that, the

earldest possible situation, what was it?
A.

Again, I could say some time in the early part of

January would be the earliest part.
Q.

The latest--excuse me.

A.

I don't think there are any younger than probably

two to three weeks of age.
MR. GAITHER:

I'm sorry.

Probably older.

That's all the questions I have.

THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. McCandless?
MR. McCANDLESS: Yeah.

Just one question for some

clarification.
RECRQSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. MCCANDLESS:
Q.

All right. Doctor, you testified, I believe, that

one of the things you relied on in ruling out immune
deficiency disorders was Breanna was in the 50th percentile;
did I understand that right, as far as weight and growth is
high?
A.

For six months, yes.
J. M. LIDDELL

Q.

Would it change your opinion at all if she were in

the 10th percentile?
A.

She dropped down in weight to the 10th percentile.

But the ultimate test of whether or not she had an immune
deficiency disorder is the autopsy that she has structurally
normal lymph nodes, structurally normal thymus, structurally
normal bone marrow; that she also had a normal white cell
count.

These are all inconsistent with immune deficiency

disorder, so the drop of her weight is not due to an immune
deficiency disorder.

The drop of her weight is the other

factors.
Q.

And that would be consistent, despite the findings

that Dr. Leis made, regarding the thymus?
A.

Yes.

Those are secondary findings.

to the chronic distresses.

Those are due

The immune deficiency disorders

do not cause bruises and do not cause fractures.

It's as

simple as that.
MR. McCANDLESS:

I don't have any other questions.

THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Parrish?
MR. PARRISH:

Just one very brief question.

FURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. PARRISH:
Q.

Dr. Kirschner, Dr. Leis, in his autopsy, indicates

in his opinion that fractures were two to four weeks old at
the time of death; do you have any disagreement with that?
J. M. LIDDELL
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BACKGROUND/NATURE OF AGENCY INVOLVEMENT
The Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) received the first rhfM p • • r •
refe^al concerning Bobbie Widdison, Breanna L o l e l e s s ' m i t o n
e 2 199T ^ n T
^
sub^antiated for medical neglect after it was determined that Bobbi Wi dd so'n a n d
^wZ™
(Bobbie s then-husband) failed to seek medical attention for their 10-mon h old H / T
u T
arm. The child did not receive treatment until her grandmotherTook t l ? ?
^ ^
the h Sp tal
approximately a week after the injury occurred At that
rinTth
° '

four months, the case was closed on October 28, 1991.

'raiment plan. Aiter

DCFS received its first referral concerning Breanna on January 1? loofi whf„ >,„ f„>, r,- ,
Sanders, and paternal grandmother, Maradeen Sanders, took hio"thememenJ™
f'

oi^iuijumi. one stated that she did not notice any other hniKM \Xc r^~j • L ^ . ,
case with David Tibbs, an assistant attorney general, * t S » ^ ? ?
^
'
doctor that the condition was not neglect. Ms. Goodrich Zl'Zt
* t 7
""" ?
re.tera.ed that the condition was not caused by neglect Ms Goodlh a l ° - ~ »'
T*

Widdison's home 3 „ f
o S i t L l ™

M M
'rm

P

l
1° ^ '" Pa ' n Whe " S h e P i c k e d "«r «P f™™ Ms.
un'Shi' . A f t W COnSU"inS W i , h m e d i c a l Professionals, Ms.

With regard to the bruises, K Goodrich staffed the case with Dr. Sta.no, who had seen Breanna
on January 30, 1996 after she purportedly became stuck between the her crib mattress and box
springs. According to the consultation report prepared by Dr. Helen Britton after a review of the
relevant medical records, Dr. Shamo noted that Breanna had multiple contusions, abrasions and red
linear marks. While he was concerned about the marks, he indicated that they were consistent with
Ms. Widdison's story that Breanna got caught between the crib rail and mattress. (It should be noted
'that at the preliminary hearing, Dr. Shamo stated that there were red linear marks, not bruises.) Dr.
Monsen's medical records from the February 11, 1996 visit indicate that there were "multiple
contusions . . . of the face, right arm, right upper chest, left hip and back." Some of the bruises and
a chin laceration were new since the January 30 visit with Dr. Shamo. Dr. Monsen's emergency room
notes indicate that he believed the bruises were due to abuse. He stated that "[t]he mother is advised
of the possibility of this child being taken from her care
She does not seem amenable to help in
the home. I advised her of the possibility of losing this child if things did not improve." Dr. Monsen
also recommended twice daily visits to the home by CPS and advised that the situation needed to be
"watched extremely closely."
It was also discovered during the investigation that Breanna had been diagnosed with ear infections
at the January 30 visit, but Ms. Widdison did not have the prescription filled until a week later, when
she asked Ms. Sanders to do it. Ms. Goodrich was also concerned after the mother tested positive
for opiates and benzodiazepine. The positive opiate result was explained by Ms. Widdison's use of
Lortab, but there was no explanation for the positive result for benzodiazepines. Ms. Goodrich
staffed the case with Lorraine Iverson and the decision was made to release the child to Ms. Widdison
upon her agreement to allow CPS to visit the home twice daily, at least initially. The case was
subsequently staffed with Ms. Goodrich's supervisor, Theldon Myrup, and with the assistant attorney
general, David Tibbs. In addition, information tp support a protective supervision request was faxed
to David Tibbs.
On Monday, February 12, 1996, Ms. Goodrich visited the home three times and saw the baby twice.
At both visits, the child appeared to be in satisfactory condition. Ms. Iverson also visited the home
twice on Tuesday, February 13, where the baby continued to appear adequately cared for. In
addition, the amount of medication was decreasing, indicating that it was being used. On Wednesday,
February 14, Ms. Goodrich visited the home twice and was told both times that the child was asleep.
On the first visit, the worker insisted on seeing Breanna, who was in her crib but did not appear to
be sieepy. Ms. Widdison, however, refused to allow the worker to see the baby on the second visit
that day, stating that Breanna slept all the time because of the pain. On Thursday, February 15, 1996,
Ms. Widdison came into the DCFS office and stated that she would not be available that afternoon
and would be unavailable on Friday. Ms. Goodrich, however, called the doctor's office later that
afternoon and confirmed that Breanna and her mother were there for a follow-up visit. From Friday,
February 16 through Monday, February 19, no visits were attempted. On Tuesday, February 20, Ms.
Goodrich attempted a home visit, but Ms. Widdison refused to let her see Breanna. The case was
staffed with assistant attorney general David Tibbs the following day, Wednesday, February 21, and
the decision was made to petition for at least protective supervision. That night, however, emergency
personnel were summoned to Breanna's home upon reports that the Breanna was not breathing. No
3

resuscitation efforts were mac. as it was clear that Breanna was already aead « the f
.u
Y
the time lhat
and law enforcement personnel arrived.
"

medical

,• ,

Breanna.'s ° l d e r siblin§s> ages 4 and 5, were immediately taken to the h«. v i r
exarrunanons and were removedfromthe home. They were i m 4 t D l 1 H
T
^

PhySlCal

u •

un.1 the JuvenHe Court released them to their father o ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ f ^

home

the ^
° f l b m a r y 2 5 ' 1 9 9 6 W h h a I I ^ a t i o n s ttat Ms. w7ddison had cLsed I i
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h me
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, ^
° show up. The child told the f o L mother and the doctor h s ^
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hit her. As a result, the case was substantiated for physical abuse
^
^ m°ther
The medical examiner's report indicates that Breanna had many contusion, ^
u •
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Breanna's death.
v*hfirst-degreefelony murder in Breanna's death. In a d d i t i o n , ^ ^ b ~ c h ^ %
*T?
counts of second-degree felony and class A misdemeanor c h S u s e A J t h o S
T ^
pneumonn, prosecutors contend that the abuse inflicted on BreannaomoromLed f
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and prevented herfromsurviving the pneumonia. In J f a ^ ^ ^ F
™
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6Vldence that B r e a n n a
may have died of inflicted suffocation
FINDINGS
1.
While Ms. Goodrich complied with most areas of relevant law and Pnoi;™
„ ••
y P ,Cy
were identified in the following areas:
' °'
(A)

B e caseworker did not review the nrinr history

The
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v,0,atl0ns

David C v r «„;„ c „>

«V »btag or other child residing in that household, and t h e a ! l e ^ e ^ e t r a . o r
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requiems are contained in CPS policy (see Child Welfare Manual
tt^KU,
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Although the referral number of the prior substantiated referral was notefon thV74 r f ^ r
H 'I
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d,d not review the prior history as part of her investigation.
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Child Welfare Manual Section

S
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J
f - u r e s in infants generally are the ^ ! ^ ^ Z u ^ t ^ Z
a strong hkel.hood at the „me the referrai was received that the case may have invoTved crinTa!
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charges. While a "Mandate Keport to Law Enforcement" was fihw- out, the facsimile date/time
stamp indicates that it was not received by the Millard County Sheriffs Office until February 26,
1996, four days after Breanna's death. It should be noted, however, that at the time this referral took
place, Ms. Goodrich was unaware that a broken clavicle generally resulted from child abuse. In
addition, it appears that workers may not receive adequate training on when to involve law
enforcement.
©
Bobbi Loveless and Travis Widdison should have been qnpstinned more ftYtpn^vply
concerning the cause nf \h? hryi^, At the time the January 12, 1996 referral was made, Breanna
had bruises on her cheek and forehead. There Is no indication in the case record or in the worker's
statements that the mother was ever questioned regarding the bruises. As noted earlier, Breanna had
many marks and bruises at the time of the February 11, 1996 referral, many of which were new since
the January 12 referral. The caseworker staffed the issues regarding bruises with Dr. Shamo and
noted in a letter to David Tibbs, assistant attorney general, that Dr. Monsen was very concerned
about the bruises that he saw on the February 12, 1996 visit. There is no indication in the activity log,
however, that she questioned the mother or Travis Widdison regarding the bruises, although there
is a notation in the investigation summary that "the mother reports she is a very active baby and
bumps her head when crawling, etc.". Many of the bruises, however, were not on Breanna's head.
The care givers should have been questioned more extensively regarding the cause of the bruises to
determine whether they could give plausible, consistent explanations and/or whether there was
evidence of abuse.
The settlement agreement requires that all investigations include "an interview with the child's natural
parents or other guardian" (see Section I.A.3 of the Settlement Agreement and U.C.A. § 78-3a304(c)). Presumably, the provision requires the caseworker to question the caretakers regarding the
allegations contained in the referral in order to determine whether the charges have validity. As noted
above, however, Travis Widdison was not interviewed and the mother appeared to be questioned only
briefly regarding some of the bruises.
2

Aside from the ahove-noted violations. Ms. Goodrich's investigation*; were thorough an^i
conducted in compliance with relevant law and policy. Ms. Goodrich initiated and completed the
investigations within the required time frames, made appropriate collateral contacts, conducted
staffings as required by policy (and in some cases, when they were not) and obtained the necessary
medical records. In addition, Ms. Goodrich's documentation was thorough and clearly documented
the actions taken on the case. The consensus of the committee was that Ms. Goodrich was a good
caseworker. The committee felt that the policy violations noted above, as well as many of additional
problems noted below, were more a result of systemic problems than problems or deficiencies on
the caseworker 'span.
3

- m It would have been consistent with best practices for the caseworker to have insisted on
seeing the child despif? mother's refusal to let her in the home Ms. Goodrich was very concerned
for Breanna, as evidenced by her desire to have CPS check on the child twice daily. Ms. Widdison's
refusal to allow Ms. Goodrich to visit the child should have raised a red flag and prompted Ms.
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Ms Qoodric ,g not believe she could rely^on her own .rigme^ During the fatality
review and preliminary hearing, Ms. Goodrich indicated that she could not rely on her own judgment,
but that she had to have "outside" evidencefromthird parties (doctors, etc.). For example, it appears
that Ms. Goodrich appears to have relied too much on the judgment of the assistant attorney general
and not enough on her own. Ms. Goodrich was very concerned about Breanna, but felt that the
assistant attorney general, David Tibbs, did not believe there was enough for even protective
supervision. (Mr. Tibbs, however, does not recall stating that there was not enough for protective
supervision.) As a result, she said that despite her concerns, she would have "felt stupid" pursuing
PSS or removal. Ms. Goodrich stated that she believed the assistant attorney general had to make
the decision of whether to pursue removal, PSS, etc., but Mr. Tibbs states that the decision has
always rested with the caseworker. (It appears that the current position of the attorney general's
office is to leave the decision to the caseworker, although it is unclear whether that is a new position
or a reiteration of what that office's position has always been.)
Several members of the committee expressed concern that many DCFS caseworkers have increasingly
felt that they are not empowered to make decisions due to the high level of scrutiny and "secondguessing" of their decisions. Some workers feel paralyzed and are willing to abdicate decisionmaking responsibility to others. DCFS workers, however, are specifically trained to recognize child
abuse and need to feel empowered to make decisions based on their assessment of the case, even if
their opinion conflicts with the opinion of the doctors, assistant attorney generals, etc.
5

;
After Breanna's death the caseworker took appropriate action tn protect Breanna's two older
S'Sters, Immediately upon notification of Breanna's death, Ms. Goodrich, along with law
enforcement, took the two older children for a physical examination and removed them from the
home. Pursuant to a court order, they have since been placed with their natural father. A review of
the case record indicates that Ms. Goodrich complied with relevant law, policy and court orders in
removing and placing the two children.
6

PCFS employees have implemented changes as a result of Breanna's rWh Since Breanna's
death, the DCFS employees involved have reviewed their handling of the case and have made the
following changes as a result: (a) procedures have been modified to ensure that a copy of any prior
referrals are attached to the 741 and reviewed by the worker as part of the investigation; (b) the
caseworker now requests that law enforcement accompany them on all cases in which injury to an
infant is alleged; © a complete skeletal survey is done if injury to a child is found (Dr. Britton clarified
during the review that this may be accomplished by having a full set of x-rays taken in Delta (where
the child resides) and having the x-rays sent to Primary Children's Medical Center, rather than
requiring the child to travel to Salt Lake City for the survey); (d) workers and supervisors now leave
their cellphones and beepers on 24-hours a day to improve accessibility and improve communication.
The workers and Western Region should be commended for their proactive response in
independently improving their practices after Breanna's death.
7

The caseworker would benefit from additional training Ms. Goodrich indicated that she
would benefit from additional training. She specifically stated that training regarding sex abuse
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lower lip, a 4 cm 4 . j raised contusion' above the left ear, a 1 cm by 4 cm horizontal
contusion on the back of the head, an old 1 by Vz cm oval shaped contusion on the upper arm
two red linear bruises or abrasions 5 mm by 5 cm located midway up the upper back and just
below the waist, a red linear mark or abrasion on therightbuttocks measuring 1 cm by 10 cm,
and a deep purple 'confluent diaper rash'. Although the medical assessmenfstates that these
injuries are consistent with the history, the varied ages of the bruises and abrasions and their
location-(some would be under clothed and diapered areas) do not support this conclusion.
Nonaccidental trauma would be the most likely explanation for this constellation of
physical findings (emphasis added)."
While sole responsibility cannot be placed with medical personnel for not always identifying
Breanna's injuries as stemming from abuse, the failure to do so was a significant factor in the
decisions made regarding Breanna's case.
H

; . PCFsS caseworkers mav not be adequately trained to know when to oet a second medical
2JTOIL Although there were several physical symptoms indicating that Breanna had been physically
abused, the caseworker relied on a doctor's assessment that the child's injuries were not consistent
with neglect and/or abuse (in connection with the January 12 and February 11, 1996 referrals). While
it is understandable that a lay person would defer to a medical professional's judgment regarding the
case of the injuries, DCFS workers need to be trained on when to seek a second opinion regarding
the cause of injuries.
12

The caseworker was provided with appropriate support following Banna's death The
Western^region should be commended for providing excellent support to Ms. Goodrich following
Breanna's death. Ms. Goodrich stated that her supervisor, Theldon Myrup, was extremely
supportive. In addition, the region arranged for a clinical consultant to come down from Ogden to
talk with Ms. Goodrich. (The consultant was available for additional visits, but Ms. Goodrich'did not
feel that further sessions with the consultant were needed.) It is commendable that the Western
region recognized the worker's need for support and provided that support in an expeditious and
appropriate manner.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1-

. PCFS should continue its efforts to ensure that workers are properly fraJneH DCFS should
continue to assess worker's knowledge and should provide training in needed areas. Specifically,
additional training may be required in the following areas:
(a)
Thg DCFS worker's right to conduct home visits ^ he/she feeU is necessary to
protect children As indicated earlier, Ms. Goodrich seemed to believe that she did not have
the right to insist on seeing Breanna over her mother's objections without protective
supervision. Caseworkers should be educated on their rights regarding visitation and other
interventions and should be trained on how to obtain the appropriate support (i.e., law
enforcement) in asserting those rights.
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m -uu.u«n, ^ wooers she
oe supponed in their decisions by Dv i administration when they
have made a good faith effort to discharge their duties.- "CPS work necessarily requires workers to
make many difficult judgment calls. While it is important to learn from cases where mistakes are
made or problems/tragedies occur, workers will feel more empowered and free to trust their own
judgment if they do not feel that they will be unfairly criticized for their decisions if something later
goes wrong in the case. (It should be noted that the fatality review committee recognizes their need
to be supportive m this area as well.)
3

PCFS rtonld work wifh the medical community in ensuring that r W t ^ , arft p r n p p r l y
^
9 recowiTft child abyse and to take appropriate action Doctors should be trained on recognizing
the signs of child abuse and should be educated on how to address child abuse issues (i e makine
a referral, working with CPS, contacting the Child Protection Team for consultation, etc.)
4

PCFS should ensure that worker's caseloads are held to a man?creahle nnmlw DCFS should
assess worker's caseloads and, to the extent possible, should ensure that workers have adequate time
to perform their duties in compliance with relevant law and policy.
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layer looks almost identical in cellularity to the
center p ortion.
Q

That's what I observed in Breanna.

In your opinion, doctor, would Breanna

Loveless have died of pneumonia in the absence of
effect o f physical trauma that she also suffered?
A

I don't believe so.

Q

Would you explain that?

A

Again, it's unlikely.

usually a —

]

It is possible, but

normal healthy kids can fight off

infections such as pneumonia,

Obviously, that's not

100 percent true, or as I stated earlier, we wouldn't
have somewhere between six or ten infants coming into
our office dying of pneumonia.

But most normal

healthy kids who develop infection in their lungs
classified as pneumonia are able to fight that
infection and become healthy once again.
Q

Doctor, as you perform an evaluation of the

cause an d manner of death, you also determine the
likely time of death.
A

That's correct.

Q

And did you make a determination as to

Breanna?

A

Yes, I did.

Q

What's your opinion as to when Breanna

Loveless .died?
',
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likely mechanism of that bruise?
A

That could be a push or blow or something

that creates pressure in that area of her back.
Q

Could you express any opinion as to the age

of that bruise?
A

I described it as light brown, so it's been

there a while and it has been there for a few days,
Q

What else is significant on State's

Exhibit No. 16?
A

16 also shows the degree of diaper rash that

Breanna had, at least from the posterior aspect.
State's Exhibit 17 shows the degree of diaper rash
that she had on the front aspect of her genitalia.
Q

What is your opinion as to the cause of the

diaper rash?
A

She had a history of diarrhea; and with

improper care or incomplete care of that area, as far
as changing diapers frequently, keeping the area
clean, relatively dry, and applying medication, this
is one of the more significant diaper rashes I have
seen.
Q

Is this particular condition consistent with

the claim that the baby's diaper was changed
frequently?
A

I don't believe so.
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1
2

one other location.
Q

Go ahead.

Why don't we just finish with the arms.

3

you have an opinion, doctor, as to what mechanism

4

would cause those kind of periosteal damage?

5

A

Do

A grabbing and twisting of the extremity

6

would do it.

So if you grab the child by the arm and

7

pull it somewhere, or your grab, pulling, and twist

8

would cause a shear of the periosteum to occur from

9

the surface of the bone.

Any type of act that would

10

cause rapid twisting and shearing type of action would

11

produce that.

12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Q

Would this be something that would be likely

in the1 normal everyday care of a baby?
A

Should not be.

I mean, if the kid is handled

proper ly and lifted up, you wouldn't see this.
Q

Do you see this in any kind of accidental

situation with a baby?
A

There would have to be a mechanism where the

19

leg is pinned and the body twists; so,syou know, is

20

that p ossible?

21

one extremity; but to see it on two opposite

22

extrem tities, I'd say that greatly decreases the

23

likeli hood of accident.

24
25

Q

Yeah, it would be possible, maybe, on

Can you talk about how much force would have

to be applied in this twisting action?
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A

It's just described as a rapid twisting type

of action.

You know, you'd have to have some degree

of squeeze there to apply the pressure so the forces
are taken down to the depths of the extremity, and
then the twisting motion to cause the shearing to
occur.
Q

Would these be consistent with someone

picking the baby up by one arm and the baby's body
causing the twisting motion?
A

Yes, it could be.

Q

Would you then label what you've drawn as to

the left and right arms?
A

(Witness complies).

Q

What other fractures did you find, Dr. Leis?

A

There was also a similar type of elevation of

the periosteum of the tibia with the shin bone on the
left.

And also in looking at that particular bone,

there was a line that appeared to be a spiral type
fracture , meaning as the bone broke orvwas

fractured,

that the fracture line didn't just go straight across
the bone , it had kind of a spin or spiral to it.
Q

What's the significance of that finding?

A

Again, the spiral type of fracture and the

raising of the periosteum would be a twisting type of
motion or, force applied to that particular extremity
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1
2
3
4

producing the fractures.
Can you think of any type of mechanism that

Q

would cause that twisting force to a baby's life?
Similar as to what we described in the upper

A

5

arms of the grabbing the extremity, pulling or

6

squeezing, pulling on the kid and twisting it in the

7

same motion.

8
9

Is this particul ar fracture a common thing to

Q

find in children who are not yet walking?

10

A

No.

11

Q

Are any of these fractures common in children

12
13

who are not yet walking?
No.

A

Given the mechanism of forces that

14

produce these, I'd say th ey are consistent with

15

non-accidental trauma.

16

Could you express an opinion as to the likely

Q

17

age of the arm fractures first and then the leg

18

fracture?

19

A

Again, seeing -- being able Up actually

20

visualize the periosteum raise would be at least ten

21

days .

22

assessment as to how old they were.

Kt least two to four weeks would be a fair

23

Q

As to all the fractures?

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

Thank you.

You may resume the witness
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1

suspicious leading up to the death, then we would

2

certify the cause of death as SIDS.

3

Q

Concerning those types of cases, was I to

4

understand from your discussion that there are some

5

young children that come in and it's originally

6

diagnosed as a possible SIDS case and later that

7

pneumonia is found and explains the death?

8

A

That's correct.

9

Q

Now, from what you've told me about SIDS

10

cases, seems like these cases of pneumonia would be

11

young children, there was no prior indicators that had

12

pneumonia, the parents just went out and find them in

13

the crib?

14

A

Usually about the most significant

symptoms

15

we find, they might have had some sort of upper

16

respiratory infection so that they had runny nose or

17

sniffles.

18

Q

Bronchitis?

19

A

Usually not, but there may be a physician

20
21

recently made a diagnosis such as that.
Q

So basically what you're saying, there are

22

some SIDS cases of pneumonia that you're aware of

23

where there wasn't any situation where the child was

24

showing any effects as to the extent that when the

25

child canle in it was diagnosed as sudden infant death
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syndrome case?
A

Right,

Initially, it presented as if it

might be a sudd en death syndrome death.

And then

following the c ompletion of our test we certified the
cause of death as pneumonia.
Q

That's probably similar to this case.

Yo u

looked into sudden death syndrome in this case, di dn't
you?
A

That would be considered in the different ial

diagnosis before we start, yes.
Q

And so when there was some follow-up

questions about what you would normally expect as far
as a c hild with pneumonia, with showing some sympt.oias
ahead of time a nd situations such as that, you have to
acknow ledge, do n't you, that there are cases when it
gets to the point where they come in and they are
categorized as SIDS and then you find pneumonia?
A

Yes .

Q

And in those cases where you 'found the child

sudden ly dying of pneumonia, have you analyzed it to
see wh ether it was a bacterial pneumonia as opposed to
a vira 1 pneumonia?
A

We do routinely the same cultures that I did

in the death of Breanna.

And we may or may not find

evidence of an organism based upon those tests.
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1

Q

And in some of those, have you found any

2

cases where there was a combination of the viral and

3

the pneumonia that caused sudden pneumonia to have its

4

onset?

5
6

A

Usually we only find one organism, but it

would be possible to have more than one.

7

Q

Now, in the frequency -- just to get the

8

statistics down a little bit -- was that you

9

personally that you see six infants per year, or was

10

that your entire office?

11
12

A

entire office.

13
14

Q

What is the statistics basically for SIDS

death in the last two or three years?

15
16

That's probably more representative of the

A

In our office we are getting between 30 and

40 deaths to be classified as SIDS each year.

17

Q

30 to 40?

And some of those have -- okay,

18

and originally some SIDS have been classified as

19

pneumonia, so they wouldn't be included in that 30 to

20

40?

21

A

Correct.

22

Q

All right.

23
24
25

Thank you.

Now, I would like to ask you some questions
about some medical records.
At this time, your Honor, I have marked as
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1

Q

You had no indication of any follow-up tests?

2

And the follow-up test would be a fluid serum test

3

which would test the same thing, but possibly look for

4

different -- categorize it differently?

5

A

Yes.

6

Q

Thank you.

I'm now placing on the projector

7

what I've referred to as a blood test of January 30th,

8

1996.

9

A

Yes, I do.

10

Q

And I'm going to slide it down on the screen

Do you recall receiving that document?

11

so we can see the top portion.

12

copies have any writing -- handwriting on the

13

right-hand side?

14
15
16
17

A

Yes.

office does.
Q
patient.

Does any of your

The copies that I received at the ME's
The exhibits do not.

And did you interpret that to mean, "Call
Lab results show viral illness"?

18

A

That's what it says.

19

Q

What is a viral illness?

20

A

That would be an infection because of some

21
22
23

sort of viral agent or virus.
Q

And would that include something like upper

respiratory tract problem, a virus?

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

And I have heard some discussion about one
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1
2
3

pneumonia.
Q

Secondary infection on top like plus four

Pseudomonas?

4

A

Pseudomonas could be an organism, yes.

5

Q

Thank you.

So the fact that the child has

6

bronchitis does increase the likelihood that the other

7

bacterial infections could spread to the lungs?

8

A

Could you repeat that?

9

Q

The fact that a child has bronchitis, does it

10

increase the likelihood that the infection may spread

11

to the lungs and develop pneumonia?

12

A

It may.

13

Q

Concerning the ear drainage, did you ever see

14
15
16
17

an indication that the ears were draining?
A

Yes.

I saw the dried exudates in both ear

canals.
Q

Would the drainage of the tubes that were

18

placed in January ever drain out in the area of the

19

lungs?

20

A

That's possible.

21

Q

And I think you previously discussed an

22

opening known as eustachian tube?

23

A

Correct.

24

Q

And that would be drainage into the back of

25

the mouth area?
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A

Yes .

Q

And that could be a source for the spread of

bacterial organisms possibly down to 'the lungs?
A

It's possible.

Q

The phrase "purulent rhinitis" -- I really

murdered that one -- could you help me with that
phrase again?
A

Purulent rhinitis.

Q

What does that mean to you?

A

Drainage from the nose that appears to be

infected.
Q

All right.

And now, some drainage is clear,

is that right?
A

Yes.

Q

And there's also some drainage that is

colored?
A

Yes.

Q

As far as this child is concerned, did you

see that there was a colored drainage?
A

The coloration of the exudates in the ear

canals I saw was colored.
Q

The phrase that I just couldn't speak, did

you see that in the reports of the physicians?
A

Yes, I did.

Q

What was the date of that?
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A

January 12.

Q

And does that indicate to you that there was

an infected mucus -- was infected?
A

That would indicate that she's got what

appears to be infectious drainage coming from her
nose.
Q

Is that a possible cause of pneumonia?

A

It could be.

If she sniffles and swallows

some of that material, it could wind up trapped in
lung tissue or could be inhaled.
Q

All right.

What about the pacifier?

You're

aware that young children sometimes use pacifiers?
A

Yes.

Q

And I suppose if there was some drainage on

to the pacifier, the child is sucking the pacifier,
that would be a pretty likely mechanism into the
lungs, wouldn't it?
A

It's a possible route.

Q

Did you ever inquire whether this child did

use a pacifier or anything such as that?
A

I don't recall specifically.

Q

Even if not a pacifier, what about bottles if

the child was being bottle fed?
A

Same possibility.

Q

Do you recall me asking you questions about
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1

A

At least the one I'm looking at here, they

2

didn't plot out her weight.

3

circumference.

4

report that she had lost some weight.

5
6

Q

They plotted out the head

There was some mentionings in the

Is that a common thing with a child under the

age of one?

7

A

Should not be.

8

Q

And explain that, please.

9

A

Normally the child should continue to grow

10
11
12

and continue to gain weight.
Q

Would that be an indication that something

was wrong with Breanna?

13

A

Yes.

14

Q

And what would you think would be the

15
16

possibility there?
A

She could either be sick and have a decreased

17

appetite from that, or she could be limited on the

18

amount of food that she has available to her.

19

Q

Was there anything that you saw in the

20

medical records that indicated that she would be

21

unable to metabolize food?

22

A

No.

23

Q

Mr. McCandless asked you some questions about

24

the lividity.

Let me go back to your original opinion

25

and just ask if anything that he had asked you about
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1

A

Yes,

2

Q

And again, the -- I think that you even

3

indicated that that could be caused by pulling on the

4

ears, the lesions I think you described them as.

5

A

Yes.

6

Q

Thank you.

Now, going also in that note --

7

this is December 18th of 1995 -- it talks about a

8

clear rhinitis.

9

discharge from the nose?

Does that have anything to do with

10

A

Yes.

11

Q

And that clear would mean something as

12

opposed to a colored situation, is that right?

13

A

Correct.

14

Q

Which would show there's more of a disease,

15

clear or colored?

16

A

Colored.

17

Q

And then going on to January 12th of 1996,

18

there is a phrase white mucopurulent drainage coming

19

from her nostrils?

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

And that would be the more -- the situation

22

where there would be some more indication of some type

23

of an infection?

24

A

Correct.

25

Q

And again, just for reference, the phrase
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REPORT OF EXAMINATION
Name: LOVELESS, Breanna

Case #: 96-0224

Date/Time of Death: 2 / 2 2 / 9 6 00:26
Examination by: E d w a r d A . Leis, M . D .

Age: 9 mos

Race: White

Sex: Female

Date/Time of Autopsy: 2 / 2 2 / 9 6 08:30
Investigative Agency: M i l l a r d C o u n t y Sheriff

Witnesses: Charles E. Stewart, Millard County S.O.
Manner of Death: Undetermined.
Immediate Cause of Death: P n e u m o n i a

Other Significant Conditions: Musculoskeletal trauma, recent and healing; myocarditis.
FINAL PATHOLOGIC DIAGNOSES
I. Pneumonia, bilateral, extensive.
II. Myocarditis, right heart, focal.
III. Blunt force injuries to the head:
A. Contusions, face, multiple, recent and resolving.
B. Abrasion, posterior to right ear and left scalp.
C. Upper frenula tear, mouth.
D. Abrasion/superficial laceration below lower lip, healing.
III.Blunt force injuries to the torso:
A. Contusions, upper and lower midline of back.
V. Extremity injuries, including:
A. Periosteal elevation and calcification, right radius and ulna, left radius.
B. Right clavicle fracture, mid-shaft, with healing callus.
C. Left tibia, periosteal elevation and partial spiral fracture.
D. Abrasion, posterior right elbow.
E. Contusion, left wrist and and palm.
E. Contusions, left thigh and both knees.
F. Contusions, linear, parallel, posterior right thigh.
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VI. Otitis, bilateral with dried exudates in both ear canals and residual exudates
noted in inner ears.
VII. Excoriations, labia, perineum, and buttocks.
VIII. iNo congenital abnormalities.

OPINION: This nine month old white female, Breanna Loveless, died of pneumonia.
Infection was identified in all lung lobes. The extent of this disease process is sufficient
to explain death. Although the infection had not apparently spread into the
bloodstream, (post-mortem blood cultures showed no growth), there was also evidence
of an infection and inflammation in the heart. This was limited to a focal region of the
right heart, but potentially may have been sufficient, in and of itself, to be fatal.
The deceased had several injuries that were apparent externally and by radiographs.
These were confirmed by gross and microscopic examination. The cutaneous injuries
include ecchymoses and some abrasions of the face, extremities, and back. The
contusions grossly appeared of varying ages based upon their variation in color.
Histologically, there was a variation in the inflammatory response, also consistent with
variation of the age of these injuries. The abrasions were crusted and healing. Some
contusions were patterned. The contusions to the posterior right thigh were parallel
and the contusions of the left cheek were curvilinear and suggestive of a bite mark.
The injury to the frenulum appears recent. According to the hospital record, this
area was noted to be excoriated and slightly bleeding and was felt to be secondary to
attempted intubation. Microscopically the tissue was necrotic and inflamed, consistent
with injury to this area previously and while alive.
Fractures and periosteal bone elevations were identified in several areas. The
fracture of the clavicle had a well formed callus, indicative of healing. The location of
the fracture of this bone is seen in both accidental and inflicted injury. There is no
historical explanation of the injury and in the presence of other fractures and injuries
seen in this child, I believe non-accidental trauma is a more likely etiology.
The tibia fracture and the upper extremity periosteal elevations are strongly
suggestive of non-accidental trauma because of the twisting mechanism that imparts
such injury. Radiologic dating is consistent with these injuries inflicted 2-4 weeks prior
to death. The histologic features of these injuries exhibit features consistent with this
time frame. Although some attempts of microscopic dating of bone injuries appear in
the literature, the rate of healing is quite variable, particularly in children. Microscopic
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features from the clavicle and the long bones of the extremities, overlap in their stages
of healing despite different mechanisms that would lead to the injury. The microscopic
features cannot distinguish between the injuries occurring in or around a single
episode or several separate episodes of abuse occurring over a span of a week or two..
Another important histologic finding in the sites of bone fracture, as well as noninjured bone remote from sites of injury, is that there is no indication of abnormal
bone development or "brittle bone" disease. The injuries identified are secondary to
non-accidental trauma and are not pathologic fractures.

Edward A. Leis, M.D.
Assistant Medical Examiner
Date signed: U . n ? - C;L>
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OFFICfc OF THE MEDICAL EXAMINER - S1 ATE OF UTAH
EXAMINATION PROTOCOL
EXTERNAL EXAMINATION — OME Case # 96-0224
The body is that of a normally developed white female infant, received with separately
submitted personal effects in a plastic bag. The personal effects include two one-piece
sleepers and a section of ace wrap. Personal effects are submitted as evidence to the
Millard County Sheriff's Office.
The body has the following measurements: weight 7120 grams (approximately 10th
percentile for age), length 71 cm (approximately 75th percentile for age), crown-rump
length 53 cm, head circumference 44 cm, chest circumference 41.5 cm, and abdominal
girth 43 cm.
The body is cool. Rigor is present and fixed. Lividity is posterior, red-purple, and fixed,
except in areas exposed to pressure.
The-scalp hair is light brown. The anterior fontanelle is depressed and approximately
1.5 cm in maximum dimension. The eyes are blue with 0.3 cm symmetric pupils and
petechiae are absent. There are several contusions of the face as described below. There
are dried crusted tan-green exudates present in both ear canals, the left to a greater
extent than the right. Injuries to the mouth are as described below. No teeth have
erupted. The neck is normally formed and free of external evidence of injury.
The chest is symmetrical and free of external evidence of injury. The abdomen is
distended, but soft, and free of distinguishing markings or scars.
The upper and lower extremities are normally developed and symmetrical. On the
posterior medial right elbow is a 1.1 X 0.6 cm oval red-brown based abrasion. The
remainder of the right arm is free of evidence of injury. On the palm of the left hand is
a ill-defined area of apparent purple ecchymosis. On the back of the left wrist/forearm is
a 4.8 X 1.7 cm bandlike area of ecchymosis which is wider at its posterior-medial aspect.
In this larger area, the center retains a red-purple color fading to a brown with a yellowbrown discoloration at the most peripheral margins.
Small circular light yellow-brown ecchymoses are present on the anterior left thigh and
left knee. Just above the right knee are slightly larger yellow-brown contusions, and
brown contusions with yellow margins are present below the right knee. There is no
distinct swelling of any of the extremities or shortening observable.
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The back is remarkable for light brown to yellow-brown ecchymoses at the base of the
neck and the upper back along the midline. Two of these are incised disclosing
discoloration of the subcutaneous tissue. Similar light brown ecchymoses are seen in
the upper lumbar region of the back towards the midline. These are also incised and
disclose subcutaneous changes. A 'control' incision is made in an area of lividity on the
posterior left with no subcutaneous discoloration identified.
On the back of the right thigh, just below the buttocks, are two parallel markings. One
consists of a speckled light brown ecchymosis and separated by a 3.3 cm expanse of noninjured skin, is a 2.5 cm long by 0.6 cm wide light brown ecchymosis.
The external genitalia are those of a female infant. There is no evidence of sexual
assault with the hymenal opening appearing unremarkable. The anal opening is
similarly unremarkable. In the area of the pubis and the labia majora, over an 8.0 X 3.8
cm area, are multiple small patchy to confluent red-brown to light brown based
excoriations. These continue on to the buttocks on both sides of the gluteal crease and
are on the exposed portions of the buttocks and do not lay within the fold.
DESCRIPTION OF INTURIES
I. BLUNT FORCE INTURIES TO THE HEAD:
Multiple contusions of varying
appearance, intensity, and size are noted on the forehead. There are two above the right
eyebrow, and one on the left upper forehead which is brown with yellow margins.
Immediately above the left eyebrow are light brown geographic contusions without
color change of the margins. Faintly discernible light brown ecchymosis is present on
the left forehead, just to the left of the midline, and measures 2.5 cm maximum. On the
left scalp, above the left ear, is a 1.2 x 0.5 dry red-brown based abrasion with marginal
ecchymosis.
There is red-purple discoloration at the medial aspect of the left lower eyelid which
fades to a brown color laterally. On the right cheek, over the area of the right zygoma, is
a light brown ecchymosis. Anterior to both nasal openings, the skin of the nose is dried
and crusted red-brown. There are no lacerations or tears noted of the tissue of the nose
or immediately within the openings.
Just anterior and inferior to the right ear are two faintly discernible small yellow-brown
ecchymoses. Just lateral and above the mouth, on the lower right cheek, are red-purple
ecchymoses without discernible fading. On the lower right jaw are light brown
ecchymoses having yellow margins.
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On the lower left cheek, just lateral to the left side of the mouth, are light brown
ecchymoses with slight yellow margins oriented in a slightly ciirved pattern, suggestive
of a bite mark pattern. Some dried crusted tissue is located at the left angle of the
mouth. Below the lower lip is a 1.8 X 0.6 cm dried and crusted red-brown based
abrasion /superficial laceration.
The oral cavity discloses sloughing of the mucosa of the upper gingiva and tearing of
the frenulum. The sloughed mucosa extends to the inner aspect of the inner lip. A
section is taken for microscopic examination.
RADIOGRAPHIC EXAMINATION: Total body x-rays are obtained. There is a fracture
of the right midclavicle which has indiscernible callus formation on x-ray. The right
upper extremity discloses elevation of the periosteum along the shaft of both the right
radius and ulna. Similar changes are noted on the left radius shaft. There is also an
angled fracture interrupting the cortex on one side of the left tibia.
INTERNAL EXAMINATION
BODY CAVITIES:
The body cavities are opened by the usual Y-shaped and
intermastoid incisions. No adhesions or abnormal collections of fluid are present in
any of the body cavities. The organs of the thoracic and abdominal cavities are located
in their normal anatomic positions. The subcutaneous fat layer of the abdominal wall
is 0.5 cm thick.
HEAD: The scalp is reflected in the usual fashion disclosing purple ecchymosis on the
inner surface of the scalp corresponding to the left forehead and right forehead
ecchymoses. A sample is taken from the left forehead ecchymosis for microscopic
examination. A portion of the calvarium is removed and is free of skull fractures. The
dura mater and falx cerebri are intact. No epidural or Subdural hemorrhages are
present. The brain weighs 870 grams and is placed in formalin for examination at a later
date. The spinal cord is removed by the anterior approach and is placed in formalin for
examination at a later date. Following removal of the brain and stripping of the dura,
no basilar skull fractures are seen. The inner ears are opened with tan exudates found
bilaterally.
BRAIN AFTER FIXATION:
The cerebral hemispheres are symmetrical without
evidence of swelling. The meninges appear slightly cloudy, white and bubbly on the
superior surface. There are no external signs of trauma or developmental abnormality.
With sectioning, congestion of the intraparenchymal vessels is found. The inferior
white matter of the right frontal lobe has a 0.3 cm red area. No other significant
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findings are noted. The external and internal inspection, of the spinal cord is
unremarkable.
NECK;
A serial dissection of the neck musculature is undertaken with no
intramuscular hemorrhages found. The hyoid bone is intact. The larynx does not have
any fractures. The tongue is removed, serially sectioned, with no evidence of
intramuscular hemorrhage. There are no hemorrhages along the paraspinus muscles
noted anteriorly, and the upper cervical spine appears normally aligned. An incision is
made from the base of the head along the upper portions of the spine posteriorly. There
are no hemorrhages in the paraspinus muscles identified.
CARDIOVASCULAR SYSTEM:
The heart weighs 42 grams. The pericardial sac
contains an appropriate amount of fluid and is free of adhesions. The coronary arteries
have a normal distribution and arise from normally placed and configured ostia. The
myocardium is red-brown and firm without evidence of recent or old injury. The
ventricular chambers are appropriate size and the walls are not thickened. The atrial
and ventricular septae are intact. The valves have the usual number of cusps and are
free of abnormality. The aorta and its branches arise normally. There is no coarctation.
The ductus is closed.
RESPIRATORY SYSTEM:
The lungs weigh 99 and 81 grams, right and left,
respectively. Both lungs are expanded and appropriately lobated. The pleural surfaces
are smooth and glistening. The parenchyma varies from red to a slightly darker redpurple on the posterior dependent regions with no focal lesions or areas of
consolidation present. The pulmonary artery and its branches are free of occluding
thrombo-emboli. The trachea and main bronchi are free of obstructive material. The
mucosal surfaces are tan and smooth throughout without evidence of ulceration or
hyperemia.
LIVER AND BILIARY SYSTEM: The liver weighs 338 grams. The hepatic capsule is
smooth and intact. The parenchyma has a uniform reel-brown congested appearance
with no focal lesions noted. The gallbladder contains a small amount of green, slightly
mucoid bile free of calculi.
ALIMENTARY TRACT: The esophagus is lined by smooth gray-white mucosa. The
gastric mucosa is normally rugated and the lumen contains approximately 20 cc of
white curd-like material. There are no ulcerations or erythema noted of the mucosa.
The small and large intestine are continuous, free of obstruction or lesions. The
appendix is present. The pancreas is appropriately positioned and consists of lobulated
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pink tissue.
GENITOURINARY TRACT: The combined weight of the kidneys is 43 grams. The
renal capsules strip with ease from the underlying superficially lobulated, red-brown
cortical surfaces. The cortices are sharply demarcated from the medullary pyramids. The
calyces, pelves and ureters are unremarkable. The urinary bladder is devoid of urine;
the mucosa is unremarkable. The uterus and ovaries are unremarkable for age.
RETICULOENDOTHELIAL SYSTEM: The thymus weighs 9.4 grams. The position and
lobation is appropriate. Petechiae are absent. The spleen weighs 20.5 grams. The spleen
capsule is intact encasing semi-firm dark red-purple parenchyma with prominence of
the white pulp. Regional lymph nodes appear normal. The bone marrow is red-brown
and moist.
ENDOCRINE SYSTEM: The thyroid and adrenal glands are appropriately positioned
and unremarkable. The adrenal glands in aggregate weigh 4.2 grams.
MUSCULOSKELETAL SYSTEM: There is a large callus surrounding the right clavicle
at the point of fracture. The long bones from the right forearm, the left tibia, the left
radius are removed. There is no hemorrhage noted in the surrounding tissues
associated with these bones. They are placed in formalin and decalcified before
submitting tissue for microscopic examination. On the proximal portion of the shaft of
the left tibia, there is a raised irregular bulge, consistent with a fracture noted on one
surface. Along the lengths of the forearm bones there is no obvious gross deformity.
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MICROSCOPIC DESCRIPTION
Slide Key:
A. Upper back contusions
B Lower back contusions
C. Frenulum
D. Left Forearm contusions
E. SA node, right ventricle
F. Trachea, right lung
G. Left lung

H. Liver, pancreas
I. Kidney, bladder, adrenal
J. Spleen, thymus, lymph nodes
K. Left of ventricle
L. Contusion inside left scalp
M. Vertebral body
N , 0 . Clavicle fx

P. Clavicle growth center
Q,K. Right ulna
S,T. Right radius
U,V. Left radius
VV,X,Y. Left tibia

Brl. Meninges frontal lobe
Br2. Left inf trontal red area

Br3. Hippocampus
Br4. Corpus callosum

Br5. Spinal cord
Br6. Cerebellum

SKIN, BACK: Sections of the upper back contusions disclose extravasation of red blood
cells between fat lobules in the deep subcutis. There is no associated inflammation. No
iron pigment is seen on H & E stained slides or with properly controlled iron stains.
The lower back contusions have larger areas of hemorrhage in the adipose tissue
and .in deep layers of connective tissue. The hemorrhage is without associated
inflammation. In some of the adipose tissue, there is some indication of fat cell
degeneration and foamy macrophage infiltration. A few cells containing iron pigment
are identified with special stains.
FRENULUM: Two small fragments of tissue are sectioned. Both have foci of intact
epithelium on the surface. The larger section also displays denudation of the
epithelium and a neutrophilic infiltrate into necrotic tissue. There appears to be some
mild chronic inflammation in the underlying dermis. There is no hemorrhage. A
properly controlled GMS stain reveals no yeast or fungal elements.
SKIN, FOREARM: The epidermis and dermis is intact. Immediately below the dermis
there is some residual hemorrhage and inflammatory cells. The infiltrate consists of
neutrophils and macrophages. Similar hemorrhage and inflammation is found in the
deep connective tissue strands. There are a few gold-tan refractile particles in the
dermis, consistent with iron pigment. Special stains for iron do not confirm this
finding.
SKIN, SCALP: There is no epidermis present. The main tissue fragments are composed
ed
of fat and connective tissue with some muscle. There is hemorrhage with intact red
blood cells in both sections. Inflammation is present but mild, consisting of
neutrophils. There is no discernible iron.
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HEART: Sections from the SA nodal region and the right ventricle have a few foci of
inflammation in the myocardium. There is some degeneratibn of myocytes with an
infiltrate of neutrophils and lymphocytes. An occasional foamy macrophage is also
noted. Sections from the left ventricle have a normal architecture with no
inflammatory cell infiltrate identified.
LUNGS: All sections have a fulminant infiltrate of neutrophils into alveoli. There are
also macrophages and sloughed pneumocytes in the alveoli. The mucosa of the airways
remains intact. The vasculature is unremarkable. A section of trachea is free of
inflammation.
LIVER and PANCREAS: There is a normal basic hepatic architecture. There appears to
be a slight increase in the number of white blood cells of the blood in the sinusoids. The
pancreas is unremarkable.
KIDNEY: The kidneys are unremarkable. There is no inflammation of the bladder.
ADRENALS: Normal architecture without depletion of cortical lipids.
RETICULOENDOTHELIAL SYSTEM: There is a depletion of lymphocytes in the
thymic cortex. Follicle formation is normal in the spleen and lymph nodes. There is
some central degeneration of the lymph node tissue.
GASTROINTESTINAL TRACT: Sections disclose various degrees of autolysis. Intact
areas of mucosa disclose normal maturation. There is focal chronic inflammation of
the lamina propria but this does not appear excessive. There are no significant
pathologic processes in the bowel walls.
BRAIN and SPINAL CORD: The meninges are not inflamed. In the depths of a sulcus,
some blood has leeched into the adjacent cortex. This does not appear to represent
injury and there is no tissue reaction to the site. There is no evidence of anoxic injury.
BONE, VERTEBRAL: Development and maturation of all three hematopoetic cell
lines are demonstrated in the section. There is no evidence of abnormal bone
development.
BONE, CLAVICLE: Adjacent to normal appearing
elements within the spaces, are the ghost outlines of
cellular elements. There is some fibrin in the marrow
tissue, there is differentiation into cartilaginous
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development. Neovascularization is also noted. There is no inflammatory component
to the injury noted. Hemorrhage is also absent.
At the growth center at the end of the clavicle, remote from the fracture, a normal
progression of bone development is seen. The chondrocytes are normally aligned and
of normal thickness, development of bone trabeculae is normally formed and marrow
elements are complete. There are no fractures of the trabeculae.
BONE, RIGHT RADIUS: There is focal thickening of the periosteum in the crosssections examined. The periosteum is normally a thin layer of spindle shaped cells at
the periphery of the bone. The periosteum normally abuts bone tissue with a transition
of small lacuna dipping into the underlying bone. These lacuna, or spaces, are filled
with fibro-connective tissue. The lacuna are separated by bony trabeculae, tortuous
arms that link the periosteum with the dense cortical bone near the center of the shaft.
In the sections examined, the subperiostal trabeculae are more elongate and less
tortuous. The periosteum dips deeper into the bone with dense fibro-connective tissue
between trabeculae. In the depths, the fibro-connective tissue is loose, the spaces
between trabeculae are widened, and large dilated vascular channels are prominent.
There are some trabeculae fused with the cortical bone. At approximately midway
between periosteum and compact bone, the trabeculae are no longer continuous. Large
spaces filled with similar dilated vascular channels in loose connective tissue fill the
gaps not crossed by bony trabeculae.
Focally, the layer of bony trabeculae are replaced completely by cells that are plumper
and more eosinophilic, with differentiation into cartilaginous elements, which is not
characteristic of normal bone development and signifies a response to injury.
BONE, RIGHT ULNA: There is some focal thickening of the periosteum but it is not as
dramatic as in sections from other bones described. The abnormal length of trabeculae
and a discontinuous pattern to the underlying cortical bone is again seen. Cartilaginous
islands of tissue are not present.
BONE, LEFT RADIUS: Cross sections disclose eccentricity in the thickness of the
periosteal layer. Focally the periosteum consists of a fairly thin layer of spindled cells
with eosinophilic cytoplasm and elongate nuclei. There is a progressive thickening of
the periosteum with enlargement of the cells and larger, more tortuous and
hyperchromatic nuclei, consistent with differentiation of the periosteum. Eccentrically
distributed elongation of the trabeculae are again noted as is differentiation of
cartilaginous elements.
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BONE, LEFT TIBIA: There is irregularity in the thickness of the subperiostial bone
development. Trabeculae lengths vary from short to elongate. Amid some of the
thickest trabeculae, a few islands of cartilage persist. In the depths of this same general
area, there is discontinuation of the cortical bone. From periosteum to marrow, large
lacunae are seen continuously without interruption by compact bone. There is a pocket
with dead necrotic bone trapped within. Medullary elements contain the complement
of hematopoetic elements.
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OFFICE OF THE MEDICAL EXAMINER

REPORT OF AUTOPSY
Toxicology Findings

48 N. Medical Drive
Salt Lake Citv, Utah

Caset

1960224 N^77/e: Loveless, Breanna

Date of Death:

Prosector:

Feb 22, 1996

Date/Time of Autopsy:

s

Blood Drug Saeen (ADX-Opiate, BE, Amphet) was NEGATIVE.
Blood Drug Screen (GC-ABN) was NEGATIVE.
Blood Drug Screen {GC-Volatiles} was NEGATIVE.

Drug Quantitation Results:
Cyanide: <0.5mg/l, Blood (Heart)

rp^u^

9M/0D

White/Female

Feb 22, 1996

Edward A. Leis, M.D., Assistant Medical Examiner

Drug Screen Results:

/V<^

A e:

08:30 hrs.

D. Kevin DeGraw, P.C. (6714)
1060 S. Main, Suite 101B
P.O. Box 910445
St. George, Utah 84791-0445
Telephone: (435) 688-9533
Facsimile: (435) 652-8475
Attorney for the Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATEC•FUTAH
RICKY LEE SANDERS, individually, and in
his capacity as the personal representative of
the estate of Breanna Marie Loveless,
Deceased,

AFFIDAVIT OF
MARTIN J. NYGAARD, M.D.

Plaintiff,
V.

THE DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES,
BOBBIE DAWN WIDDISON, and TRAVIS
WIDDISON,

Civil No. 980901895
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendants,

STATE OF UTAH
:ss
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

)

1.

I am a physician currently licensed to practice medicine in the State of Utah.

2.

I received my M.D. degree from the University of Utah in 1986.

3.

I did my residency training in Pediatrics at the University of North Carolina Medical
Center in Chapel Hill, North Carolina from July 1986 to July 1989.

4.

I am board certified by the American Board of Pediatrics and am a fellow of the American

Academy of Pediatrics.
5.

I have been a practicing pediatrician since August 1989.

6.

I was previously licensed to practice medicine in the State on New Mexico; however, my
New Mexico license is currently in inactive status.

7.

I am a certified Pediatric Advanced Life Support Instructor and have specialized training
in advanced Pediatric Life Support and in the detection and evaluation of child abuse.

8.

I was the chairman of the Child Advocacy CommitteefromAugust 1989 to March 1994
and am currently a consultant on the prevention and treatment of child abuse.

9.

I have reviewed the Report of Examination of Breanna Loveless attached as Exhibit 1 to
this document (referred to as the "Autopsy Report") and I have been provided with
information regarding Breanna's medical history. The opinions expressed herein are based
on my review of the Autopsy Report and the information I received about Breanna's
medical history. The documents and information I reviewed are of a type reasonably
relied by experts in the medical field.

10.

Based upon my review of the Autopsy Report, I agree with Dr. Leis' opinion that Breanna
died of pneumonia. My opinion is based on thefindingthat all section of the lungs had a
fulminant infiltrate of neutrophils into alveoli and that there were macrophages and
sloughed pneumocytes in the alveoli. It is my medical opinion that the stage of pneumonia
noted in the autopsy report, while not always fatal, was certainly sufficient to cause death
even in a child who had been otherwise perfectly healthy.

11.

I can state with medical certainty that the presence of neutrophils in the alveoli indicates
2

that Breanna probably had bacterial pneumonia rather than viral pneumonia.
12.

I can state with medical certainty that it can take as little as two days for pneumonia to
progressfromthe stage where symptoms of the disease are first detectable to the
potentially fatal stage of pneumonia revealed by Breanna's autopsy report.

13.

I can state with medical certainty that nine-month-old children who are otherwise perfectly
healthy get pheumonia.

14.

I can state with medical certainty that Breanna's pneumonia was not caused by the blunt
force and skeletal injuries noted in the Autopsy Report. Pneumonia is caused by a viral
and/or bacterial invasion of the lungs and is not caused by blunt force trauma to the body.

15.

Based upon my review of the autopsy report, I also agree with Dr. Lies' opinion that
Myocarditis, which is a viral and/or bacterial infection of the heart, may have been the sole
cause of Breanna's death; however, it is impossible to know whether the Myocarditis was
in fact the cause of death because of the advanced stage of pneumonia that was present.
Thefindingin the autopsy report that there was an infiltrate of neutrophils and
lymphocytes in the heart indicates that the Myocarditis was significant. It is my medical
opinion that even though the pneumonia was a more likely cause of Breanna's death given
the advanced stage of the pneumonia that was present, Myocarditis cannot be ruled out as
the primary cause of Breanna's death. It is also my medical opinion that Myocarditis
would have been the most likely cause of Breanna's death if the advanced stage of
pneumonia had not been present.

16.

It is my medical opinion that the stage of myocarditis revealed by Breanna's autopsy was
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sufficient to cause death even to a child who had otherwise been perfectly healthy.
17.

I can state with medical certainty that Breanna's Myocarditis was not caused by the blunt
force and skeletal injuries noted in the Autopsy Report. Myocarditis is caused by a viral
and/or bacterial infection of the heart and not by blunt force trauma to the body.

18.

I can state with medical certainty that nine-month-old children who are otherwise perfectly
healthy get myocarditis.

19.

I can state with medical certainty that Breanna did not die as the result of the blunt force
and skeletal injuries noted in the Autopsy Report. All blunt force and skeletal injuries
noted in the Autopsy Report were external injuries that were insufficient to cause
Breanna's death either individually or collectively. While blunt force or skeletal injuries
can result in death, such deaths occur as the result of internal injuries or complications
associated with the blunt force or skeletal injuries and not as the result of the type of
external injuries noted in the autopsy report. There were no such internal injuries or
complications noted in the Autopsy Report that would be sufficient to explain Breanna's
death. In particular, the autopsy found no evidence of gastrointestinal or intracranial
bleeding.

20.

The Autopsy Report indicated a depletion of lymphocytes in the thymus. Dr. Leis
indicated that healthy thymus for an infant her Breanna's age should weigh between 20 and
30 grams while Breanna's weighed just over 9 grams. However, Breanna was not a
healthy child. Breanna was not only suffering from two potentially life threatening
infectious diseases at the time of her death, but her medical records indicate that she had
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suffered chronic and persistent infectious illnesses in the months preceding her death.
These illnesses included numerous ear infections, a significant sinus infection and
bronchitis. Breanna also had a blood test taken on January 12, 1996 which indicated the
presence of an infectious disease. A follow-up blood test on February 11, 1996 indicated
that the infection was not only remained present but had increased in severity. Breanna
also had a fever on February 11, 1996 which also indicates that she was suffering from an
infectious disease. Breanna also suffered from chronic and persistent diarrhea and
experienced a weight unusual for a child her age in the months immediately preceding her
death. The weight loss might indicate that Breanna was receiving inadequate nutrition.
In addition, there is evidence that Breanna's caretaker often failed to seek timely medical
treatment for Breanna's infectious illnesses and failed to administer or evenfillprescribed
medications.
I can state with medical certainty that a depletion of lymphocytes in the thymus affects the
ability of the body tofightinfectious diseases.
Based on Breanna's medical history, it would not be unusual tofinda depletion of
lymphocytes in Breanna's thymus at the time of her death. This could be explained solely
from the fact that Breanna was suffering from pneumonia and myocarditis at the time of
her death since both of these diseases cause a depletion of lymphocytes in the thymus.
Even if the depletion of lymphocytes is not completely explained by Breanna's pneumonia
and myocarditis, the depletion of lymphocytes could also be explained solely by the
pneumonia and myocarditis combined with Breanna's medical history of chronic infectious
5

illness, failure on the part of Breanna's caretaker to seek timely medical treatment, and the
failure of Breanna's caretaker to administer prescribed medications.
23.

Based on all medical factors that were present at the time of Breanna's death, it is my
medical opinion that it is more likely than not that Breanna would have died of pneumonia
or myocarditis even if she did not have the blunt force trauma injuries that were described
in Breanna's autopsy report.
Dated thisj^day of December, 1999.

Si

Martin J. Ny$u#d, M.D.
Utah License #94-270722-1205
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORD this ^_ day of December, 1999

0, 7(.2
0 . KEVIN DEGRAW
Notary Public
Stale of Utah
2180 Windom Place, St. George, UT 84790
\
My Commission Expires OctT 21, 2002

Notary Public
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1060 S. Main, Suite 101B
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St. George, Utah 84791-0445
Telephone: (435) 688-9533
Facsimile: (435) 652-8475
Attorney for the Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE C•FUTAH
RICKY LEE SANDERS, individually, and in
his capacity as the personal representative of
the estate of Breanna Marie Loveless,
Deceased,

AFFIDAVIT OF
MERIDEAN SANDERS

Plaintiff,
V.

THE DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES,
BOBBIE DAWN WTDDISON, and TRAVIS
WIDDISON,

Civil No. 980901895
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendants,

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

)

:ss
1.

I am over 18 years of age and competent to testify concerning the things contained in this
affidavit based on my own personal knowledge.

2.

I am the paternal grandmother of Breanna Marie Loveless who was born on May 22,
1995.

3.

Beginning approximately 6 weeks after Breanna's birth, my son, who is Breanna's natural
father, and my son and I began having regular and extended visitations with Breanna.

4.

I soon began seeing signs neglect including medical neglect.

5.

Beginning as early as September 1, 1995, Breanna would be brought to us with serious
untreated illnesses. These illnesses included yeast infections, serious diaper rash, and ear
infections.

6.

On many occasions, the Breanna's mother had not take Breanna to the doctor even though
Breanna was in obvious need of medical attention. On those occasions, I or my son would
be required to take Breanna to the doctor's office for treatment.

7.

Breanna had continual ear infections from approximately September 1, 1995 to the time I
last saw her on February 11, 1996.

8.

Breanna also had chronic and persistent diarrhea and severe diaper rash from
approximately September, 1995 until the time I last saw her on February 11, 1996.

9.

I would often observe that the Breanna's mother failed to administer Breanna's prescribed
medications. On at least one occasion, the Breanna's mother brought me an unfilled
prescription that was at least a week old. On another occasion, Breanna was brought to
us with the seal still on a prescription bottle that my son had purchased at least a week
earlier.

10.

Based on my own personal knowledge, Breanna was continually ill with diarrhea, yeast
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infections, severe diaper rash, ear infections, sinus infections and/or bronchitis from
approximately August, 1995 until that date of her death.
Dated this 6> day of December, 1999.

/

Matadeen Sanders

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORD this £ h day of December, 1999.

" ^WV—yV ~ IT—A
- .
Notary Public
NOTARY PUBLIC"!

{
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ORIGINAL
BARBARA E. OCHOA - 4102
Assistant Attorneys General
JAN GRAHAM - 1231
Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendant
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140856
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856
Telephone: N(801) 366-0100
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RICKY LEE SANDERS,
individually, and in his
capacity as the personal
representative of the estate
of Breanna Marie Loveless,
Deceased,

:

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
:

THE DIVISION OF FAMILY
SERVICES, BOBBIE DAWN
:
WIDDISON, and TRAVIS WIDDISON,

Civil No. 980901895
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendants.

The Division of Family Services1 Motion for Summary Judgment
came before the Court for oral argument on December 20, 1999, the
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson presiding.

Plaintiff was present

and represented by counsel, D. Kevin DeGraw.

Defendant was

represented by Barbara E. Ochoa, Assistant Attorney General.

The Court, having heard the arguments of the parties and
having reviewed the pleadings on file herein, now rules as
follows:
Breanna Loveless died of pneumonia on February 22, 1996 at
the age of nine months.

Her mother, defendant Bobbie Dawn

Widdison, was subsequently convicted of first degree murder,
three counts of felony child abuse and three counts of
misdemeanor child abuse.

Her boyfriend, defendant Travis

Widdison, was also convicted of felony child abuse and two counts
of misdemeanor child abuse.
Plaintiff's cause of action against the Division alleged
that defendant was negligent in failing to protect Breanna from
both the medical neglect and physical harm inflicted by Bobbie
Dawn Widdison and Travis Widdison.

Defendant's Motion for

Summary Judgment claimed it was immune from suit under the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act because Breanna's death arose out of an
assault and battery.
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted a three-step approach to
determine whether a governmental entity is immune from suit under
the Governmental Immunity Act.

Ledfors v. Emery County School

Dist., 849 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Utah 1993).
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The parties agreed that

the first two steps in the analysis were satisfied.

The third

prong of the test asks whether there is an exception to the
general waiver of immunity which acts to preserve immunity.

The

parties agreed that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act preserves
immunity "if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or
results from: . . .
63-30-10(2).

(2) assault [or] battery."

Utah Code Ann. §

The issue for the Court is whether Breanna's death

arose out of, in connection with, or resulted from a battery.
The testimony of Robert H. Kirschner, M.D. was accepted into
the record.

Dr. Kirschner!s testimony established that Breanna

Loveless was a physically abused child, that the abuse caused her
immune system to be depressed, and that she developed pneumonia
as a direct result of being an abused child.

Dr. Leis, the

State's Chief Deputy Medical Examiner, testified that he didn't
believe Breanna would have died of pneumonia in the absence of
the effect of the physical trauma she also suffered.
In Taylor v. Qgden School Dist., 927 P.2d 159 (Utah 1996),
the Utah Supreme Court determined that the phrase "arises out of"
within the assault exception to the waiver of governmental
immunity is a phrase of much broader significance than "caused
by."

The Court concluded that there need be only some causal
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relationship between the injury and the assault.

Plaintiff's

expert, Martin J. Nygaard, M.D., does not go far enough to refute
the existence of a causal connection between the pneumonia which
caused Breanna!s death and the physical abuse she suffered.
Defendant has established a causal connection between
Breannafs pneumonia and the physical abuse she suffered.
Plaintiff's expert did not refute that causal connection.
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is therefore well taken.
Being now fully advised in the premises, and for good cause
shown, IT IS ORDERED:
1.

Defendant Division of Family Services' Motion for

Summary Judgment is granted and plaintiff's complaint against the
Division is hereby dismissed with prejudice;
2.

Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint

Against Defendant The Division of Family Services is denied as
being moot;
3.

The Court entered the defaults of Bobbie Dawn Widdison

and Travis Widdison on December 20, 1999.

There is no just

reason to delay entry of judgment in this case and the Court
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certifies this as a final order under Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
DATED this

J^\

day of

7 > ^ ^

/ 2 000.

T$£sTBE; COURT:

V'/fiomer F. Wilkinson
'Third D i s t r i c t Court Judge
Approved as to form:

D. Kevin DeGraw
Attorney for Plaintiff
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